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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies migration, entrepreneurship, and parental investment. Migration for 
economic opportunity may both benefit and burden left-behind family members. Chapter 1 
examines how migration affects the mother-child and brother-sister distributions of time in 
market work, agricultural work, home production, caregiving, and leisure, as well as the boy-girl 
allocation of formal education time. Controlling for family heterogeneity in the level as well as 
allocation of time use, this chapter finds robust evidence of strong shifts in the allocations of 
time spent in formal education across similarly aged boy-girl pairs and in housework between 
mothers and daughters in association with migration. The findings may help policymarkers to 
evaluate the benefit and burden of international migration along the time use dimension that has 
been relatively understudied. 
There has been evidence on the entrepreneurial behavior of migrants in receiving countries or 
after they return to home countries, but little research on the entrepreneurship of left-behind 
persons when migrants are still abroad. Using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey, 
Chapter 2 examines the effects of ongoing migration on the entrepreneurship of left-behind 
family members. Striking evidence shows that migration stimulates the entrepreneurship of left-
behind members through improved financial status. The preferred estimates indicate that having 
migrant family members increases an individual’s rate of participation in entrepreneurship by at 
least 50 percent relative to the mean. The analysis also demonstrates the differential migration 
effects and differential motives pertinent to becoming new entrepreneurs by gender. These 
findings have profound implications for the empowerment of women and how public policies 
such as microcredit may promote entrepreneurship through the relaxation of financial constraints. 
Chapter 3 provides new evidence of the effects of child gender on parental investments to 
children and labor market outcomes in two-parent families with one child. Using data from the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey, I document a son premium on the intensive margin of both 
paternal and maternal labor supply that is conditional on the child’s age. Parents with a newborn 
to six-year-old son have a higher labor supply than parents with a daughter of the same age 
group. A further examination indicates that the co-residence with grandparents induces the son 
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premium. Grandparents are more likely to live in the same household as a grandson than of a 
granddaughter, which allows parents with a preschool age son to work more. The intensification 
of market work associated with having a son leads to differential developmental investments to 
boys and girls, which may cause differences in cognitive ability, education, and other measures 
of a child’s well-being. It may also influence the economic consequences over the lifecycle of 
parents through labor market attachment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation studies migration, entrepreneurship, and parental investments in countries from 
Latin America and Asia and aims to understand the micro-mechanisms through which public 
policy can best serve to reduce poverty and promote development. 
The first two chapters examine the implications of migration for left-behind family members on 
household finance, labor market and education outcomes, and intrahousehold interactions. 
International migration for economic opportunity is an important and much-studied phenomenon. 
A relatively new research topic in this field focuses on transnational households (i.e. a family 
member working in a foreign country while the other family members residing in the home 
country, Cortes [forthcoming]) and studies migration’s impact on the well-being of left-behind 
family members (in particular, women, children, and elderly people). Interest has motivated 
detailed studies of migration’s impact on women’s labor force participation, child labor and 
educational attainment, elderly health and labor, intra-family bargaining power and 
intergenerational transfers. These questions are of interest to researchers and policymakers 
because they relate to inequality and economic development in home countries. 
The first chapter analyzes how migration of a family member affects everyday household 
routines and responsibilities. Little research has comprehensively studied time allocation on 
market work, home production, agricultural work, learning, and leisure. This chapter is 
motivated by two important reasons. First, the implication of migration on time use pattern is 
extremely important since the allocation of time use may be as consequential to individual well-
being as the allocation of goods. Second, since the substitutability of a left-behind family 
member for the migrant depends on individual characteristics, the impact of migration on time 
use may differ considerably according to sex. These differences in migration’s impact may 
increase sex-based inequality, mitigating policy efforts to promote equality.  
This chapter finds evidence that time allocations along with migration are sex-biased and depend 
on the substitutability of family members for the migrant. Findings indicate that boys and girls 
leave school to take over the household responsibility left by their departing older brother or 
sister, respectively. This leads to strong migration effects on their education. 
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The second chapter examines the impact of reduced financial constraints through migration on 
rates of entrepreneurship. This chapter is motivated by the fact that entrepreneurship and 
innovations are fundamental aspects of economic development, in particular in the process of 
creative destruction but often hindered by financial constraints and the underdevelopment of 
financial sectors (Bianchi and Bobba, 2013). Current and potential entrepreneurs face challenges 
to obtain adequate access to capital to finance their business ideas and enlarge the firm size. 
Remittances by international migrants to their home countries constitute the largest source of 
external finance in developing countries along with FDI. Migration is an important strategy that 
an individual or a family uses to reduce financial constraints and implies an opportunity to 
promote the availability of risk capital for potential entrepreneurs. 
Using household level data from the Mexican Family Life Survey, I find evidence that migration 
increases the rates of entrepreneurs among non-migrants, especially women, from sending 
families. The underlying mechanism is likely the improvement of financial status of the whole 
family associated with migration. These results have profound macro and policy implications. 
They indicate that migration may not necessarily undermine the economy of the sending 
communities, because resources can be sent back and used productively. In this sense, migration 
and remittances may have important impact on reducing poverty in the long run. Moreover, 
public policies that increase access to capital may effectively increase local rates of 
entrepreneurs and innovations.  
The third chapter extends the understanding of family behaviors by studying child gender, 
parental investments to children and labor market outcomes in transitional societies. This 
research is motivated by two reasons.  
First, the labor force participation and the labor supply of women with preschool-aged children 
strongly correlate with the availability of childcare. In many countries, the government provides 
subsidies to parents in order to facilitate the household’s access to childcare and early childhood 
education (Baker et al, 2008). Despite of the work discussing formal childcare (childcare centers), 
maternal employment, and child’s development, informal care settings (daycare home and 
relative care) have received much less attention. Second, the supply of childcare and childhood 
3 
 
education in China is very limited compared with both international standards and domestic 
demand. The inequality with regard to access to informal childcare is very likely to transform 
into gaps in the labor market outcomes of parents and parental investments given the situation of 
childcare in China. 
Informal childcare is heterogeneous and determined by many factors. Chapter 3 investigates one 
factor – child gender. Using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, this chapter finds 
that child gender influences the access to grandparent childcare due to the grandson preference. 
Grandparents live closer to a grandson than a granddaughter. This living proximity allows 
parents with a preschool-aged son to work more and spend less time care for a child. The 
intensification of market work at the expense of high quality parenting time associated with 
having a son may lead to asymmetry between the developmental investment to boys and girls, 
and differences in cognitive ability, education, and other measures of a child's well-being. It may 
also influence the economic consequences over the lifecycle of parents through labor market 
attachment. This study sheds light on the importance of increasing the establishments of 
childcare facilities and providing high quality childhood education in China. 
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CHAPTER 1. MEXICO-TO-U.S. MIGRATION AND THE TIME USE OF LEFT-
BEHIND FAMILY MEMBERS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Recurrent migration of Mexican workers to the U.S. for economic opportunity is an important 
and much-studied phenomenon. Hanson (2006) reviews the large literature on the motives and 
attributes of migrants and the recent U.S-Mexico migration record. Migration’s impact on the 
welfare of Mexican communities and left-behind families has received attention (e.g., see 
Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Garip, forthcoming; Acosta, 2011; Taylor, 1987; and Antman, in 
press), but little research has comprehensively studied how the migration of a family member 
affects everyday household routines and responsibilities. This aspect of migration is extremely 
important. At the most general level, the allocation of time use may be no less consequential to 
individual development and happiness than the allocation of goods. This paper is also motivated 
by another important reason: Since the perceived substitutability of a left-behind family member 
for the migrant depends upon the characteristics of both the migrant and the family member, 
migration’s impacts on time use may differ considerably according to sex. These differences in 
impact may increase sex-based inequality, mitigating policy efforts to promote equality (Pitt and 
Rosenzweig, 1990). 
Migration is predicted to affect time use through several channels. In the near term, migration is 
a major expense that may necessitate increased paid work by left-behind household members. 
Ultimately, remittances from a successful migrant expand opportunities for human capital 
investment and leisure, reducing maternal and child paid labor and increasing children’s 
educational attainment. Time-use preferences of the mother may also dominate when the father 
is absent due to noncooperative behavior. Mothers are often posited to value education more than 
fathers, for example. Finally, because the migrant is both a demander and supplier of activities in 
the household, re-optimization inevitably leads to adjustments by the left-behind in the migrant’s 
absence.  
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We estimate the re-allocation of activities between household members in the wake of the U.S. 
migration of a household member using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
We emphasize the role of sex-based inequities in adjustment patterns. Following Rosenzweig 
and Pitt (1990), we estimate the shift in activities between left-behind mothers and boys, mothers 
and girls, and opposite-sex siblings of similar age.  
This work makes several new contributions to the literature. This is the first work of which we 
are aware to examine the allocation of time use across household members in a comprehensive 
fashion, encompassing hours of time in market work, home production, agricultural work, 
learning, and leisure for the same households. This work is also unique in the migration literature 
in focusing on migration’s effect on the distribution of time use among family members, rather 
than estimating each family member’s experience in isolation. While Chen (2013) also examines 
intra-household shifts in responsibilities, her time use data have important limitations, and the 
activities of each household member are estimated without reference to other members’ time use. 
Along with Acosta (2011), this paper forms a nascent body of evidence on sex-biased migration 
effects. Finally, this work makes a broad contribution to the migration literature by 
demonstrating that the effects of migration often depend importantly on the migrant’s former 
household role.  
There are multiple challenges to estimating the impact of migration on time use. The chief issues 
are the simultaneity of time use across all activities and household members, the endogeneity of 
the migration choice with the time use of all members across all activities, and unobserved 
community, family, and individual-level heterogeneity. Migration and household time 
allocations are endogenous because families that would be more inconvenienced by migration 
are less inclined to send a migrant.1 In a reduced-form approach, it is desirable to include a host 
of explanators that help control such factors (e.g., a detailed household roster). However, if 
migrant-sending households have systematically less need to make major adjustments in time use 
in response to migration due to unobserved factors, the naïve estimate understates the causal 
effect of migration on time allocations. It may also be the case that family tastes for certain 
                                                          
1 This is consistent with large households being more likely to send migrants; they have ample workers on 
hand to cover the absent member’s responsibilities.  
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activities are correlated with migration. Correlated unobserved family preferences for both time-
use allocations and migration could also contribute to estimation bias (e.g., households in 
communities where child labor is less stigmatized may also view adult migration as a less 
attractive option). The directions of such ‘taste’ biases are unpredictable in general. 
Our approach, in light of these problems and with the data limitations we face, is as follows. First, 
we follow the existing literature in employing migration to explain the dependent variable of 
interest. In the specific instance of time use, the lack of person-specific prices in actual 
household data is a serious obstacle to implementing a more structural approach, as Pitt and 
colleagues discuss at length (Pitt, 1997; Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1990; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
and Pitt et al., 2003). We follow the approach of Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) in chiefly 
examining time-use differences across family member pairs. Under specific assumptions, this 
aids identification of the relevant effects, and controls for community and family-level 
heterogeneity in activity levels that could bias the migration coefficient. Although our data do 
not permit implementation of a true fixed-effects approach, we control for potential biases due to 
heterogeneity in families’ taste for pairwise allocations (which is problematic when the 
heterogeneity is correlated with migration and other variables) by including the relevant lagged 
time allocation from the pre-migration period. Finally, the prior literature proposes several 
instrumental variables strategies to address endogenous migration. However, in our data, all of 
these approaches produced estimates of which we were deeply skeptical. These attempts are also 
described below.2 
To preview the findings, we find robust evidence of strong shifts in the allocations of time spent 
in formal education across similarly aged boy-girl sibling pairs and in housework between 
mothers and daughters in association with migration. The education findings indicate large shifts 
favoring girls when an adult son migrates, and large shifts favoring boys when an adult daughter 
migrates. Supplementary analyses suggest that these shifts are driven by the girl or boy taking on 
                                                          
2 Arguably the more similar the individuals being compared, the less likely the estimates are to suffer 
from endogeneity bias, because the implicit adjustment costs of reallocating time use are low. That is, 
‘costless’ adjustments should not inhibit migration. Specifically for our context, families may perceive 
time readjustments across children and adults as more costly than readjustments between similarly-aged 
children.  
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the former responsibilities of their departing elder sister or brother, respectively, crowding out 
education time. In the case of housework, there is a relative shift of time onto girls, but not boys, 
that is associated with migration. Findings for other categories (agricultural work, market work, 
and caregiving) are less significant or less robust, but with some evidence that boys are relatively 
more affected. There is virtually no evidence of migration effects on the allocation of leisure 
time.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 briefly overviews the relevant literature. Section 1.3 
discusses the predictions of a standard economic model of household allocation in light of 
migration choice and discusses how sex biases in reallocations may originate. Section 1.4 details 
our estimation strategy. Section 1.5 describes the construction of the samples and variables. 
Findings are presented in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes with a discussion of the findings and 
directions for future research.    
1.2 Prior Literature 
Interest in the well-being of left-behind family members has motivated detailed studies of 
migration’s impact on women’s labor force participation, child labor, health, formal educational 
attainment, entrepreneurship, and intra-family bargaining power. This discussion focuses on 
prior studies that examine the effects of migration on the market work, domestic work, and 
education of left-behind family members.3  
Chang, et al. (2011) use the China Health and Nutrition Survey to examine the impacts of 
domestic, rural-to-urban migration on left-behind elders’ and children’s time in market work, 
agricultural work, and housework. Internal migration increases agricultural work and housework 
for all left-behind members, with the largest effects on females. Migration status is indicated by 
the number of household members who are away from home looking for a job, while the 
prevalence of migrants in the origin community serves as an instrument for migration. Chen 
(2013) uses the same data to study paternal migration’s impact on maternal and child time 
allocations. Fixed-effect estimates indicate decreased maternal time in both housework and 
income-generating work, with the housework burden shifted onto children. Acosta (2011) 
                                                          
3 For a broad overview of migrations’ impacts on the left-behind, see Antman (in press).  
8 
 
examines households in El Salvador using an IV strategy based on migration networks and local 
return migration rates. He finds that children in remittance-receiving households spend more 
time in “unpaid work” at home (unfortunately, Acosta does not provide a definition of unpaid 
work at home; some authors use unpaid work to refer to production of items for sale outside the 
household, while others also incorporate housework in this term).  
Research findings for Pakistan, El Salvador, and some Latin American countries provide 
evidence of reduced child labor and increased school retention in the wake of migration (Alcaraz, 
et al., 2012). Acosta (2011) finds El Salvadoran girls in remittance-receiving families have better 
school attendance, although middle-school attendance may be reduced. Overall, Acosta’s (2011) 
evidence suggests that girls reduce paid work and shift into schooling, while boys also reduce 
paid work but shift into unpaid work at home. Deb and Seck (2009) study the effects of within-
Mexico migration on children using the MxFLS, applying distance and rainfall measures as 
migration instruments. 4  Internal migration increases the probability of a child being in the 
expected grade-for-age, adversely affects health, and increases housework time. Antman (2011a), 
using the Mexican National Urban Labor Force Survey finds that left-behind children, especially 
boys, study less and work for pay more when a father migrates to the U.S. Antman’s (2011a) 
estimation incorporates individual fixed effects and an instrumental variable based on U.S. 
unemployment rates in immigrant-hiring industries at U.S. destinations.   
Taken as a whole, the findings from the literature on the effects of migration on left-behind 
Mexican children’s educational attainment are inconclusive and often differ by the sex of the 
child affected (Alcaraz et al, 2012). Hanson and Woodruff (2003), instrumenting migration with 
the interaction between historical state migration patterns and household characteristics, find that 
10-15-year old children, particularly daughters of less-educated parents, complete significantly 
more years of schooling when a household member is in the U.S. Antman (2011b) uses the 
Mexican Migration Project to estimate a family-fixed-effect model relating sibling differences in 
years of schooling to children’s differential experience of parental U.S. migration prior to age 20. 
She finds that migration has a positive effect on girls’ educational attainment. McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2011) use the 1997 National Survey of Demographic Dynamics and historical 
                                                          
4 Rainfall instruments are arguably invalid in this context.  
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migration rate instruments to estimate migration’s impact on educational attainment in rural 
Mexico. Parental migration reduces the chance that boys and girls complete high school and that 
boys complete middle school.5  
Several papers have studied left-behind women’s paid work. Hanson (2007) finds lower 
women’s labor force participation rates in higher-migration areas of Mexico. Recent studies for 
other countries generally concur that left-behind women reduce their time in paid labor in 
association with migration (see Binzel and Assaad, [2011] for Egypt, and Chang et al., [2011] 
and Mu and Walle [2011] for China). These studies also tend to find increased women’s time in 
unpaid household and agricultural work.  
1.3 Predicted Effects of Migration 
A standard model of household production, child investment, and labor market choice generates 
predictions about how activities are allocated among a household’s adults and children. Consider 
a family consisting of two parents and their children of various sexes and ages. Typical 
assumptions are that the father has a comparative advantage in market work, that families desire 
both purchased and home-produced goods, and that parents value child quality, which can be 
raised through education investment. Educational investment requires the child’s time (while 
financial resources may also be required, this is ignored here to simplify the discussion, and 
because the opportunity cost of time is usually the primary costly input when schools are 
publicly subsidized).  
Such models generate a hierarchy of assignment to market work within the family. The first 
member assigned to market work is the father, with perhaps all of his non-leisure time devoted to 
the market. If the marginal value of additional purchased goods is sufficiently great once his time 
is exhausted, the mother will devote time to work. The downside of devoting maternal time to 
market work is that children may need to make up some of the home production that the mother 
is no longer able to provide, which reduces their learning time. In the worst-case scenario, family 
financial resources may still be so low that a child has to work in the market. In general, the first 
                                                          
5 Nobles (2011) presents OLS estimates from the MxFLS of a positive association between the absent 
father’s financial contribution (reported ordinally) and educational attainment and college aspirations.  
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child into the market will be the one with the strongest comparative advantage in market work, 
or alternatively, the weakest comparative advantage in learning (and/or housework).  
Family-member migration affects resources available to the left-behind, changes the household 
roster, alters the net demand for various activities and purchased consumption goods, and 
changes the degree of control of the left-behind parent. Each of these channels induces 
alterations in the optimal allocation of activities across family members. Due to varying 
perceived and actual relative productivities of boys and girls in various activities, biases about 
the ‘suitability’ of boys and girls for various activities, and biases in parental preferences, the 
migration effects may have uneven impacts on boys and girls in the same family.  
The left-behind family may experience a net increase in financial resources due to remittances. 
In this case, mothers are predicted to shift away from market work into housework, which allows 
children to shift out of market work or housework and into learning. If there is a bias for girls to 
substitute for mothers in housework, then girls may disproportionately benefit from remittances. 
However, if the family was so formerly so poor that it had a child worker, this worker was more 
likely a boy. Therefore, sex-biased effects of remittances on some activities, such as learning, are 
ambiguous.  
It has been asserted that migration is often associated with near-term financial hardship 
(McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011; Antman, 2011a) because the journey and establishment in the 
destination labor market may be costly. As a result, shorter- and longer-term impacts of 
migration may differ. Mothers may face pressure to earn more in the near term, with consequent 
increases in children’s housework time. In this ‘short-term scarcity’ scenario, housework time 
increases at the expense of learning to a greater degree for children who are at a comparative 
disadvantage in formal education compared with their siblings, as girls may be perceived to be. 
Older children, especially boys, could also be pushed into the labor market in the short run.6 In 
this case, the effect on the relative time spent in learning of boys and girls is ambiguous. 
                                                          
6 Empirical evidence on dynamics is lacking. The wave 2 U.S. migrant group in the MxFLS is a mix of 
the newly migrated and cyclical/return migrants. Restricting attention to prime-age adults with children at 
home likely increases the share of newly migrated in our samples; not only are parents of children 
younger than the adult population, but adult children may be better migration candidates than parents 
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Absence of the migrant household member also affects the time use and purchased goods 
demands of the household. If the migrant is a net ‘taker’ of household production, his absence 
creates a housework windfall. The mother could use this time-resource gain to increase work for 
pay (if the marginal utility of wealth remains high despite migration) or take more leisure, and 
children could spend more time in learning. If boys and girls do not share this gain equally, 
presumably it is because of differences in the comparative advantage in learning versus 
housework by sex, or because of biases in parental preferences that favor one sex.  
In contrast, the migrant may be a net ‘giver’ of household production. For example, a father or 
adult son in a rural community may do important agricultural work or chores (carrying water, 
chopping wood) for the family, or an adult daughter may be a net provider of housekeeping to 
the family. In these cases, the absence opens up a net gap in some aspect of household 
production that must be filled by others. If boys and girls are viewed as more substitutable for 
some activities than others, then the differential impact of migration on left-behind children 
according to their sex may depend importantly on the sex of the migrant, with boys being 
relatively disadvantaged in learning when a father or brother migrates, and girls being relatively 
disadvantaged when an older sister migrates.  
If the absence of the household member induces a decline in the overall demand for purchased 
goods, then this is very similar to the case of increased remittances. Mothers shift away from 
market work, allowing children to shift out of housework and into learning. If there is a bias for 
girls to substitute for mothers in housework, then girls disproportionately benefit from the 
reduced demand for purchased goods. However, if the family was so formerly so poor that it had 
a child worker, it is likely that this worker was a boy. Again, sex-bias effects on some activities, 
such as learning, may be ambiguous. 
Finally, Chen (2013) extrapolates this model to one in which parents bargain over the allocation 
of resources under imperfect monitoring by the migrant. When the father migrates, the mother 
may exploit this situation to assert her preferences over the left-behind household. Typically, it is 
assumed that mothers value child investment, especially in education, more than fathers (e.g., see 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when there are still young children in the household. Further, families may expect lower, or even no, 
remittances from sibling migrants compared with a paternal migrant.  
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Akresh, deWalque and Kazianga, 2012). Therefore, it may be that the mother alters the 
distribution of time and material resources to promote learning by her children. In this case, 
whether boys and girls benefit differentially will depend on maternal preferences.  
However, an important strand of the household bargaining literature suggests that a mother might 
use her new position to establish a measure of economic autonomy by working for pay (e.g., 
Antman, 2013, which also uses the MxFLS, finds working mothers are more involved in 
household decision-making). In this case, children’s learning time could be reduced as a 
consequence of greater maternal power following migration. If girls are more likely to substitute 
for maternal work at home, girls may lose learning time relative to boys in this scenario.  
1.4 Estimation Strategy 
We analyze the allocation of time in major activities among left-behind mothers and minor 
children. Very young children and left-behind adult sons and daughters are not analyzed because, 
respectively, children under age 6 rarely attend school or participate in home production, the 
dominant activity of adult males remaining in Mexico is work outside the home, and the sample 
of older left-behind adult daughters is quite small.  
We estimate the difference in hours spent in a given activity between two household members, 
denoted i and j. The difference in their time in hours per week spent on activity y is specified 
(1.1) 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1�𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑗� + 𝛼2�ℎ𝑖 − ℎ𝑗� + 𝛾3𝑀 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀. 
The pairwise time difference is measured subsequent to the opportunity for out-migration to 
occur (i.e., at wave 2). The second and third terms are person i’s comparative advantage in 
learning and housework activities, respectively, M indicates that a former household member has 
migrated, and X is a vector of individual, household, and community characteristics.  
We use Raven’s test scores as ability indicators, a (Raven et al, 1998).7 If parents perceive that 
the productivity of additional schooling is increasing (decreasing) in attainment, children with 
higher attainment will attract more (respectively, less) schooling investment. We employ detailed 
                                                          
7 While age-for-grade might also be usefully included, missing values overly constrained the samples. 
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age-sex categorical variables as proxies for perceived relative housework productivity. We do 
not have hypothetical market wages for children, so these variables also help to capture their 
potential value in the market.  
‘M’ indicates whether a father, adult son, or adult daughter residing in the household in wave 1 
has moved to the U.S. from Mexico between the survey waves. ‘X’ contains additional controls, 
including household wealth, family composition (indicators of the presence and numbers of 
family members of various sexes and ages), and rural location, which may indicate both a taste 
for and differential cost of home-produced goods. Maternal education controls for maternal labor 
market opportunities, her preferences for educational investment in children, and her taste for 
purchased versus home-produced goods. Since the key role of maternal preferences justifies the 
inclusion of maternal education in the child-to-child specifications also, we estimate the same 
specification for boy-girl and mother-child pairings. The specification always include a full set of 
interview-month dummies to control for seasonality in activities.  
While differencing activity levels between family members controls for family-member-
invariant tastes in time use (e.g., a fastidious household demands more housework from all 
members), families may also have time-invariant, heterogeneous tastes over time allocations as 
(e.g., a family systematically allocates more housework to female children than the mother). This 
is problematic for our estimates if these tastes are correlated with the migration choice. To 
address this, we use the pre-migration wave of the MxFLS to construct an alternative dependent 
variable that incorporates the intra-family time allocation observed prior to the migration 
occurrence, or �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗� − (𝑦𝑖′ − 𝑦𝑗′), where a prime denotes the initial period. A complication is 
that the initial migration status of the household is not known. That is, the wave 1 household 
could already be ‘treated’ by U.S. migration, unbeknownst to the researcher. In that case, the 
inclusion of the lagged time use difference already incorporates adjustments in response to 
migration, leading to an understated estimate of the migration effect. Therefore, the estimates 
from this specification are likely conservative ones.  
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1.5 Sample and Variable Construction 
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is a nationally representative, two-wave, longitudinal 
study of the Mexican population. The base-line survey, conducted during 2002, consisted of over 
35,000 individuals originating from 8,440 households in 150 communities (Rubalcava and 
Teruel, 2006). The second wave, conducted during 2005 and 2006, achieved a 90 percent 
household re-contact rate (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2008).  
1.5.1 Derivation of the Estimation Subsamples 
We began with MxFLS households residing in Mexico during both interview rounds. To restrict 
attention to families with similar migration choice sets, pairs were drawn from two-parent 
families in which there was at least one minor child as well as a child who was potentially 
eligible to migrate to the U.S. as an ‘adult.’ Children were defined as persons in the household 
who were not yet 18 years old in wave 2. Our initial assumption was that persons reaching age 
13 by wave 2 could migrate to the U.S. in an adult role (i.e., with the aim of paid work). 
Therefore, households lacking a member of the 6-17-year age group in wave 2 and households 
lacking a child aged at least 13 in wave 2 were deleted from the sample. A handful of households 
where a mother was the U.S. migrant were dropped.  
The resultant sample of nearly 2,500 mothers and 5,400 children was rearranged into three 
estimation subsamples. The mother-boy and mother-girl subsamples consisted of 2,657 and 
2,725 pairs, respectively. For the boy-girl subsample, we controlled strong age trends in 
children’s time use by restricting attention to opposite-sex siblings sharing the age categories 6-
9, 10-12, and 13-17. There were 813 suitable boy-girl pairs.  
1.5.2 Time Use Variables 
The Appendix A summarizes time use information in the MxFLS. This information was recoded 
into the six primary dependent variables investigated—market work, agricultural work, 
housework, caregiving, formal education, and leisure.  
Individuals older than 14 reported the number of hours worked on their primary and secondary 
jobs in the week preceding the interview. Average weekly employment hours in the past year 
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were reported for 3-14-year-olds. Employment was not analyzed for persons younger than 13, 
since just 2 percent of this group were employed. The sample was restricted to rural households 
in this case of agricultural activities, since these activities were unlikely to occur elsewhere.  
Total hours spent in housework in the past week was constructed from responses about time 
spent cooking and preparing food, washing clothes and cleaning house, carrying firewood, and 
carrying water. Caregiving time combined hours reported taking care of children, elders, or the 
sick with hours helping another household member study.  
Respondents aged 15 and older were asked to report a specific number of hours in school during 
the last week. Respondents for younger children were asked about the average hours per day and 
average days per week the child spent at school during the academic year 2004-2005.8 Time in 
formal education was constructed as the product of average hours at school per day times 
average days at school per week plus hours of out-of-school study for those under 15. Those over 
14 simply reported hours spent in school and studying out of school in the past week. Leisure 
activities included entertainment outside the home, playing, watching TV, using the Internet, and 
reading. Sleep time was excluded from leisure in order to better identify discretionary activities.  
1.5.3 Construction of Explanatory Variables  
The wave 2 survey module “Migrants U.S.” contained information on wave 1 sample members 
living in the U.S. at the wave 2 interview date. Wave 1 relationship status determined the 
migrant’s family role. Migration dummies were constructed as any (adult) migrant, father 
migrant, adult son migrant, adult daughter migrant and male migrant (father or son).  
The ability to perform various activities differs by age. Following Kimmel and Connelly (2006), 
we grouped children into five age cohorts, 0-2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-12 and 13-17. This categorization fit 
the Mexican children’s time-use data well. Children did not enroll in school in meaningful 
numbers until age 6; thereafter, they typically spent much of the day in school. The presence of 
0-2 and 3-5-year olds was predicted to greatly increase a household’s net demand for home 
                                                          
8 In the wave 1 survey, average hours were asked for the academic year 2001-2002. 
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production. Age and sex indicated how close a substitute a child was for other family members. 
We employed a full set of sex-and-age-category dummy variables in all analyses.  
Cognitive ability was measured with Raven’s progressive matrices instrument. The share of 
correct answers was transformed into a z-score by age and wave. There were a large number of 
missing wave 2 Raven’s test scores, especially for mothers. To conserve observations, we 
replaced mothers’ missing values with wave 1 scores as available. 9  Since the identical test 
instrument was implemented in both waves, the imputation was likely quite accurate for adults. 
To preserve sample size, we imputed a z-score of 1 to mothers without reported scores.  
Other explanators appeared in all specifications. Household assets are likely correlated with both 
migration and activities. We followed Kaestner and Malamud (2013) in defining household 
assets as the total peso value of housing and land, bicycles and motor vehicles, electronic and 
kitchen appliances, savings and financial assets, farming equipment, and livestock. Dummy 
variables indicated the sample quintile membership of each household in the asset distribution of 
sample households. Following Rubalcava and Teruel (2006), we classified communities as rural 
(less than 2,500 persons), small urban (2,500-100,000), or large urban (100,000). A dummy 
variable for the presence of extended family was included in all regressions. Finally, maternal 
education was characterized as ever attending elementary, secondary, high school, or college.   
1.5.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1.1 provides an overview of household members’ activities prior to possible family-
member migration to the U.S. There are strong patterns of activity specialization by age and sex. 
Mothers and adult daughters dominate homemaking activities (housework and caregiving), with 
substantial support from older daughters. While mothers average 29.4 hours per week of 
housework, fathers average just 3.4 hours. More than 90 percent of mothers engage in 
housework, while participation of other females strongly increases with age. Girls’ housework 
starts at low levels, reaches 9.7 hours per week at ages 13-17, and climbs further if they remain 
                                                          
9 Nearly one-half of mother’s sample observations were affected. In 15 percent of missing cases, both the 
mother and child’s score was missing. In another 15 percent, only the child’s score was missing. In the 
remaining 70 percent of cases, the mother’s score alone was missing. 
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in the household as an adult. In contrast, males do little housework at any age. Boys’ housework 
peaks at just 4.1 hours per week at ages 13-17 and declines to 3 hours for males remaining in the 
household after age 17.  
Caregiving is also a largely female responsibility. Weekly hours average 21.5 for mothers and 
5.3 for both adult daughters and 13-17-year old girls. Corresponding figures for males are just 
3.9 hours (fathers), 1.2 hours (adult sons), and 2.4 hours (13-17-year-old boys). Disaggregated 
information (not reported in the table) indicates that much of the housework and caregiving time 
of mothers and adult daughters is spent cleaning, washing clothes, preparing food, cooking, 
caring for other family members, and helping other household members to study. In contrast, 
fathers’ and adult sons’ housework mostly consists of carrying water and firewood. These 
extreme patterns in household production by age and sex supported our decision not to analyze 
the time use of left-behind fathers and adult sons.  
Adult males dominate paid work. 95 percent of fathers and 75 percent of adult sons report 
employment, with weekly hours averaging 45.4 and 31.8, respectively. About 33 percent of 
mothers and 46 percent of adult daughters are employed, with average work hours of 11.1 and 
18.3, respectively. Sex differences in labor force participation emerge at ages 13-17, with boys’ 
employment hours (13.8) more than double girls’. Males are the dominant breadwinners (male 
earnings account for 80 percent of family income; not reported in a table). Adult males and older 
boys are also the main providers of agricultural work. 
Nearly all boys and girls are in school at ages 6-12. Hours in education markedly peak at an 
average of 31 hours per week for both boys and girls at ages 10-12. While hours fall 
considerably by ages 13-17, average declines are similar for boys and girls.  
Leisure time is highest at ages 6-9 (at 30 hours or more for boys and girls) and strictly decreases 
with age. Girls’ leisure time declines in age as housework and caregiving hours grow. Adult 
females report slightly more leisure time than adult males.  
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for the three estimation samples. Comparing mothers 
with boys at least 13 years of age, mothers average just 1.7 more hours of market work, but 22 
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hours more housework, and 11 hours more caregiving. Boys’ hours in agricultural work are 
slightly higher than mothers’ (by 1 hour) and boys’ leisure exceeds mothers’ by 15 hours. Girls 
exhibit greater similarity to their mothers. Except for market work, the absolute value of the 
mother-girl difference is less than the corresponding mother-boy difference for all activities. 
Boys average 3 hours more market work per week , 2 hours more agricultural work, and 1 hour 
more formal education than their similarly-aged sisters, while boys’ and girls’ leisure hours are 
similar. Girls contribute 4 hours more housework and 2 hours more caregiving per week than 
boys.   
Table 1.2 indicates migration status. Approximately 7 percent of observation-pairs experience 
any migration. Migration is overwhelmingly by a male, usually an adult son. From 1.5-1.9 
percent of observation-pairs experience migration of an adult daughter.  
Shares of children in the defined age groups are similar across the two mother-child samples, and 
other family structure variables are also stable. Households average 0.1 infant-toddlers, 0.2 3-5-
year-olds, 1.5 male adults, and 0.8 adult offspring. The distribution of children is skewed older in 
the boy-girl sample due to the selection criteria.  
While children have significantly higher Raven’s test z-scores than their mothers, possibly 
reflecting intergenerational improvements in cognitive ability, it should be noted that child and 
adult versions of the test differ. Average maternal education is quite low; half attended 
elementary school (as the highest grade) and only 25 percent attended secondary school. Only 8 
percent of mothers attended high school and just 5 percent attended college.  
Asset distributions in the subsamples are roughly representative of the population. Selection on 
having more children (as in the boy-girl subsample) skews the distribution somewhat poorer. 
From 47-51 percent of sample observation-pairs are located in rural areas and from 29-31 
percent are in large urban areas. There are no important differences in characteristics across the 
three estimation samples other than those arising from the selection criteria.  
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1.6 Findings 
The basic findings on hours spent on various activities are presented in tables 1.3-1.9. Three 
estimates are presented for each migration coefficient. The first applies OLS to equation (1.1) 
(denoted FD) and the last applies OLS to the baseline-adjusted dependent variables (denoted 
DFD). The middle estimate is the FD estimate applied to the restricted sample required by the 
DFD estimate (note that this restriction makes the sample children older, since a lagged activity 
difference must be available). Errors are always clustered at the household level.  
In each of tables 1.3-1.9, the first row contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations 
from a specification with Any migrant as the only right-hand-side migration variable. The second 
row reports the coefficient on Male migrant for a specification with Male migrant and Adult 
daughter migrant as the migration variables. The last three rows list estimates for a specification 
with Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant as the migration variables.  
Before proceeding to the main findings, we briefly discuss the estimated effects of other 
explanators.10 With the exception of market work estimates, the child’s own age is the most 
important driver of mother-boy time allocations. Boys’ burden of housework, caregiving, and 
agricultural work relative to mothers increases with age, while relative leisure decreases with age. 
Family structure is also important. The presence of children under 6 and of at least one female 
sibling (younger or older), increases mothers’ caregiving relative to boys’. The presence of male 
siblings increases the leisure of boys relative to mothers, consistent with a fixed amount of non-
leisure activities being spread over more boys. More educated mothers take on more paid and 
agricultural work relative to their sons. Boys from asset-poorer families do more housework and 
take less leisure relative to their mothers. In rural areas, relatively more paid work is allocated to 
boys than mothers.  
Findings for non-migration variables are qualitatively similar in mother-boy and mother-girl 
specifications, with the following exceptions. While cognitive ability does not affect mother-boy 
allocations, girls with higher Raven’s test scores are allocated less housework and caregiving 
relative to their mothers. Also in contrast to mother-boy estimates, the presence of male or 
                                                          
10 A complete set of FD coefficient estimates are available upon request. 
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female siblings of any age at home does not markedly change mother-girl activity allocations of 
any type.  
Boy-girl activity differences sharpen with age, as expected, with boys increasingly shifting into 
market work and girls increasingly into housework. Boys with higher Raven’s test scores do less 
agricultural work than their similar-age sisters. Girls’ leisure decreases relative to boys’ in the 
presence of a very young sibling, while boys’ leisure benefits from the presence of both male and 
female siblings. The presence of male siblings reduces boys’ agricultural work relative to girls, 
while the presence of female siblings increases boys’ relative leisure. In contrast, girls benefit 
somewhat, but less than boys, from the presence of a female sibling, through relative reductions 
in housework. Boys with more educated mothers enjoy increased leisure over their their similar-
age sisters.  
1.6.1 Market and Agricultural Work Allocations 
Estimated effects of migration on the allocation of market and agricultural work to left-behind 
family members are presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. The FD coefficient estimates indicate large 
shifts of market work hours from boys to mothers when there is a migrant. However, DFD 
findings for mothers and boys are all estimated to be insignificant. Although some individual 
point estimates are large in absolute magnitude, none of the estimates of migration’s effect on 
mother-girl and boy-girl allocations of market work differ significantly from zero at standard 
confidence levels,  
In the case of agricultural work (Table 1.4), the FD and DFD coefficient estimates indicate shifts 
from boys to mothers in agricultural work when a male household member or an adult daughter 
migrates, although these are only significant at the 90% level. A (marginally) positive shift in 
agricultural work time from girls to mothers is not robust to controlling for the pre-migration 
allocation. All boy-girl estimates are insignificant.  
1.6.2 Housework and Caregiving Allocations 
Estimated effects of migration on the allocation of housework and caregiving to left-behind 
family members are presented in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. FD estimates indicate a shift 
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of 3.5 hours of housework from mothers to girls corresponding to any migration, with a 
marginally significant shift of over 5 hours to girls from mothers when the migrant is an adult 
daughter. FD estimates also indicate a shift in housework hours from girls to boys, apparently 
due to the migration of an adult son.  
Table 1.6 presents caregiving findings. The DFD estimate is of a large shift of over 11 hours 
from mothers to boys when a father migrates. In the case of mothers and girls, the FD estimate is 
of a caregiving shift to girls when an adult son migrates. There is some evidence of a caregiving 
shift from girls to mothers when an adult son migrates, but this estimate is not robust with 
respect to controlling for the pre-migration allocation. In boy-girl comparisons, the DFD estimate 
is of a (marginally significant) shift in caregiving from boys to girls of more than 4 hours per 
week when an adult son migrates. 
1.6.3 Allocations of Time in Formal Education 
Very large shifts in formal education time between similarly-aged, opposite-sex siblings are 
estimated with both the FD and DFD approaches (Table 1.7). The first three columns present 
findings for the base sample. Whether the girl or boy in a similarly-aged pair is relatively 
advantaged by migration depends crucially on the migrant’s identity. When an adult son is the 
migrant, the DFD estimate indicates a gain of nearly 19 hours per week in formal education time 
for girls over their brothers. In contrast, when an adult daughter migrates, boys gain 24 hours of 
formal education time over girls.  
Such large hours estimates are consistent with school-leaving behavior, so we present some 
supplemental estimates that aid further understanding of the origins of the hours effects. First, it 
is unlikely, given the sample statistics suggesting high average enrollments and hours, that 
younger children are driving the findings. The last three columns in Table 1.7 confirm this by 
presenting the findings for sibling pairs in the 13-17-year age group only. Because of prior 
sample restrictions, the sample change little when a lagged time allocation is required (i.e., DFD). 
In the case of the FD specification sample, the significant findings are driven by the oldest group 
of children. Since this older group has the option to leave school, the findings are compatible 
with school-leaving behavior.  
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To further explore what is driving the education findings, we present some supplementary level 
estimates of formal education hours. In the case of education, it turns out that the level estimates 
are similar to the sibling difference estimates; that is, the differences in the two level estimates of 
migration in table 1.8 are generally similar in magnitude to the estimates of the net effect 
presented in table 1.7. This suggests that family heterogeneity in education (at least, conditional 
on having a boy and a girl in the same age group) is not systematically correlated with the 
migration variables. The first estimate presented for both boys and girls is the impact of 
migration on weekly hours. The average decline in boys’ hours when an adult son departs is 
marginally negative and slightly less than a one-third reduction in average hours, while the 
departure of an older sister is associated with an increase in hours of almost 60% above the 
average. For girls, the change in average hours when an older brother departs amounts to a nearly 
50% increase. While the decline in girls’ hours when an older sister departs is not estimated to 
differ significantly from zero, it is large in magnitude, at over 40% of average hours.  
The main purpose of presenting level estimates is to provide school participation effects. The 
next three columns explore the impact of migration on the probability of reporting either no or 
very low school attendance. The share of boys reporting spending positive hours on formal 
learning increases by nearly one-third when their older sister departs. When their older brother 
departs, the incidence of boys reporting very low but nonzero enrollment hours falls by more 
than 20 percentage-points. For girls, the pattern of impacts on attendance is somewhat different. 
The departure of an older brother reduces the share of girls who report spending more than 10 
hours per week on education by more than one-third. Similarly, the greatest impact of an older 
sister departing (a decline of over 40 percentage points) is on the likelihood of reporting low but 
positive education hours. While estimated impacts on enrollment at more than 5 hours per week 
are fairly large in absolute magnitude, they are imprecisely estimated for girls. These findings 
can be explained by a combination of factors. First, it is possible that girls are more likely to 
continue to maintain a marginal connection to formal education than boys, rather than 
definitively dropping out. This would explain why the major findings for girls occur at the 10-
hour-per week cutoff. Second, the formal learning variable is constructed differently for children 
above age 14. For those above, learning is “hours last week”; for younger children, average 
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hours refer to the prior school year. Therefore, if younger children are observed in the process of 
dropping out over a longer period, the effects of migration also reflect the age composition of 
those ‘treated’ by migration. Due to small sample sizes and low incidence of migration, it’s not 
possible to meaningfully explore this issue further.   
1.6.4 Leisure Allocations 
Effects on the allocation of leisure to left-behind family members are presented in Table 1.9. 
With a single exception (a DFD estimate that mothers gain leisure over boys when the father 
migrates), the estimated effects of migration do not differ significantly from zero. Many 
coefficients are also quite small in absolute magnitude.  
1.6.5 Robustness of the Findings11 
We conducted robustness checks on the sensitivities of all the findings to the exact sample and 
variable specifications, including adjusting for differences in the age compositions of the three 
subsamples and altering our assumption about the minimum age of potential adult migrants. We 
were also concerned about correctly capturing the alternatives facing rural families.  
Increasing the Similarity of the Three Samples’ Membership 
We have presented estimates for families containing at least one minor child and at least one 
child older than age 12 in wave 2 in the paper. These families contain a diversity of children’s 
age-sex compositions. To make the three samples more similar, we further restricted attention to 
families containing both a boy and girl in the 13-17-year-old age category. With this 
modification, all pairs examined also faced the same activity choice set (i.e., including market 
work). This restriction substantially reduced mother-child sample sizes—by 70 to 85 percent, 
depending on activity—while the boy-girl subsamples were reduced by as much as one-third.  
With this age restriction, all mother-girl estimates of the effect of migration were estimated to be 
insignificant, with the exception that migration of an adult daughter marginally increased the 
agricultural work of girls according to the FD estimate (the DFD estimate of this effect was 
                                                          
11 A complete set of robustness findings are available upon request.  
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similar in magnitude but imprecise). This overall pattern of findings is not surprising. As 
evidenced by the descriptive statistics, older girls engage in a pattern of activities very similar to 
their mothers. Thus, there is little scope for further adjustment of mother-girl responsibilities in 
the wake of migration. There were some positive mother-boy shifts for the FD specification of 
market work in the cases of adult son and adult daughter migration, but DFD estimates were 
insignificant, as before. For boy-girl comparisons, market work, housework, caregiving, 
education and leisure findings were quite similar to those for the unrestricted sample, but the FD 
and DFD estimates indicated a (marginal) shift in agricultural work from boys to girls in 
response to the migration of an adult daughter.  
Increasing the Minimum Age of Adult Migration 
To ensure that the migrant family member was engaged in activities expected of an adult and that 
the goals of migrating fathers and adult children were fairly similar (i.e., to work in the U.S.), we 
raised the minimum age of sons and daughters considered as candidates for migration from 13 to 
18 (in wave 2),12 in an attempt to eliminate children who simply accompanied an adult to the U.S. 
from being classified as migrants. This change decreased the incidence of sibling migration by 
20 percent in the sample of all families with both a minor child and a child at least age 13. 
Sample size was reduced by about one-half from the base specifications for each subsample.  
Several FD and DFD estimates changed considerably with this heightened age restriction. 
Overall, there was evidence of more potentially adverse effects of migration of adult daughters 
on girls. Specifically, when an adult daughter migrated, market work shifted to girls from 
mothers and agricultural work shifted to girls from boys. Findings on leisure also differed. When 
the father migrated, boys gained leisure over both their mothers and sisters according to the FD 
estimates. The DFD estimates indicated that mothers gained leisure from both boys and girls 
when an adult daughter migrated.  
There were also some notable differences in the case of formal education time. The adverse 
effect of adult daughter migration on girls’ education was 40 percent as large in absolute 
magnitude and was insignificant in both FD and DFD specifications, while the favorable effect 
                                                          
12 These estimates are available upon request. 
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of adult son migration on girls’ relative education persisted. Differences in the findings 
according to the classification of ‘adult’ migrant may arise for various reasons. For example, the 
older the migrant, the more likely they may be to remit resources from the U.S., which would 
explain how younger sisters are able to remain in school.  
Families in Rural Areas 
We re-estimated all specifications for rural households, roughly halving the three analysis 
subsamples. Mother-boy findings were similar to those estimated from the entire sample across 
all choices. Findings for mother-girl allocations were similar to prior findings, except for market 
work. FD estimates indicated shifts in market work to girls from mothers due to any migration. 
In boy-girl comparisons, FD estimates indicated a shift in market work to boys when the father 
migrated and to girls when the adult daughter migrated. These latter findings are consistent with 
market work being systematically re-allocated to boys and girls according to the sex of the 
migrating family member.  
In the case of education, potentially adverse effects of migration on girls were more pronounced 
in rural families. The estimated adverse effect of an adult daughter’s migration on girls’ relative 
time in education was 50 percent larger in absolute magnitude in the rural subsample. In contrast, 
the adverse effect of an adult son’s migration on boys was little altered by this sample restriction.  
1.6.6 IV Strategies 
In theory, migration and time use are endogenously determined. As a remedy, we attempted to 
implement many of the standard approaches in the literature, using arguably exogenous variables 
as migration instruments. The variables were constructed using the community level information 
of MxFLS, geographic information provided by other authors, and results from other work. The 
variables exploited included historical factors, community culture, distance, and natural and 
economic shocks. However, we were not satisfied that any of the typical IV estimators used in 
the literature solved the endogeneity problems for our sample. Here, we briefly describe the IV 
strategies that were pursued.  
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It is a historical fact that certain areas of Mexico became advantaged in migration earlier than 
others, and prior work found that contemporary patterns of migration still strongly mimic these 
earlier patterns. The use of historical migration strategies is widespread in the literature (see the 
large number of studies employing historical migration rate strategies cited in McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2011). We followed McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) and Hildebrandt et al (2005) in using a historical 1950s 
migration rate for the household’s state of residence as an instrument for migration. In boy-girl 
samples, first stage F-statistics were never strong enough to merit proceeding to implement the 
IV. In general, migration is relatively rare and more idiosyncratic for families with children, and 
that is an issue with all of our analysis samples. While first-stage F-statistics indicated a 
reasonably strong correlation between the historical and current migration patterns for mother-
child samples, the resultant IV estimates were typically very large and imprecisely estimated.13 
Other studies interact migration rates with household characteristics (e.g. Hanson and Woodruff, 
2003). However, the first stage of the characteristic-interacted IVs is likely weak and proved so 
in our data. 
We followed the similarly motivated strategy of Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), which used the 
distances from the capital of the household’s state of residence to the nearest railroad station in 
place by the turn of the 20th century. In this case, we often found that the distances, when 
significant in the first-stage specifications, had signs contrary to that expected if the instrument 
shifted migration as hypothesized, with closer locations to railroads indicating a lower cost to 
migration. These first-stage findings cast doubt on the validity of this strategy.  
In order to exploit an exogenous variable that influences cotemporary migration shocks without 
affecting other outcomes in Mexico, we also followed the approach in Munshi (2003) and 
Antman (2011), matching the most popular destinations in the U.S. with the a migrant’s state of 
residence in Mexico. Research indicates that Mexican immigrants establish a tight spatial 
                                                          
13  It is possible that the exogeneity assumption of historical migration rates does not hold when 
examining the impact of contemporary migration in receiving areas (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007).  
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concentration within a limited number of destination zones in the U.S. (Munshi, 2003), 
suggesting that economic conditions in the destination areas (unemployment rates and hourly 
wages for popular industries for migrants—chiefly construction and service) might be 
determinants of U.S. migration that are orthogonal to conditions in the sending community. 
Unfortunately, in our samples the correlations between destination economic conditions and 
migration patterns were weak.  
We also used community-level information on out-migration computed within-sample as well as 
contact of local residents with migration clubs as migration instruments. These variables are 
valid IVs when the aggregated migration pattern in a community does not influence household 
outcomes other than migration. This method is widely used in the prior literature (e.g., Chang et 
al, 2011). Unfortunately, in none of our samples were these variables significant predictors of 
migration, leading again to indefensibly weak first stages.  
Finally, some other work, including Munshi (2003), Deb and Seck (2009) and Yang (2008) has 
applied natural and economic shocks as migration instruments. In a similar vein, it is possible to 
create between-wave crop and unemployment shock variables in the MxFLS. However, it is 
extremely unlikely that such shocks do not also independently influence allocations of time to 
activities, including market work, by household members, and therefore such variables fail the 
validity standard for an IV.  
In summary, migration proved too idiosyncratic to be reliably predicted in our samples of 
households with children. This often led to insupportably weak first stage estimates across a 
wide variety of IV approaches (We note that many of the studies cited did not report first-stage 
F-statistics).  
Other approaches, which may have been more promising in the first stage, were clearly invalid in 
the context of our study.  
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1.7 Conclusion 
We estimated the impact of family-member migration on the time use of left-behind household 
members with approaches that controlled for family heterogeneity in the level as well as 
allocation of time use.  
Our strongest findings, in terms of significance and robustness, were for the allocations of 
housework time between mothers and daughters and formal education time between boys and 
girls. Housework time tended to shift from mothers to girls in the presence of any migrant, with 
some weak evidence that girls were stepping into the housework chores of an older sister. There 
was some evidence that housework shifted relatively onto boys from girls when a male migrated, 
which is also plausible, given some of the strongly ‘male’ chores embedded in the housework 
variable. Boys were greatly advantaged in education time when an older sister was the migrant 
and girls were strongly advantaged in education time when an older brother was the migrant. In 
addition, there was some evidence that market work and agricultural work shifted from boys to 
mothers when a male migrated. There was very little evidence that migration affected the 
allocation of leisure time.  
1.7.1 Discussion 
Comparisons of similarly-aged, opposite-sex siblings provide the most direct evidence on 
whether time allocations are sex-biased. There is weak evidence of inequities in caregiving (girls 
take on more caregiving than boys when an adult son migrates) and also that housework is 
shifted relatively less onto girls than boys when an adult son migrates. With the exception of 
caregiving and education time, DFD estimates of migration did not differ significantly from zero 
for most boy-girl activity allocations. Strong migration effects on education vary with both the 
sex of the child and the identity of the migrant and are robust to controlling for the pre-migration 
time allocation of education.14 Supplemental findings support the interpretation that boys and 
                                                          
14 Examination of mother-child estimates for the other time-use variables suggests caution in making 
conclusions about education; in most cases the FD and DFD estimates were usually not similar to either 
IV estimate. Arguably, however, estimates based on comparisons across similarly-aged siblings may 
suffer less endogeneity bias than estimates based on mother-child comparisons. E.g., families may 
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girls leave school to take over the household role of their departing older brother or sister, 
respectively.  
Comparing findings across mother-boy and mother-girl pairings also provides evidence of sex-
based inequities. FD estimates indicate that market work is shifted from boys to mothers but not 
from girls to mothers. The likely result is to make the market work allocations of boys and girls 
within the household more equitable, since the sample statistics indicate boys work more in the 
marketplace than girls to begin with. In the case of housework, there is evidence of shifts of 
housework duties from mothers to girls when an adult daughter migrates. We note that some of 
the strongest findings for mother-boys are in the traditionally ‘male’ activities market work and 
agricultural work, while the strongest findings for mother-girls are for housework.  
Differences in the pattern of effects according to the identity of the migrant and sex of the child 
could also be interpreted as evidence of sex bias in the perceived substitutability of family 
members for the migrant. Nearly every significant effect on mother-boy allocations is associated 
with the migration of a male from the household, while in the case of girls, mother-girl effects 
are driven by both male and female migration. This is consistent with the reallocation of duties 
across mothers and boys representing a more internally “costly” change for the household than 
mother-girl reallocations. Therefore, significant mother-boy reallocations are only made in 
response to situations in which traditionally “male work” has been affected.  
Finally, we note that a basic theory of household production with migration predicts that when 
migration increases family income, housework shifts to mothers from children. To the contrary, 
we find that mothers pass housework on to children, especially girls, as a result of migration. A 
possible explanation is that migration episodes entail a period of scarcity, so that our migration 
variable is not highly correlated with remittance receipt. Chen (2013) also finds that changes in 
maternal-child time in housework in the wake of paternal migration with remittances do not 
comport with theoretical predictions, even with the addition of husband-wife bargaining to the 
model. Since we lack remittance data, the only conclusion at this time is that our findings are 
similar to Chen’s (2013).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
perceive time readjustments across children and adults as more costly than time readjustments between 
similarly-aged children.  
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1.7.2 Comparisons with the Prior Literature on Mexico 
Prior work on migration and time use has estimated its impact on time levels, whereas we have 
focused largely on time differences among household members. Nonetheless, our findings shed 
further light on prior contributions. Given the differences in cultural norms, family sizes, 
resources, and other factors across countries, we focus the discussion on prior work on Mexico.  
Prior evidence on the education effects of Mexico-to-U.S. migration is mixed. In principle, our 
evidence could be consistent with Deb and Seck (2009)’s finding of an overall improvement in 
education by both sexes, as measured by age-for-grade, because we estimate the relative 
distribution of education time between boys and girls. That is, education time may increase for 
both siblings, but more for one than the other. However, the supplementary analysis shows that 
school drop-out plays a key role in the findings, contradicting this scenario. Antman (2011b) 
finds a positive effect of parental migration to the U.S. on attainment while Hanson and 
Woodruff (2003) find a positive effect of any household migrant in the U.S. In contrast, our 
education findings differ with both the sex of the child and the sex and family role of the migrant.  
Our education findings are, however, entirely consistent with findings of Hanson and Woodruff 
(2003) and Antman (2011b) that gains in children’s school enrollment as a consequence of ‘any 
migration’ are largely restricted to girls. Since the migration variables used in these other studies 
entirely or largely exclude female migrants, these analyses may have missed the possible 
(relative) benefits to boys (equivalently, that girls may be harmed) that we found in the case of 
adult daughter migration. 
Deb and Seck (2009), also using the MxFLS, find evidence that Mexico-U.S. migration increases 
children’s—especially girls’—housework load relative to mothers.’ Deb and Seck’s (2009) 
‘housework’ measure also incorporates agricultural chores. Our findings on housework are 
consistent with Deb and Seck (2009), although we find weak evidence of mothers taking on 
more agricultural work from both boys and girls. While Antman (2011a) finds that boys work for 
pay more when a father migrates to the U.S., we find no evidence of reallocations of paid work 
between boys and mothers, or between similarly-aged, opposite-sex siblings, in response to any 
type of migration. Indeed, our strongest evidence on this point is of mothers’ market work 
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allocations increasing relative to boys. This finding also contrasts with Hanson (2007)’s evidence 
of lower female labor force participation rates in higher-migration areas of Mexico.  
1.7.3 Directions for Further Research  
The findings underline the need for future research that carefully delineates migration according 
to the family role of the migrant. Many societies still hew to sex-based divisions of labor. Sex is 
associated with both changes in net demands for activities in the wake of the departure of the 
migrating member, as well as the perceived suitability of a left-behind household member to 
meet these changes. As Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) note, in the presence of such differentials in 
treatment and expectations, all kinds of shocks families confront can influence human capital 
investment, broadly considered, in ways that may substantially exacerbate sex-based inequality 
over time.    
Two major themes related to this work would benefit from additional research effort. There are 
now many studies on the net effect of a migration episode on left-behind family member 
outcomes that indicate well-being. A richer, more specific understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying these findings—e.g., remittances, bargaining power, and household re-optimization—
is lacking. Second, there is emerging evidence of substantial feedback among a person’s entire 
set of skills and experiences (e.g., Behrman, et al. [2008], Cunha and Heckman, [2008]), 
underlining the need to learn more about how family time use relates to both the cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills instilled in children.15 
  
                                                          
15 There are few studies of children’s time allocation in response to events other than migration. Vuri 
(2010) finds that improved school access reduces children’s time in both housework and paid work in 
Ghana. Attanasio, et al (2010) find a conditional cash transfer program in Colombia increased children’s 
time in school, decreased time in housework, and had little impact on time in paid work. 
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Table 1.1. Participation and Time in Activities by Family Member Role 
  Father    Mother   Adult son  Adult daughter 
 Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs 
Any activity                
Housework 0.348 0.476 2,440  0.918a 0.275 2,446  0.364 0.482 637  0.736a 0.441 530 
                
Caregiving 0.386 0.487 1,951  0.749a 0.434 2,272  0.200 0.400 485  0.437a 0.497 439 
                
Market work 0.947 0.225 1,947  0.328a 0.470 2,272  0.754 0.431 484  0.459a 0.499 440 
                
Agricultural work 0.274 0.446 931  0.101a 0.302 1,059  0.184 0.389 228  0.079a 0.271 189 
                
Formal education 0.009 0.094 1,777  0.012 0.108 2,022  0.280 0.449 479  0.333c 0.472 438 
                
Leisure 0.870 0.337 1,951  0.886c 0.317 2,272  0.953 0.213 485  0.950 0.218 439 
               
Hours of activity               
Housework 3.37 7.14 1,951  29.40a 15.71 2,272  3.05 5.93 485  11.37a 11.69 439 
                
Caregiving 3.92 9.42 1,951  21.47a 24.59 2,272  1.20 4.33 485  5.31a 11.55 439 
                
Market work 45.38 21.11 1,951  11.12a 19.61 2,272  31.78 23.84 485  18.32a 23.38 440 
                
Agricultural work 7.69 16.83 931  0.881a 4.97 1,059  3.83 11.11 228  0.529a 2.43 189 
                
Formal education 0.120 1.97 1,777  0.101 1.17 2,022  3.08 6.87 479  4.16b 8.93 438 
                
Leisure 12.09 10.60 1,947  12.24 10.83 2,270  16.61 12.87 485  17.18 13.65 437 
Notes: Unweighted summary statistics calculated in wave 1, prior to migration. Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least 
one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural work samples restricted to rural areas. Hours statistics include zeros. 
(a,b,c) indicate significance at (1% , 5%, 10%) levels for a t-test of no difference between males and females in the same family role (‘parent’ or 
‘child’).  
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Table 1.1. (cont.) 
 13-17-year old son  13-17-year old daughter  10-12-year old son  10-12-year old daughter 
 Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs 
Any activity                
Housework 0.511 0.500 1,199  0.839a 0.368 1,169  0.570 0.495 958  0.768a 0.422 992 
                
Caregiving 0.345 0.475 1,085  0.484a 0.500 1,077  0.316 0.465 909  0.442a 0.497 938 
                
Market work 0.364 0.481 803  0.165a 0.371 772  − − −  − − − 
                
Agricultural work 0.194 0.396 551  0.078a 0.269 524  0.132 0.339 425  0.060a 0.237 470 
                
Formal education 0.767 0.423 1,072  0.763 0.425 1,063  0.988 0.110 901  0.985 0.122 934 
                
Leisure 0.941 0.236 1,085  0.948 0.222 1,077  0.941 0.237 909  0.939 0.239 938 
               
Hours of activity                
Housework 4.13 7.53 1,085  9.65a 9.86 1,077  3.58 5.61 909  6.25a 6.39 938 
                
Caregiving 2.44 5.83 1,084  5.31a 9.96 1,075  2.57 6.62 906  3.87a 7.25 935 
                
Market work 13.75 22.88 803  6.47a 17.13 772  − − −  − − − 
                
Agricultural work 3.10 9.42 551  0.597a 3.44 524  1.24 4.80 425  0.347a 1.84 470 
                
Formal education 19.42 17.99 1,072  19.91 18.47 1,063  31.44 7.42 901  31.40 8.15 934 
                
Leisure 22.45 15.94 1,084  21.21c 15.86 1,074  30.12 17.40 906  26.77a 16.68 935 
Notes: Unweighted summary statistics calculated in wave 1, prior to migration. Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least 
one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural work samples restricted to rural areas. Hours statistics include zeros. 
(a,b,c) indicate significance at (1% , 5%, 10%) levels for a t-test of no difference between males and females in the same family role (parent or 
child) and age group. 
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Table 1.1. (cont.) 
 6-9-year old son  6-9-year old daughter 
 Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs 
Any activity        
Housework 0.368 0.483 850  0.532a 0.499  855 
        
Caregiving 0.148 0.355 785  0.187b 0.390 779 
        
Market work − − −  − − − 
        
Agricultural work 0.064 0.245 406  0.020a 0.141 394 
        
Formal education 0.991 0.095 662  0.994 0.080 625 
        
Leisure 0.912 0.283 785  0.910 0.286 779 
       
Hours of activity        
Housework 1.91 3.70 785  3.20a 4.77 779 
        
Caregiving 1.04 3.65 784  1.55b 4.63 777 
        
Market work − − −  − − − 
        
Agricultural work 0.468 2.74 406  0.109b 0.952  394 
        
Formal education 29.92 6.50 662  29.99 6.67 625 
        
Leisure 32.41 17.58 784  29.72a 16.99 777 
Notes: Unweighted summary statistics calculated in wave 1, prior to migration. Samples restricted to 
members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. 
Agricultural work samples restricted to rural areas. Hours statistics include zeros. (a,b,c) indicate 
significance at (1% , 5%, 10%) levels for a t-test of no difference between males and females in the same 
family role (parent or child) and age group. 
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Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mother-boy  Mother-girl  Boy-girl 
 Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs 
Time difference            
Market work 1.73 27.11 1,173  7.09a 24.10 1,222  3.00* 22.20 430 
            
Agricultural work -1.00 7.50 1,029  0.726a 5.79 1,079  2.19 9.18 340 
            
Housework 22.40 15.67 2159  18.3a 16.63 2219  -4.48* 9.25 650 
            
Caregiving 11.39 19.78 2,157  10.12b 21.34 2219  -1.82 * 8.36 650 
            
Formal Education - - -  - - -  1.03 22.77 583 
            
Leisure -15.02 18.96 2,157  -12.7 a 17.18 2,218  0.651 19.30 650 
Migrant identity            
Any  0.072 0.259 2,657  0.073 0.261 2,725  0.068 0.251 813 
            
Male 0.060 0.238 2,657  0.059 0.237 2,725  0.055 0.229 813 
            
Paternal 0.021 0.145 2,657  0.023 0.149 2,725  0.020 0.139 813 
            
Adult son 0.043 0.202 2,657  0.042 0.200 2,725  0.042 0.200 813 
            
Adult daughter 0.017 0.128 2,657  0.019 0.136 2,725  0.015 0.121 813 
Other explanators: Individual 
Age 6-9 0.189 0.392 2,657  0.195 0.396 2,725  0.169 0.375 813 
            
Age 10-12 0.241 0.428 2,657  0.228 0.420 2,725  0.129 0.336 813 
            
Age 13-17 0.570 0.495 2,657  0.577 0.494 2,725  0.702 0.458 813 
            
Other boy 6-9 0.180 0.384 2,657  0.177 0.381 2,725  0.146 0.354 813 
            
Other boy 10-12 0.199 0.399 2,657  0.183 0.387 2,725  0.208 0.406 813 
            
Other boy 13-17 0.355 0.479 2,657  0.374 0.484 2,725  0.395 0.489 813 
            
Adult male (18+) 0.285 0.451 2,657  0.295 0.456 2,725  0.245 0.430 813 
            
Other girl 6-9 0.173 0.378 2,657  0.179 0.384 2,725  0.165 0.371 813 
            
Other girl 10-12 0.195 0.397 2,657  0.198 0.398 2,725  0.216 0.412 813 
            
Other girl 13-17 0.385 0.487 2,657  0.371 0.483 2,725  0.263 0.441 813 
            
Adult female (18+) 0.279 0.449 2,657  0.281 0.450 2,725  0.257 0.437 813 
            
Raven's score -0.190 1.188 2,657  -0.180 1.19 2,725  -0.052 1.11 813 
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Table 1.2. (cont.) 
 Mother-boy  Mother-girl  Boy-girl 
 Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs  Mean SD Obs 
Other explanators: Maternal education (highest level attended) 
Elementary  0.493 0.500 2,471  0.498 0.500 2,522  0.124 0.329 769 
            
Secondary 0.245 0.430 2,471  0.248 0.432 2,522  0.518 0.500 769 
            
High school 0.079 0.269 2,471  0.060 0.237 2,522  0.233 0.423 769 
            
College 0.046 0.210 2,471  0.048 0.213 2,522  0.055 0.227 769 
 
Other explanators: Household 
Extended 
family 0.174 0.379 2,657  0.177 0.381 2,725  0.207 0.405 813 
            
Children 0-2 
(#) 0.080 0.289 2,657  0.089 0.306 2,725  0.082 0.284 813 
            
Children 3-5 
(#) 0.200 0.449 2,657  0.208 0.462 2,725  0.237 0.490 813 
            
Adult males (#) 1.47 0.991 2,657  1.47 0.961 2,725  1.48 1.00 813 
            
Adult children 
(#) 0.814 1.07 2,657  0.843 1.11 2,725  0.760 1.13 813 
            
Male children 
(#) 1.90 1.16 2,657  0.997 1.05 2,725  1.95 1.16 813 
            
Female 
children (#) 0.995 1.03 2,657  1.89 1.15 2,725  1.82 1.12 813 
            
Asset Q2 0.226 0.419 2,425  0.228 0.420 2,466  0.239 0.427 758 
            
Asset Q3 0.213 0.410 2,425  0.199 0.399 2,466  0.194 0.396 758 
            
Asset Q4 0.199 0.399 2,425  0.182 0.386 2,466  0.168 0.374 758 
            
Asset Q5 0.181 0.385 2,425  0.201 0.401 2,466  0.198 0.399 758 
            
Rural 0.469 0.499 2,471  0.467 0.499 2,522  0.512 0.500 769 
            
Large urban 0.305 0.461 2,471  0.310 0.462 2,522  0.286 0.452 769 
Notes: Unweighted summary statistics measured in wave 2. All samples restricted to members of two-
parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas.  (a, b) indicates significance at the (1%, 5%) level for a t-test of no 
difference in means between mother-boy and mother-girls samples. *Significantly different from zero at 
the 95% confidence level.  
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Table 1.3. Estimated Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on the Allocation of Market Work between Left-Behind Family 
Members 
 Mother-Boy  Mother-Girl  Boy-Girl 
 FDa FD DFDb  FDa FD DFDb  FDa FD DFDb 
Any e 9.87**  
(3.22) 
9.85** 
(3.21) 
5.32 
(4.11) 
 -1.38  
(3.09) 
-1.57 
(3.11) 
2.44  
(2.83) 
 -2.89  
(5.06) 
-1.10 
(4.94) 
4.64  
(6.01) 
            
Any male f 
 
8.03* 
(3.41) 
7.94* 
(3.39) 
2.97 
(4.35) 
 
 0.228 
(3.23) 
 
-0.127 
(3.24) 
3.19 
(2.92) 
 
 1.51 
(5.37) 
 
2.36 
(5.45) 
6.73 
(6.06) 
 
            
Father g 
 
7.09 
(5.78) 
7.16 
(5.69) 
4.28 
(6.84) 
 0.996 
(3.92) 
 
1.32 
(3.94) 
2.63 
(3.37) 
 
 11.27 
(8.92) 
 
11.25 
(9.04) 
9.56 
(9.87) 
 
            
Adult song 
 
6.66+ 
(3.93) 
6.48+ 
(3.93) 
0.829 
(5.18) 
 
 0.182 
(4.27) 
 
-0.349 
(4.29) 
3.19 
(3.80) 
 
 -3.97 
(5.59) 
 
-2.73 
(5.58) 
3.47 
(6.35) 
 
            
Adult daughter g 
 
7.87 
(8.24) 
8.22 
(8.29) 
4.52 
(11.45) 
 -2.39 
(6.33) 
 
-1.90 
(6.25) 
-2.30 
(6.07) 
 
 -13.29 
(10.10) 
 
-9.95 
(10.00) 
-2.44 
(12.01) 
 
            
Observations 1,167 1,117 1,117  1,217 1,149 1,149  427 408 408 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanators.  
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 1.4. Estimated Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on the Allocations of Agricultural Work between Left-Behind 
Family Members 
 Mother-Boy Mother-Girl Boy-Girl 
 FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb 
Any e 1.21  
(0.82) 
1.26 
(0.81) 
2.22*  
(1.05) 
 1.61  
(1.20) 
1.51 
(1.21) 
1.29  
(1.24) 
 -1.12  
(1.57) 
-0.714 
(1.47) 
-2.42  
(1.92) 
            
Any male f 1.38+ 
 (0.77) 
1.42+ 
(0.77) 
1.77+  
(1.02) 
 2.22+  
(1.20) 
2.03+ 
(1.17) 
1.53  
(1.19) 
 -0.463  
(1.46) 
0.379 
(1.38) 
-1.49   
(1.93) 
            
Father g 1.22 
(1.38) 
1.16 
(1.40) 
0.916  
(1.36) 
 4.59  
(3.24) 
4.66 
(3.21) 
4.66  
(3.09) 
 0.369  
(1.59) 
0.683 
(1.68) 
2.06  
(1.73) 
            
Adult song 1.11  
(0.96) 
1.15 
(0.95) 
2.21  
(1.36) 
 -0.664  
(1.30) 
-1.01 
(1.29) 
-1.56  
(1.23) 
 -1.36  
(1.90) 
-0.484 
(1.85) 
-3.98  
(2.73) 
            
Adult daughter g 
 
2.54  
(2.84) 
2.65 
(2.99) 
5.51+  
(3.22) 
 2.74   
(4.42) 
3.05 
(4.49) 
3.71  
(4.38) 
 -3.17  
(4.20) 
-5.45 
(4.16) 
-5.37  
(4.23) 
            
Observations 1,027 999 999  1,074 1,038 1,038  339 319 319 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanators.  
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Table 1.5. Estimated Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on the Allocation of Housework between Left-Behind Family 
Members 
 Mother-Boy  Mother-Girl   Boy-Girl 
 FDa FDa DFDb   FDa FDa DFDb   FDa FDa DFDb 
Any e -2.25  
(1.69) 
-1.58 
(1.69) 
0.789  
(2.64) 
  -3.50* 
(1.69) 
-3.50* 
(1.72) 
-3.50* 
(1.72) 
  4.21** 
(1.45) 
4.21** 
(1.48) 
2.70 
(2.08) 
              
Any male f -2.98  
(1.84) 
-2.88 
(1.86) 
-1.06 
(2.90) 
  -2.57 
(1.87) 
-2.54 
(1.90) 
-2.54 
(1.90) 
  4.15* 
(1.74) 
4.09* 
(1.76) 
0.965 
(2.23) 
              
Father g -2.07 
(2.30) 
-2.25 
(1.97) 
-1.03 
(4.59) 
  2.09 
(2.84) 
2.30 
(2.87) 
2.30 
(2.87) 
  -1.04 
(2.06) 
-1.10 
(2.09) 
-2.09 
(2.34) 
              
Adult song -2.21 
(2.47) 
-1.97 
(2.48) 
0.175 
(3.46) 
  -3.12 
(2.36) 
-3.22 
(2.40) 
-3.22 
(2.40) 
  6.56*** 
(1.94) 
6.47** 
(1.98) 
2.42 
(2.86) 
              
Adult daughter g -0.053 
(3.05) 
2.25 
(2.73) 
3.71 
(5.08) 
  -5.20+ 
(3.11) 
-5.36+ 
(3.18) 
-5.36+ 
(3.18) 
  1.96 
(2.50) 
1.94 
(2.91) 
5.67 
(4.48) 
              
Observations 2,151 2,028 2,028   2,210 2,065 2,065   647 604 604 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.   + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanators.  
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Table 1.6. Estimated Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on the Allocation of Caregiving between Left-Behind Family 
Members 
 Mother-Boy Mother-Girl  Boy-Girl 
 FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb 
Anye -1.13 
(2.17) 
-1.14 
(1.96) 
0.738 
(3.25) 
 -1.73 
(2.19) 
-1.29 
(2.35) 
-1.12 
(2.85) 
 -1.32 
(1.31) 
-0.738 
(1.29) 
-2.32 
(1.83) 
            
Any male f -1.63 
(2.46) 
-2.33 
(2.22) 
-2.71 
(3.57) 
 -1.77 
(2.57) 
-1.78 
(2.74) 
0.200 
(3.10) 
 -1.18 
(1.46) 
-0.786 
(1.41) 
-3.65+ 
(1.90) 
            
Father g -2.56 
(3.62) 
-5.73* 
(2.71) 
-11.28* 
(5.30) 
 4.93 
(4.83) 
5.63 
(5.07) 
6.01 
(5.46) 
 0.272 
(2.32) 
0.230 
(1.62) 
-0.836 
(2.56) 
            
Adult song -1.55 
(2.91) 
-0.764 
(2.74) 
1.33 
(4.21) 
 -6.63** 
(2.34) 
-7.15** 
(2.47) 
-4.77 
(3.14) 
 -1.45 
(1.77) 
-2.32 
(1.90) 
-4.37+ 
(2.31) 
            
Adult daughter g 2.00 
(3.42) 
5.07 
(3.19) 
8.57 
(5.67) 
 0.041 
(3.43) 
2.00 
(3.65) 
-7.95 
(6.26) 
 -3.55 
(2.81) 
-3.34 
(3.28) 
-0.818 
(4.25) 
            
Observations 2,149 1,835 1,835  2,210 1,872 1,872  647 524 524 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanators. 
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Table 1.7. Estimated Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on the Allocation of Formal 
Education between Similar-age, Opposite-sex siblings 
 Base sample 13-17-Year Olds 
 FDa FDa DFDb FDa FDa DFDb 
Any e 
 
-2.30 
(5.15) 
-4.36 
(5.81) 
-7.28 
(6.59) 
-7.30 
(5.81) 
-7.80 
(5.94) 
-10.23 
(7.01) 
       
Any male f 
 
-8.63 
(5.44) 
-11.80+ 
(6.21) 
-15.59* 
(7.00) 
-16.46** 
(5.80) 
-16.78** 
(6.05) 
-19.95** 
(7.35) 
       
Father g 
 
5.05 
(6.64) 
5.64 
(8.10) 
-4.13 
(9.50) 
2.95 
(9.32) 
4.89 
(9.17) 
-5.32 
(11.08) 
       
Adult song 
 
-15.86* 
(6.23) 
-18.33** 
(6.59) 
-18.81* 
(7.99) 
-21.52* 
(5.47) 
-22.88** 
(5.71) 
-22.35** 
(7.90) 
       
Adult daughter g 
 
19.92** 
(7.35) 
20.12** 
(7.67) 
23.55* 
(9.12) 
21.08** 
(8.31) 
20.35* 
(7.67) 
23.80* 
(9.96) 
       
Observations 580 473 473 425 404 404 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and 
another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications 
contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at the household 
level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated 
with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the 
only migration explanator.  
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a 
specification with migration explanators Any male migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, 
and Adult daughter migrant from a single regression with these three migration explanators.
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Table 1.8. Estimated (Level) Effects of Mexico-to-U.S. Migration on Education of Left-Behind Boys and Girls 
 
 Boys  Girls 
 Weekly 
hours 
Enrollment = 
hours>0 
Enrollment = 
hours>5 
Enrollment = 
hours>10 
 Weekly 
hours 
Enrollment = 
hours>0 
Enrollment = 
hours>5 
Enrollment 
= hours>10 
Any e 0.464 
(2.93) 
0.033 
(0.088) 
-0.013 
(0.090) 
-0.004 
(0.085) 
 2.763 
(3.673) 
0.073 
(0.082) 
0.041 
(0.100) 
0.120 
(0.108) 
          
Any male f 
 
-3.68 
(3.27) 
-0.059 
(0.104) 
-0.125 
(0.104) 
-0.127 
(0.092) 
 4.94 
(3.92) 
0.033 
(0.096) 
0.084 
(0.101) 
0.251* 
(0.107) 
          
Father g 
 
4.56 
(5.62) 
0.135 
(0.137) 
0.198 
(0.171) 
0.160 
(0.151) 
 -0.484 
(5.78) 
-0.020 
(0.152) 
-0.039 
(0.152) 
0.069 
(0.150) 
          
Adult song 
 
-6.20+ 
(3.43) 
-0.113 
(0.126) 
-0.214+ 
(0.112) 
-0.234* 
(0.093) 
 9.67* 
(4.57) 
0.095 
(0.113) 
0.184 
(0.115) 
0.370** 
(0.119) 
          
Adult 
daughter g 
11.54* 
(5.01) 
0.321** 
(0.099) 
0.267+ 
(0.153) 
0.315+ 
(0.167) 
 -8.38 
(6.62) 
0.104 
(0.144) 
-0.221 
(0.221) 
-0.421* 
(0.187) 
          
Observations 580 580 580 580  580 580 580 580 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanators.  
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Table 1.9. Estimated Effects of Migration on the Allocation of Leisure between Left-Behind Family Members 
 Mother-Boy  Mother-Girl  Boy-Girl 
 FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb  FDa FDa DFDb 
Any e 
 
-0.719 
(1.34) 
 
-1.19 
(1.40) 
 
2.94 
(2.35) 
 0.183 
(1.31) 
 
0.094 
(1.38) 
 
1.29 
(2.01) 
 
 -1.76 
(3.48) 
 
-3.39 
(4.03) 
 
-5.87 
(6.18) 
 
            
Any male f 
 
-0.682 
(1.49) 
-1.03 
(1.55) 
2.54 
(2.62) 
 0.144 
(1.43) 
0.022 
(1.50) 
1.48 
(2.26) 
 -1.47 
(4.19) 
-4.85 
(4.70) 
-6.93 
(7.23) 
            
Father g 
 
-0.457 
(2.25) 
 
-1.35 
(2.28) 
 
10.39* 
(4.60) 
 -1.11 
(2.67) 
-1.47 
(2.75) 
-0.697 
(3.33) 
 0.164 
(7.35) 
-2.23 
(9.34) 
-6.99 
(12.14) 
            
Adult song 
 
-1.78 
(1.77) 
 
-1.75 
(1.86) 
 
-2.95 
(2.54) 
 1.13 
(1.58) 
 
1.15 
(1.67) 
 
2.33 
(2.79) 
 
 -0.812 
(4.69) 
 
-3.36 
(4.87) 
 
-3.19 
(8.73) 
 
            
Adult 
daughter g 
 
-2.43 
(2.50) 
-2.91 
(2.46) 
3.46 
(4.02) 
 2.03 
(2.81) 
2.12 
(3.23) 
4.08 
(3.66) 
 0.430 
(5.39) 
4.86 
(5.86) 
0.239 
(7.48) 
            
Observations 2,149 
 
1,834 
 
1,834 
 
 2,209 
 
1,869 
 
1,869 
 
 647 
 
524 
 
524 
 
Notes: Samples restricted to members of two-parent families with at least one 13-17-year old child and another minor child in wave 2. Agricultural 
work samples restricted to rural areas. All specifications contain other explanators, as described in the narrative. Standard errors are clustered at 
the household level.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
aFamily difference specification estimated with OLS.  
bFamily difference specification, dependent variable incorporates wave 1 time-use information, estimated with OLS. 
eRow contains estimated coefficients and standard deviations for a specification where Any migrant is the only migration explanator. 
fRow contains  the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Any male migrant for a specification with migration explanators Any male 
migrant and Adult daughter migrant. 
gRow contains the estimated coefficients and standard deviations from Father migrant, Adult son migrant, and Adult daughter migrant from a 
single regression with these three migration explanator 
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CHAPTER 2. MIGRATION, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO 
 
2.1 Introduction 
What makes an entrepreneur? This is a nontrivial question in studying development economics. 
The entrepreneur is a key figure for authors like Schumpeter (1934) because, quite simply, s/he 
is the persona causa of economic development. Among factors that affect entrepreneurship, 
migration means not only changes in income and physical capital, as well as investments in 
human capital and social capital, but also shocks to preferences, especially attitudes toward risk. 
The widespread reallocation of labor forces across regions and countries calls for research to 
inquire how migration shapes the entrepreneurial behavior of migrants and their families. There 
has been evidence showing that migrants are more likely to be self-employed and become 
entrepreneurs than natives in host countries and, to some extent, even make better entrepreneurs 
(e.g., Borjas [1986], Light and Bhachu [1993], Lofstrom [2002], OECD [2010], and Hunt 
[2011]). Research also finds a higher level of entrepreneurial activities among returnees to home 
countries than non-migrants (e.g., Ilahi [1999], McCormick and Wahba [2001], Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp [2002], and Piracha and Vadean [2010]). How about family members, especially 
women, left behind in home countries? Do they become more actively engaged in 
entrepreneurship when some members are absent on account of migration? These questions have 
not yet been well explored in the economic literature, but constitute another essential dimension 
of the migration effect on entrepreneurship. Answers to such questions are crucial for 
understanding the occupational choice and economic wellbeing of left-behind people, small 
business development, and employment creation in sending communities. 
Mexico provides a promising locus for studying these issues. The Mexican labor force is 
distinguished by high rates of both international migration and entrepreneurship (Thom and Xu 
[2010]). It is relatively common for Mexican families to have some migrant members. The left-
behind are not just children and elderly people but also include working-age adults, especially 
45 
 
women, who are potential entrepreneurs.16 Self-employment differs from wage-earning activities 
in its nature and, as such, is often used in the literature as a proxy for entrepreneurship in a broad 
sense (e.g., Evans and Leighton [1989], Blanchflower and Oswald [1998], Lazear [2004], and 
Cagetti and De Nardi [2006]). 17 OECD (2005) ranked Mexico as one of the three member 
countries with the highest rate of self-employment along with Korea and Turkey. Among OECD 
countries, female self-employment was observed to grow by a large amount from 2003 to 2005 
only in Mexico and two other countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic), which coincides 
with the time period of the survey data used in this paper and the expansion of Mexico-to-U.S. 
migration (OECD [2005]). It is natural to consider whether there is a link between high 
migration and self-employment in Mexico and whether the development of female 
entrepreneurship is somehow related to migration. It is also of special interest to understand 
female occupational choice for a developing country like Mexico, where only about 30% of 
married and 50% of single women are employed.18 
From a theoretical viewpoint, there are potentially multiple channels through which migration 
may affect entrepreneurial choice. It is thus an empirical question to evaluate the net effect. 
Using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), this paper is one of the first studies 
to investigate the implications of international migration for the entrepreneurial behavior of non-
migrants in sending families. Another contribution of this paper is to add new evidence on the 
role of financial constraints in relating migration to entrepreneurship. Remittances and higher 
family income associated with migration, due to the wage differences across the border, may 
release the financial constraints that left-behind family members previously faced. In this way, 
the analysis yields an in-depth understanding of the main mechanism behind the migration effect. 
By examining the differential effects of migration across gender, this study also contributes to 
the literature on female entrepreneurship that remains underrepresented, at least as it relates to 
migration. 
                                                          
16 International migration is male dominated in Mexico. See Section 2.3 for more details. 
17 Being common practice does not justify that self-employment is a perfect measure of entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of self-employment is one important step toward understanding 
entrepreneurship. 
18 These figures are derived from the author's calculations using data from the Mexican Family Life 
Survey. 
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Random selection of migration is rare in the real world. To make causal inferences, it is crucial 
to control for important confounding factors. This paper addresses the endogeneity and self-
selection issues using three plausible alternative strategies: controlling for lagged dependent 
variable, fixed effects (FE) modeling, and the instrumental variable (IV) approach, following the 
suggestion of Angrist and Pischke (2009). Inferences are made based on those broadly similar 
results and robust findings. There is scant research with successful application of the panel data 
approach in the literature of migration mainly because of data limitations, despite the fact that 
many researchers have encouraged its use.  
The panel structure of the MxFLS data allows for a comparison between the outcomes of the 
same respondent before and after the incident of migration relative to the comparable respondent 
in the base group. This application of the FE method strengthens the identification and empirical 
findings. Given the debates over instrumental variables used in migration related studies, this 
paper chooses a less controversial variable, prior migration network, in light of the strong path 
dependence of migration. 
In relation to the existing literature, this paper is close to the work of Woodruff and Zenteno 
(2007). Specifically, their examination of the impact of attachment to migration networks on the 
performance of microenterprises in Mexico found migration to be associated with higher capital 
investment and higher profit. The research question in this paper is different from theirs in two 
main aspects. First, their study restricted the sample of analysis to existing microenterprises and 
focused on their behavior on the intensive margin of capital use, production, and profit. In 
contrast, this paper examines the creation of new and nascent enterprises and entrepreneurs on 
the extensive margin, i.e. probability of occurrence. Second, they only considered 
microenterprises in urban Mexico, while the analysis of this paper covers both urban and rural 
areas. The inclusion of rural areas is important given that rural residents account for 45% of male 
and 33% of female Mexico-to-U.S. migrants (Fernández-Huertas Moraga [2013]). Moreover, the 
development of entrepreneurship is arguably more important for long-term poverty reduction in 
rural areas. 
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Another paper that relates to this research is Yang's (2008). That study investigated the influence 
of remittances' change generated by the exchange rate fluctuation, during the Asian financial 
crisis, on household's participation in entrepreneurial activities and entrepreneurial income. This 
paper differs from Yang's work by looking at individual's (not only household's) entrepreneurial 
choice from a perspective of gender inequality.19 Moreover, the methods used in the two papers 
are different with regard to identifying the mechanism of the migration effect at play.20 
To preview the findings, striking evidence shows that Mexico-to-U.S. migration spurs entrepren-
eurship in sending families. The preferred estimates indicate that having a current U.S. migrant 
family member increases an individual's participation in entrepreneurship by at least 50% 
relative to the mean. The analysis documents a strong gender inequality with a larger positive 
effect of migration going to female entrepreneurs. Migration is also found to be more important 
to individuals who faced prior financial constraints. The additional tests provide evidence that 
migration gives them better access to the credit market. In other words, individuals may leverage 
the remittances they receive. Entrepreneurship may be seen either as a survival strategy for those 
who cannot find other means of income earning or as evidence of entrepreneurial spirit and the 
desire to own businesses. With respect to these motives, the greater effect of ongoing migration 
on the self-employment of individuals with the least household wealth seems to favor the idea 
that the observed boost in entrepreneurship is more necessity-based than opportunity-driven. 
However, the financial channel does not absorb all of the migration effect on left-behind women. 
Therefore, males may join in entrepreneurship due to economic necessity while females may 
choose to become entrepreneurs for more than that reason alone. 
These results have deep policy implications. Development programs such as microcredit may 
enhance entrepreneurship by relaxing credit constraints. Migration may not necessarily 
                                                          
19 Yang (2008) provided some evidence on individual's self-employment. However, the sample only 
includes 10-17-year old children whose participation rate in the labor force and entrepreneurship is very 
low. Furthermore, the evidence was mainly interpreted alongside other human capital outcomes of 
children. 
20 Yang (2008) employed the variation of capital intensity of specific types of entrepreneurial activities to 
identify whether financial constraints matter or not. This paper examines individual and household's 
access to the credit market and the migration effect for individuals whose financial constraints are most 
likely to be binding without migration. 
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undermine the economies of sending communities and regions, but it may, in fact, actually lead 
to a higher level of entrepreneurial activities among the left-behind. Further, these policies may 
exert greater influences on female entrepreneurship. More women-oriented programs are yet to 
be introduced, and they can be effective indeed. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 develops a framework for understanding the link 
between migration and entrepreneurship. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the data and empirical 
strategy, respectively. Section 2.5 reports and interprets the findings. Section 2.6 concludes with 
a discussion of policy implications. 
2.2 How Would Migration Affect Entrepreneurship? 
This section provides grounding for the link between migration and entrepreneurship. From a 
theoretical perspective, the seminal model by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) provided a useful 
framework for thinking about individual entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints. In 
particular, their work used a parameter (multiple) to measure the degree of liquidity constraints 
and argued that the financial capital that one can invest in a business is the multiple of individual 
assets (or wealth). In an economy with imperfect credit markets, this multiple is smaller than 
infinity. This model, then, has two important implications. First, individuals with high 
entrepreneurial ability opt for entrepreneurship. Second, new businesses are financially 
constrained, and the amount of capital available for investment is limited by personal wealth. 
In the empirical literature, the inadequacy of individual and household assets as well as the lack 
of credit access is regarded as the main obstacle to entrepreneurial development in both 
developed and developing countries. For example, a recent study by Chatterji and Seamans 
(2012) documented that the deregulation of the U.S. credit market expanded the access to credit, 
allowing liquidity-constrained individuals to borrow, and increased the rate of new business 
formation. In the developing world, previous research found evidence from a wide range of 
countries that returnees are more likely than non-migrants to be entrepreneurs because they can 
use personal wealth accumulated during migration to start businesses (see Ilahi [1999] for the 
case of Pakistan; Dustmann and Kirchkamp [2002] for Turkey; Mesnard [2004] for Tunis; 
Woodruff and Zenteno [2007] and Bercovitz, Martens and Savage [2013] for Mexico; and 
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Wahba and Zenou [2012] for Egypt). Meanwhile, policymakers in developing countries have 
supported microcredit programs in an effort to provide basic access to credit as a means of 
promoting self-employment, reducing poverty and empowering socially-excluded persons, 
especially women (Brana [2013]). 
According to the same argument and under the assumption that family members pool resources, 
the concept remains that remittances sent by migrants lead to better financial conditions for left-
behind members and enable them to finance their business ideas. Previous literature identified 
intra-family wealth transfer as a major channel underlying the observed family links in 
entrepreneurship (Parker [2008]). The creation of new businesses may be financed using the 
monetary remittances themselves or by leveraging remittances through borrowing, or a 
combination of the two modes. In particular, left-behind individuals may use the expected future 
cash transfer from their migrant family members to secure loans that they would not otherwise 
be able to acquire. This is especially relevant when the local credit market is underdeveloped.21 
Nevertheless, the prediction of the net use of loans to finance business ideas remains 
undetermined and constitutes an empirical question; this is because remittances may also 
substitute loans for families with financial shortages in some cases (Ambrosius and Cuecuecha 
[2013]). 
Reducing financial barriers via migration may have a greater impact on women than men. In 
general, women are more likely to be unemployed and face discrimination in the gender-
segmented labor market. They may demand more necessity-based entrepreneurial activities but 
face obstacles to access the credit market. This may be due to the adverse selection of banks, 
since women's business ideas are less attractive to banks and considered small and risky (Brana 
[2013]). In some instances, women also experience more difficulties in providing collateral as 
they average lower personal earnings than men. In such situations, the lack of financing sources 
puts women at a disadvantage to men when trying to create their own businesses. Both the direct 
relaxation of financial constraints through remittances and the indirect conveniences in obtaining 
                                                          
21 This argument is similar to that established by Angelucci (2013), who provided evidence showing that 
potential poor migrants use the expected cash transfer from a welfare program (Oportunidades) as 
collateral to borrow and finance their trip to the U.S. rather than using the transfer itself. 
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loans associated with migration appear more important for the development of female 
entrepreneurship. 
Cross-border migration usually exposes migrants to knowledge and information, which can be 
transferred to family members remaining at home, known as “social remittances.” This type of 
information dispersion is likely to bring more business ideas and knowledge of innovations to 
sending families. Bercovitz, Martens and Savage (2013) found that cross-border work experience 
may reduce key entrepreneurial obstacles as migrants who gain human capital through on-the-job 
training while working in the U.S. and those who are exposed to an entrepreneurial-supportive 
social context via employment in entrepreneurial firms in the U.S. are more likely to employ 
remittances for entrepreneurial activities. With such knowledge spillover within families, the 
entrepreneurial ability of non-migrant individuals may be increased. In other words, migration 
may also work via the second key element of Evans and Jovanovic's (1989) model, i.e. 
entrepreneurial ability. 
In short, migration can make it easier for left-behind family members to raise capital. Knowledge 
dispersion may inspire new ideas. Since knowledge, entrepreneurial ability, and business ideas 
are not observed in the MxFLS data, the focus will be given to credit access when examining the 
mechanism behind the migration effect on entrepreneurship. However, migration does not 
necessarily shape the emergence of new businesses in a stimulative way. For example, left-
behind family members may be occupied with many of the duties previously performed by 
migrants. It may be more difficult for them to operate enterprises on account of the lack of labor 
help and emotional support that occurs when migrants are absent from home. Migration also 
means shocks to preferences, but the impact is ambiguous. Therefore, careful empirical research 
is needed to understand the net effect of migration on entrepreneurship of the left-behind, to 
which the rest of this paper is devoted. 
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2.3 Data and Variables 
2.3.1 Data Set 
The data used in this paper are from the first two waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS), completed in 2002 and 2006 respectively. The MxFLS is the first Mexican survey 
with national representation and a longitudinal design, tracking the population for long periods of 
time, regardless of residential decisions. The initial survey interviewed over 35,000 individuals 
from 8,440 households in 150 communities nationwide (Rubalcava and Teruel [2006]). The 
follow-up wave has a recontact rate of 90% at the household level (Rubalcava and Teruel 
[2008]). 
The MxFLS contains detailed information on demographic characteristics, employment, 
occupation, business ownership, and access to credit, which is essential to this research. The 
information on international and domestic migration, as well as non-migration absence, is also 
available from the MxFLS data. The same respondent and household are tracked over time in the 
MxFLS. Entry into entrepreneurship following migration, by starting an enterprise or entering 
self-employment, is then observed in the MxFLS data. These distinctive features render the 
MxFLS data set ideal for the purpose of this paper. 
2.3.2 Sample 
To construct a sample for this study, it is important to recall some important patterns of Mexico-
to-U.S. migration. First, Mexico-to-U.S. migration is male dominated. Using data from Mexico's 
2005 labor force survey, Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) showed that 64% of domestic 
migrants were male, while the percentage of male migrants to the U.S. was as high as 81%. 
Second, the fraction of female U.S. migrants has been increasing over the past two decades 
(Marcelli and Cornelius [2001]). 
To maintain focus on the migration effect on left-behind family members, this study restricts the 
sample to all adult members from households with at least two members aged between 15 and 59 
years old at the time of the MxFLS-1. The MxFLS requires all respondents older than 14 to 
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answer an “adult” questionnaire. This is not surprising given that 14 is the minimum legal age to 
work in Mexico.  
This paper simply defines children who are older than 14 as adult children and explicitly state 
when 18 is used as the cutoff age for adulthood. The unit of observation is then an individual 
member, who could be a mother, father or adult child, or the household as a whole. 22  In 
particular, inactive workers may have withdrawn from the labor force and may be less affected 
by migration or other economic shocks. As such, a subsample of active workers is also 
constructed to include only those who were employed at the time of the MxFLS-2.23  
The restriction on the sample is imposed to reduce the heterogeneity of sampled households and 
to ensure that they all have the same type of migrant candidates: parents, spouses, siblings, and 
adult children. It also facilitates the empirical analysis on occupational choice, given that all 
individuals in the sample are prime-age (15-59) men and women.  Young children or elderly 
people, who have not entered or have already withdrawn from the labor markets, are not the 
focus of this paper. 
In the end, this construction leads to a sample of nearly 2,100 households, which consist of about 
7,400 adult individuals living in Mexico in both waves of the MxFLS. 
2.3.3 Variables 
The primary explanatory variable of interest is whether left-behind individuals have a current 
Mexico-to-U.S. migrant family member or not. Migrants who departed from Mexico before the 
second wave of the survey, i.e. before the MxFLS-1 or between the MxFLS-1 and 2, and were 
still living in the U.S. in 2006 are identified from the migration panel of the MxFLS-2. To ensure 
that migrants and their left-behind family members have strong interactions involving economic 
activities, the family relationship between migrants and non-migrants are restricted to parents, 
spouses, children, and siblings. Return migrants are excluded because the decision to return is 
                                                          
22 The analysis at the household level can be found in Appendix B. 
23 Some respondents who were unemployed may be searching for jobs so they were still in the labor force. 
However, the MxFLS does not have a direct question to identify those who were still looking for jobs and 
those who had stopped searching. 
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likely to be endogenous and depends on the ex post realizations of their migration experiences 
(Kaestner and Malamud [2013]). Labeled as any “migration,” the migration variable is binary, 
indicating whether or not a left-behind individual has any migrant parent, spouse, child or sibling 
relation in the U.S. who departed Mexico before 2006 and who was still residing in the U.S. at 
that time. It should be noted that this definition does not guarantee that all migrants moved to the 
U.S. for economic reasons. In Section 2.5, however, I will provide evidence showing that it is, in 
fact, very close to economic migration. 
Notice that the definition of migration used in this paper is based on an extended family network. 
Previous work has documented the importance of focusing on extended family relationships as 
an informal unit for risk sharing and capital acquisition (see Angelucci et al. [2009]). This paper 
follows Angelucci et al. (2009) and considers both intergenerational links (parents and children) 
and intragenerational links (spouses and siblings). 
Table 2.1 groups migrants according to their relationship with left-behind members. For the left-
behind individuals analyzed, 409 out of 7385 (5.5%) have a migrant child living in the U.S., 826 
(11.2%) have a migrant sibling, 85 (1.2%) have a migrant parent, and 66 (0.9%) have a migrant 
spouse. The incidences of migration in the first four columns sum up to the number in the last 
column. That is, 1386 (18.8%) individuals have a close migrant relative in the U.S. at the time of 
MxFLS-2. This fraction is higher than that in the Mexico Census: According to the Census 2000, 
6.2% of Mexican households had some household member who left to live in another country in 
the period of 1995-1999, preceding the survey. It is not surprising to see a higher migration rate 
in the MxFLS data. First, both the fraction and the number of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. 
stably increased over time during the period of 2000-2007, before the financial crisis. Second, 
the transnational ties in this paper are based on family relationships. In other words, migrants and 
left-behind persons do not have to live in the same household before migration occurred. If 
eligible migrants are restricted to those originating from left-behind individuals' households, the 
rate of having a migrant among sampled individuals from the MxFLS data becomes very close to 
that in the Census. 
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Some interesting patterns of Mexico-to-U.S. migration are also observed in the MxFLS data. In 
the subgroup of migrants who have reported their demographic information, the analysis shows 
that daughter-migrants are more prevalent than father-migrants in this sample, which is 
consistent with the increasing trend of female migration discussed above. The male-to-female 
ratio of U.S. migrants is also in line with that calculated from other sources showing that nearly 
75% of trips to the U.S. longer than 1 year were achieved by males. Further, it is adult children, 
not parents (in particular fathers), that are the dominant group of U.S. migrants, and this finding 
is consistent with demographic characteristics of Mexican migrants in the U.S. (Hanson and 
McIntosh [2010]). 
A set of dependent variables are employed to measure entrepreneurship. Participation in 
entrepreneurship is proxied by the status of self-employment as a broad measure and the status of 
being an employer as a narrow measure.  Both variables are binary and have appeared in the 
literature of entrepreneurship. Self-employed individuals earn no wage or salary but derive 
income from exercising their profession or business on their own account and at their own risk.24 
In the MxFLS data, both measures are identified using the original survey question, “What's your 
position or role in the main job?” A person is counted as self-employed if s/he reported as self-
employed, working in a family business as an unpaid worker or a boss, employer or business 
proprietor. A person is counted as an employer only if s/he reported as working as a boss, 
employer or business proprietor. Farmers working on their own plots are not counted as 
entrepreneurs in either case. 
This paper considers broad self-employment as the preferred measure of entrepreneurship 
because self-employment has further-reaching implications for poverty reduction in Mexico. 
Previous studies (e.g., Fairlie and Woodruff [2007]) documented that the majority of self-
employed Mexicans work by themselves, if separate own-account workers from employers. The 
fraction of own-account workers in all entrepreneurs is 88% for males and 89% for females. In 
the MxFLS data, the fraction of employers is 20% in all self-employed persons identified above 
and 2.5% in all sampled individuals. The low frequency of being an employer increases the 
                                                          
24 Self-employed workers in the Mexico Census are those who report themselves as employers or workers 
on their own account in the week preceding the survey (Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007). 
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challenge to examine the migration effect on entrepreneurial behavior. Nevertheless, on account 
of the importance of opportunity-based entrepreneurship and associated job creation, this paper 
also analyzes the influence of migration on left-behind family members becoming employers and 
considers it as complementary evidence to the main findings on self-employment. 
Other covariate variables, including individual, household, and household head's demographic 
characteristic are controlled for in regressions. An individual's age, gender, education, and 
cognitive ability, measured by Raven's score,25 determine her/his time allocation. All of this 
information is directly available from roster files. Household income is a main factor for 
explaining occupational choice, but it is endogenous to the dependent variables. Consequently, 
the level of household assets is used as a substitute, given that it is relatively exogenous in the 
short run. Following Kaestner and Malamud (2013), household asset level is defined as the 
aggregated pecuniary value of housing and land, bicycles and motor vehicles, electronic and 
kitchen appliances, savings and financial assets, farming equipment, and livestock. The sample 
quintile membership of the individual's household in the distribution of household assets is 
included as a dummy variable in regressions. Household structure determines both the demand 
and supply of housework and market production as well as the strength of family ties. In 
particular, the number of young children (0-6 years old) is entered into regressions because they 
are more likely to influence the labor force participation and occupational choice of females.26 
Shocks that hit families between the two waves of the survey such as death, sickness or 
unemployment of some members are also observed from the MxFLS data and are controlled for 
in my analysis. Following Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), original states are grouped into six 
regions: north, south, capital, center, border, and other. Regional dummy variables can absorb 
the heterogeneity in aggregate supply and demand and other factors in local labor markets. 
The strength of the local economy also influences the decision to become an entrepreneur. The 
community module of the MxFLS makes it possible to construct contextual variables to control 
                                                          
25 The test consists of a series of color figures that measure visual reasoning ability. 
26 According to previous studies, a woman is less likely to participate in income-generating work if she 
has a child younger than 6. Fertility may be endogenously determined within a family along with the 
decision of migration and occupational choice. It is not especially desirable to use fertility as a control 
variable if migration defers fertility. The findings are not sensitive if fertility is excluded from the 
regression models. 
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for the potential influence of community economic environment. First, different sectors may 
have different distributions of entrepreneurship. The original MxFLS reports 12 major sectors: 
farming, cattle/forestry/hunting/fishing, metallurgy, mining and excavation, manufacturing, 
assembly plant, electricity/gas/water/petroleum, construction, wholesale and retail commerce, 
transportation/storage/media, finance and insurance, and social services. 27  A set of dummy 
variables are created, accordingly, to capture the variety of industries and productive activities at 
the community level. Second, if there is a sufficient supply of well-paid formal jobs around, self-
employment or small enterprise options may become less appealing. Two additional variables at 
the community level to capture the attractiveness of being employed are hourly wages of adult 
male and female laborers. It is expected that the higher the average wage is, the lower the 
probability that an individual from this community will work as self-employed. 
Table 2.2 displays the summary statistics for dependent and independent variables. In the full 
sample, 13% of respondents reported as self-employed in 2006. In the active worker subsample, 
the rate is as high as 25% for the same year.28 Males are relatively less representative than 
females (44% vs. 56%). All respondents averaged at 33 years old and 6.4 years of schooling. 
Raven's score averages at 1 by definition (standardization). Individuals are from households with 
6 total members, 4.6 prime-age adults (15-59 years old) and 0.4 young children (0-6 years old) 
on average. As regards the geographical region, nearly 40% of individuals are from the center 
areas. Rural residents account for 45% of the observations. In addition to the migration shock, 7% 
of individuals experienced the loss of a household member, 12% experienced a sick member, 8% 
experienced an unemployed member, and 4% experienced a natural disaster, such as flood, 
between 2002 and 2006.29 The final rows present the summary of community-leading enterprises 
and average hourly wage by sex. 
                                                          
27 This classification is similar to that of the U.S. Census. 
28 The rate of self-employment is usually calculated as the ratio of the number of self-employed people to 
the total number of employed people in empirical research. 
29 In the MxFLS data, it is observed whether or not such a shock arrived between the two waves of the 
survey, but not the specific time if it occurred. 
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2.4 Empirical Strategy 
Random selection of migration is a useful benchmark but not a very realistic assumption. In most 
cases, migration from Mexico to the U.S. is correlated with confounding factors that affect both 
migration and entrepreneurship. Therefore, the key to the causal inferences of the migration 
effect is to control for important confounding factors that could be observed or unobserved. This 
paper uses three plausible alternative strategies introduced below to ensure the robustness of the 
findings and draws inferences based on those broadly similar results. 
2.4.1 Cross Sectional Analysis 
To start, assume that migration is randomly assigned to individuals. The treatment group consists 
of adult individuals who have migrant family members living in the U.S. in 2006, while the base 
group consists of adults who have no current U.S. migrant members. Family background in the 
base group is heterogeneous because it includes families (1) without U.S. migrants but with 
domestic migrants to other cities or localities in Mexico, (2) without any type of migrants but 
with some members left for non-migration reasons, and (3) without any absent members. The 
focus of this paper is on the average difference in the outcomes between individuals from 
families with U.S. migrants and those from all types of non-U.S.-migrant-sending families.30 
Consider individual 𝑖 from household ℎ. The baseline model is then specified as 
(2.1) 𝑦𝑖ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖ℎ + 𝛽2𝑋ℎ + 𝛾𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑖ℎ + 𝑒𝑖ℎ 
where 𝑦𝑖ℎ  is the outcome variable showing the status of self-employment or employership in 
2006, 𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑖ℎ  is the explanatory variable of interest, which is a dummy variable indicating 
whether some family member of individual 𝑖 is a U.S. migrant or not, and 𝑋𝑖ℎ and 𝑋ℎ are vectors 
of control variables at the individual and household levels. Coefficient 𝛾 measures the average 
overall effect of U.S. migration on the entrepreneurship of left-behind persons. When the 
                                                          
30  This difference is arguably more important than that generated by other types of absence for 
entrepreneurship given the substantially higher income and longer duration associated with U.S. 
migration. 
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exogeneity hypothesis cannot be rejected, the above cross sectional analysis yields consistent 
estimates. Otherwise, the results could be biased and misleading. 
The estimation is based on the linear probability model (LPM) to get an intuitive interpretation 
of coefficient 𝛾 as the probability that the outcome variable equals 1 given migration and other 
control variables. The results from Probit regressions are very similar and hence not reported in 
this paper. The control variables entered in regressions include individual characteristics (sex, 
age, education, and cognitive ability), household characteristics (household assets, family 
structure, and rural locality), geographical dummies, unexpected shocks (death, illness, 
unemployment of some household member, and natural disaster), and community environment 
for employment and business (leading industry, and gender-specific wage rate). It is important to 
note that the coefficient 𝛾 is interpreted as the effect of ongoing migration, not involving return 
migration. 
The analysis then proceeds with the relaxed assumption that past entrepreneurial experience, 
which is time varying, is an important confounding variable for migration. In other words, what 
makes being assigned to a migrant family special is the previous status of entrepreneurship of the 
individual being analyzed. This may occur when an individual's employment and income affect 
the family's ability to send a member abroad. To address this type of endogeneity, equation (2.1) 
is re-estimated by including a dummy variable for the status of self-employment or employership 
at the time of the MxFLS-1, which is the lagged dependent variable. This new model, in fact, 
controls for the initial status of entrepreneurship directly. The estimated coefficient 𝛾 would be 
consistent if individuals are randomly assigned to migrant and non-migrant families, conditional 
on their initial entrepreneurial status. 
2.4.2 Fixed Effects Model 
Another type of confounding factors are unobserved but fixed over time. For example, families 
with a higher earning ability could afford to send family members abroad and at the same time, 
may tend to operate businesses. Family members who share the same attitudes toward 
undertaking risks due to their personalities may be more likely to migrate to the U.S. and start 
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businesses. In both cases, the LPM estimates are biased upwards and the observed correlation 
between migration and the entrepreneurial behavior of left-behind family members is spurious. 
To correct for this type of endogeneity, this paper exploits the panel structure of the MxFLS data 
and implement the fixed effects (FE) approach to further evaluate the migration effect. Since 
each individual has only two observations, in 2002 and 2006 respectively, the FE approach is 
equivalent to the first order differencing. Having repeated observations helps to rule out the 
influences of some unobserved factors and leads to consistent estimates if all important 
confounding factors are invariant over time. 
Rewrite the model as 
(2.2) 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋ℎ𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖ℎ + 𝜃ℎ + 𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 
where the outcome variable 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 is the status of self-employment or employership at time 𝑡, the 
control variables 𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑡 and 𝑋ℎ𝑡 represent individual and household characteristics observed at 𝑡, 
the migration variable 𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑖ℎ𝑡 indicates whether having any family member living in the U.S. 
or not at 𝑡, 𝜇𝑖ℎ and 𝜃ℎ denotes unobserved and time invariant characteristics of the individual and 
the household, and  𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 stands for the error term. Time index 𝑡 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2 represents the wave of 
the survey in which an observation is made. 
Taking first difference over 𝑡 gives 
(2.3) ∆𝑦𝑖ℎ ≡ 𝑦𝑖ℎ2 − 𝑦𝑖ℎ1 = 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑖ℎ + 𝛽2∆𝑋ℎ + 𝛾∆𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑖ℎ + ∆𝑒𝑖ℎ 
The unobserved time-invariant factors that relate to both the dependent variable and the 
migration variable are then removed. Therefore, the migration effect 𝛾 is identified by the FE 
approach under valid assumptions. The key for causal inferences using FE estimates is that 
migration is randomly assigned to Mexicans conditional on these fixed omitted variables. 
However, the FE estimates should be interpreted with caution. The FE approach may attenuate 
the migration-entrepreneurship relationship due to bias arising from measurement error. The 
differenced regressors may become noisier, and measurement error tends to bias the FE estimates 
down to zero. 
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2.4.3 Instrumental Variable Strategy 
The last strategy is to re-estimate the migration effect using the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. As discussed above, the FE approach may not be able to rule out the confounding 
effect of time varying factors or reverse causality, especially when the timing of migration and of 
starting businesses is not observed in the data. Given the debates over instrumental variables 
used in migration related studies, this paper chooses a less controversial variable, prior migration 
network, to predict the likelihood of current migration. All models are estimated using two stage 
least squares. 
The migration prevalence variable is constructed using the Mexico Census 2000 (10.6% sample) 
and the associated international migration supplement from the IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010). 
Following Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), this paper 
defines migration prevalence as the proportion of households in a municipality that have at least 
one migrant during the time period of 1995-1999. According to Mexico Census, a migrant is one 
who left to live in another country, primarily to the U.S., during the five years preceding the 
survey. This definition includes both permanent and temporary migrants, as well as current and 
returned (at the time of Census) migrants. It, however, does rule out non-economic trips to the 
U.S. for vacation, work assignment, visits to relatives, or other related reasons (Ruggles et al., 
2010). There are at least two advantages of using the Mexico Census 2000 to calculate municipal 
migration prevalence. First, to consider migration rates during 1995-1999 is more helpful for 
capturing the average trend of migration prevalence than is the migration rate obtained from a 
single year. Second, municipality is the smallest geography in the Census. Migration prevalence 
defined at the municipality level has more variation than that defined at the state level. 
The rationale behind the correlation of historical network and current individual migration is that 
migration exhibits strong path dependence and that the local strength of migration in history was 
exogenously determined by the demand in the U.S. labor market and the spread of the railroads. 
To put it differently, some states and municipalities, mainly from west central Mexico, have high 
migration rates due to historical and socioeconomic factors. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2011) and 
Sellars (2011) provided more details about such historical factors that determined migration 
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prevalence in history, including the rail lines constructed in 1920. As networks lower the cost of 
migration for future migrants, they become self-perpetuating and continue to influence the 
migration decisions of households today. Therefore, migration streams from different states and 
municipalities have then reinforced themselves over time. High migration municipalities remain 
dependent on migration, while migration in new sending areas grows gradually over time. 
The key identification assumption is that municipal migration rate with a 5-year lag does not 
affect an individual's current entrepreneurial choices, apart from its influence via ongoing 
migration. In particular, the identification of the migration effect requires the independence 
between municipal migration rates and municipal average unmeasured characteristics affecting 
entrepreneurship, e.g. economic conditions, financial depth, and aggregate demand to goods and 
services provided by self-employed workers and small businesses. 
Several issues may potentially threaten the validity of the instrument and therefore need to be 
addressed. The first issue is the potential correlation between aggregate migration network and 
the distribution of entrepreneurial ability (especially if the influence of entrepreneurial ability is 
persistent). However, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) established evidence suggesting that the rail 
lines were not significantly correlated with the distribution of entrepreneurial ability at the time 
of early migration. 
The second potential challenge is that aggregate migration prevalence may be correlated with 
other factors, like aggregate demand and financial depth, affecting the development of local 
entrepreneurs. The following methods address this concern. 
First, previous studies indicated that the same group of states and municipalities with high 
migration rates in history continue to supply the largest number of migrants to the U.S. The 
pattern has not changed through many dramatic shifts in politics and policy on either side of the 
border (Mckenzie and Rapoport [2007]). A recent study by Bachmeier (2013) also confirmed 
that international migration from Mexico to the U.S. from 1995-2000 is largely a function of the 
volume at migrants' point of origin a decade prior. Previous networks determine the prevalence 
of a municipality's migration more so than other factors. The influence of confounding factors 
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that could affect the development of local entrepreneurs on changing migration prevalence 
should be minimal. 
Moreover, I argue that the definition of migration based on extended family ties has partially 
alleviated this concern. The fact that family ties could be geographically dispersed to spread risk 
indicates that the non-migrants being analyzed and their migrant relatives are not necessarily 
originated from the same community. Therefore, individuals in a community may have different 
connections to migration but face the same market conditions. This argument is similar to that of 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), who relied on the group of entrepreneurs whose states of birth are 
distinct from their states of residence to address this type of confounding effect. 
Moreover, because the current data does not allow for a clear identification of all migrants' 
geographic places of origin in Mexico, the method of McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) is applied 
in this paper to control for a number of lagged variables around the same time period as the 
lagged measure of migration prevalence. The controls are average employment rate, average 
literacy rate and educational attainment. 31  Meanwhile, controlling for community-level 
economic characteristics (e.g., male and female wage rates as well as the type of leading 
enterprise) may also help to address the potential influence of confounding aggregate factors. 
I use the method of two-stage least square (2SLS) to estimate the model, which should perform 
well when the focus is on the direct interpretation of the causal effect rather the estimation of the 
precise coefficient (Acosta [2011]). 
2.5 Findings 
2.5.1 Baseline Results 
This section first presents empirical evidence from cross sectional estimation, with or without 
controlling for the initial status of entrepreneurship. In particular, gender differences in the effect 
of migration on entrepreneurial behavior are documented. 
Self-Employment 
                                                          
31 Notably, the potential correlation between these variables and migration prevalence may represent the 
influence of migration over the 1995-1999 period. 
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Table 2.3 presents the LPM findings of the migration effect. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable indicating the status of self-employment in 2006. The variable of U.S. migration in the 
first row is the main regressor of interest. Models are estimated without (columns (1)-(2)) and 
with (columns (3)-(6)) the initial entrepreneurial status being controlled for. In particular, the 
initial status of entrepreneurship are controlled for in different ways: The lagged dependent 
variable is included as an additional regressor in columns (3)-(4), while the sample for analysis is 
restricted to non-entrepreneurs in the initial wave of the survey in columns (5)-(6).32 The purpose 
of restricting the analysis to non-initial-entrepreneurs is to exclude the potential influence of 
withdrawal from self-employment. This approach of tailoring the sample allows the dependent 
variable to clearly represent entry into entrepreneurship between the two waves of the survey. A 
comparison between columns (3)-(4) and columns (5)-(6) may reveal whether the findings are 
influenced by the multiple categories of occupational transition between 2002 and 2006. For 
each specification, the estimates are presented using the full sample and the active worker 
subsample with the same set of control variables. 
Table 2.3 provides strong evidence that the probability of self-employment of left-behind 
persons correlates with the U.S. migration of a family member. The higher probability of 
becoming new and nascent entrepreneurs leads to the higher participation rate in self-
employment observed in 2006. For the three pairs of regressions, the direction and the magnitude 
of the migration effect estimated with and without (not reported due to space limitation) the 
control variables are largely similar. Having a current migrant family member may increase the 
likelihood of the left-behind person to be self-employed in 2006 by 3.6% (7%) in the full (active 
worker) sample without considering the entrepreneurial status in 2002. As shown in columns (3)-
(6), the observed effects hardly decline after the initial entrepreneurial status is controlled for. 
Migration raises the likelihood of entering into self-employment by 3.5% in the full sample, and 
this effect is as high as 8% among individuals who were working in 2006. Under the assumption 
that the lagged entrepreneurial status is the only important confounding source, this implies that 
shifting from a non-migrant family to a migrant family may increase an individual's probability 
of becoming a new and nascent entrepreneur by 40% relative to the sample mean. 
                                                          
32  The lagged dependent variable has a zero value for all non-initial-entrepreneurs and is thus 
automatically omitted by regressions using the restricted sample. 
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The following rows display the estimated coefficients and standard deviations of the control 
variables. These estimates are in general consistent with the prediction. First, males average a 
higher participation rate in self-employment in 2006 than females and are more likely to enter 
into self-employment if they were previously unemployed (the reverse is true if they were 
previously employed). Second, older individuals left-behind are estimated to be more likely than 
younger individuals to be self-employed. Third, in the active worker subsample, well-educated 
people are slightly less likely to be self-employed than relatively less educated people. 
Interestingly, the effects of household assets on the probability of self-employment and the 
likelihood to enter are consistent with Evans and Jovanovic's (1989) model. Individuals from 
households with lower assets are less likely to be entrepreneurs due to financial constraints. The 
estimates exhibit an asset gradient in column (2): Compared with counterparts from households 
with the highest level of assets, individuals are 9%, 7%, 5%, and 4% less likely to be self-
employed if they are from households with assets at the lowest, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quintile, 
respectively. The magnitude of this financial barrier effect is similar to the migration effect. 
Also, there is evidence supporting the idea discussed in Section 2.3 that different sectors may 
have different distributions of self-employment. The bottom rows of Table 2.3 show that the 
agricultural sector restricts self-employment, while the sectors of cattle/forestry/hunting, mining, 
and construction may provide more opportunities for self-employment. The higher the hourly 
wage of male employees, the less likely an individual from this community is to be self-
employed, although the estimates are not always significant. 
Gender Effect 
To examine whether migration has symmetric effects on left-behind males and females, Table 
2.4 displays the gender-specific estimates. Compared to the results reported in Table 2.3, the 
most important finding is the significant and larger effect of U.S. migration on female 
entrepreneurship, increasing the likelihood for women to become new entrepreneurs to a greater 
extent than men. Women are about 4% more likely to become self-employed when they have a 
U.S. migrant family member than those who do not have any, as shown in columns (1) and (3) 
without and with the control for the initial entrepreneurial status. The effect is nearly 12% for 
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active female workers (columns (2) and (4)). The effect may increase to 5% and 15%, 
respectively, for those who were not entrepreneurs in 2002 (columns (5) and (6)). 
In the lower panel, however, migration does not seem to influence the likelihood for men to enter 
into self-employment, even though the correlation between the probability of being self-
employed in 2006 and having a migrant family member is still high and statistically significant 
for active male workers (column (2)). In none of the other columns, is the estimated coefficient 
on the migration variable significantly different from zero. 
This analysis by sex of left-behind family members reveals an important dimension of gender 
inequality in entrepreneurship. The evidence of the differential effects is also consistent with the 
OECD report for its member countries, which showed that more women than men start their own 
businesses in the informal sector, probably out of economic necessity, especially in Egypt and 
Mexico (OECD [2012]).  
2.5.2 FE and IV Estimates 
As discussed in Section 2.4, the FE approach is a preferred strategy if the sources of endogeneity 
of migration are likely to be time-invariant. In that scenario, the coefficient of migration 
estimated from the FE model may be interpreted as the causal effect of being randomly assigned 
to a migrant family, rather than a non-migrant family, on an individual's status as an entrepreneur 
at the time of the survey. 
The results obtained by the FE approach are presented in Table 2.5. The dependent variable for 
these regressions is the status of self-employment at the time of the MxFLS-1 or 2.33 The left 
panel presents the estimated migration effects from the sample that does not exclude initial 
entrepreneurs. When females and males are pooled together, migration increases the 
participation rate of left-behind persons in entrepreneurial activities by 2.3% (15% relative to the 
mean). For all male adults, having a U.S. migrant family member increases the chance of being 
self-employed by as much as 4.5% (a 20% increase relative to the sample mean). The estimated 
                                                          
33 The size of the full sample or the active worker subsample is about double of the corresponding sample 
used in Table 2.3 and 2.4 because every individual now has repeated observations if not for missing 
values. 
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effects are not statistically significant in other sample specifications, which seem to contradict 
the LPM findings. One possibility is that measurement error biases the FE estimates down to 
zero given the discrete nature of the dependent variable and the two-period structure of the panel 
data. 
When the sample for analysis is restricted to non-entrepreneurs in the initial wave of the survey, 
the findings are very different from those for the unrestricted sample shown in the left panel but 
consistent with the main LPM results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The right panel of Table 2.5 shows 
that having a U.S. migration family member increases an individual's participation in self-
employment by 2% and the number doubles if the individual was employed in 2006. The 
magnitudes of both effects are around 50% relative to the mean. Breaking down the estimates by 
sex, the probability of a left-behind woman becoming a new and nascent entrepreneur increases 
by 2% (8% for an active female worker) shifting from non-migrant family to migrant family. 
This is a large effect, which is about a 70% (80%) increase relative to the mean of the female 
(active female work) sample. However, the impact of such a shift on creating new male 
entrepreneurs is quite limited, about 1% (0.2 mean) and insignificant. The FE estimates of the 
migration effect are very close to the findings from the lagged dependent variable model in Table 
2.4 (columns (5) and (6)) in terms of the magnitude (relative to the mean). 
In short, the FE estimates provide further evidence that migration increases the participation of 
left-behind family members in entrepreneurship, although the gender-specific effects appear 
somewhat different from the LPM findings. It can be inferred from the FE estimates that left-
behind women are more likely to become self-employed following the U.S. migration of some 
family member, while men may not. 
The IV approach addresses the confounding effect of time varying factors and reverse causality. 
Appendix C presents the first stage analysis. The endogenous variable of current migration is 
regressed on the lagged municipal migration prevalence (in the period of 1995-1999) and other 
control variables. The first row of Table C.1 indicates that a 6% (mean of the variable) increase 
in municipal migration rate between 1995-1999 tends to increase the probability that an 
individual living in this municipality has a current migrant family member in 2006 by 11%. In all 
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specifications, the F-statistics reported in the bottom of Table C.1 are large, which relieves the 
weak instrument concern. 
Table 2.6 contains the IV estimates, for which municipal migration prevalence in the period of 
1995-1999 is used as the instrument. In the pooling sample of females and males (in the top 
panel), an individual is 13.3% more likely to become an entrepreneur if assigned to a migrant 
family rather a non-migrant family. That is about a 90% increase relative to the mean. This is 
similar to the effect found for active workers in magnitude. The size of the migration effect is 
even larger in the sample of non-initial-entrepreneurs. 
Separating male and female respondents, the middle panel presents the estimates for women. 
Consistent with the FE results, the IV estimates indicate that migration tends to increase female 
participation in entrepreneurship by creating more entries into this career. To be specific, a 
woman with a migrant family member is 13.7% (1.4 mean) more likely to be self-employed than 
one without. The estimated coefficient in column (3) indicates that migration may create new 
female entrepreneurs by as much as 10.9% (1.6 mean). Meanwhile, it is not surprising that the 
migration effect is larger in the active worker subsample, comparing columns (2) and (4) with (1) 
and (3). The lower panel presents the results for the sample of all males and the subsample of 
males who are non-initial entrepreneurs. In none of the specifications from column (1)-(4), does 
having a migrant family member significantly affect men's participation in entrepreneurship. 
These results are also largely consistent with the findings of the lagged dependent variable and 
FE models. 
2.5.3 Understanding the Mechanism 
After establishing the evidence that migration stimulates entrepreneurship of non-migrant family 
members, a natural question follows: why is it so? As discussed in Section 2.2, the relaxation of 
financial constraints is potentially an important channel through which migration can exert its 
influences. This section develops new empirical tests to further examine the mechanism behind 
the migration effect. 
To be concrete, define a new variable to capture financial constraints. Household assets are 
observed in the first wave of the MxFLS, i.e. before the occurrence of most migration under 
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consideration. An individual is regarded as facing financial constraints if his/her household 
locates at the lowest quintile of the distribution of household assets in the MxFLS-1. Then, this 
binary constraints variable and its interaction with the migration variable are included as 
additional regressors into the baseline specification (2.1). If migration increases the self-
employment of left-behind persons through the relaxation of financial constraints, the coefficient 
on the interaction term between migration and constraints should be positive. That is, the 
migration effect is larger for individuals from households that were previously financially 
constrained than from households without such constraints or those that are less constrained. 
Table 2.7 presents the LPM estimates for this new model with a structure similar to Table 2.4. 
The analysis examines the pooled sample and also treats males and females separately to allow 
for the differential migration effects as observed above. In general, the results reported in Table 
2.7 are consistent with the theory of financial constraints. The negative effect of the constraints 
variable found in the top panel indicates that financial constraints are indeed an important 
obstacle to the development of entrepreneurship. Individuals (active workers) who were 
financially constrained are 3% (6%) less likely to become entrepreneurs than those without such 
constraints. Moreover, the estimates in the last two columns show that migration has a larger 
effect on creating new entrepreneurs among individuals or active workers who faced financial 
constraints in the initial survey. It is this piece of evidence that lends support to the hypothesis of 
financial mechanism. The fact that the coefficients on the migration variable are still large and 
statistically significant almost over all regression models suggests that the impact of migration 
may take place via more than one mechanism. 
In the middle panel, the results of the female sample are largely in line with the financial 
constraints theory as well as the findings in the pooled sample. The bottom panel contains the 
results for males only. Facing financial constraints in the MxFLS-1 negatively affects the status 
of male self-employment in the MxFLS-2. Migration, however, is more important for boosting 
the entry into self-employment for men who faced prior financial constraints, according to 
columns (5) and (6). Furthermore, unlike the analysis for the pooled or the female sample, 
migration may affect the creation of male entrepreneurs solely via the financial mechanism, since 
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the coefficients on the migration variable is close to zero. This evidence may account for the less 
significant effect of migration on male entrepreneurship found in previous parts. 
The interpretation of findings in Table 2.7 requires two assumptions: (1) the 20% individuals 
with the least household assets in MxFLS-1 face the binding financial constraints; and (2) these 
individuals start small businesses out of necessity. Then the empirical analysis in this part 
provides suggestive evidence that migration may spur the necessity-based entrepreneurial 
activities of both males and females whose financial constraints were binding before migration 
occured. Besides the improvement of financial status, more females may start businesses for 
other reasons. The reasons behind the different mechanisms across gender underlying the 
migration effect could be the demand of housework and other non-economic activities in 
females' time use. In this sense, women may have reasons such as working part-time or enjoying 
the flexibility of working schedule other than necessity to become new and nascent entrepreneurs. 
A complementary test further examines the relation between the access to the credit market and 
the status of U.S. migration. Two variables are used to proxy the credit access: the dummy for 
whether or not asking for any loan and the log transformation of the amount borrowed, 
unconditional on receiving any loan, during the past 12 months before the interview. Importantly, 
over 95% of those requested loans were actually granted loans.34 The “asking for any loan” 
variable is thus very indicative, showing both the change in the need for credit and the 
improvement in the condition (wealth effect) to secure a loan. The main hypothesis to test is that 
migration gives left-behind family members better access to the credit market. That is potentially 
due to the wealth creation or the expected cash transfer from migrant family members that would 
improve the availability of collateral or the benefit of the social ties linked to migration networks. 
The underlying assumption of this test is that the loan obtained would be used in a productive 
manner, such as initial capital for new startups.35  
                                                          
34 This outcome does not imply that it is easy to obtain loans in Mexico. The high approval rate is likely 
due to the fact that respondents tend to indicate they have requested any loan only when they have 
received it. 
35 This is a reasonable assumption based on the tests for the motivation of a loan request in MxFLS-1. 
Women from migrating families are more likely to request loans for production investment (e.g. the 
purchase of equipment and other production materials). Little evidence shows that loans were used to 
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In Table 2.8, the credit access variable, the asking indicator or the loan size, is regressed on the 
migration variable using the OLS (columns (1)-(4)) and FE (columns (5)-(6)) methods, 
respectively. Strong evidence for the link between the family status of migration and the access 
to loans of left-behind individuals is found. Pooling males and females together, the top panel 
documents a positive overall relation between migration and credit access in all regression 
models. In the middle panel, having a U.S. migrant family member increases the chance of 
asking for and obtaining a loan in the year prior to the interview by 5% (6%) for female adults 
(active workers), according to columns (1) and (2). The findings on the amount of loan received 
in the same time window are similar, as shown in columns (3) and (4).36 Finally, in the bottom 
panel, all estimates for the migration effect on credit access are statistically significant for males 
and are of a similar magnitude across sample specifications. 
The right panel presents results using the fixed effects approach. For both the probability of 
having any loan and loan size, the direction and magnitude of the migration effect are largely 
consistent with the OLS findings. The main difference is that FE estimates indicate migration 
does not significantly influence male's loan size. The magnitude of coefficients from the FE 
estimation is similar to those from the OLS estimation, but standard deviations almost double. 
Since column (5) and (6) indicate migration significantly increases a male's probability of having 
any loan, the intensive margin (amount of loan conditional on having a loan) may account for 
this difference.37 
Overall, the findings drawn from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that financial constraints are a major 
obstacle to the development of entrepreneurship, and, in particular, for those with low household 
assets. The relaxation of financial constraints may create more nascent entrepreneurs. The 
analysis also indicates how the underlying mechanisms of the migration effect may differ by 
gender. Economic necessity seems likely to be the most important driving force for left-behind 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cover the direct migration expenses. Only the data from the first wave is currently available. I cannot 
explicitly tell individuals' purposes of borrowing in the MxFLS-2. Admittedly, this is a caveat of the test 
developed here.  
36 Since the loan size is log transformed, the interpretation of the coefficients is a percentage difference 
associated with corresponding regressors. 
37 Given the measurement error of the specific amount of loans, it is difficult to identify any effect on the 
intensive margin. 
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males to participate in entrepreneurship. However, women from migrant-sending families are 
more likely to enter into entrepreneurship out of economic necessity and also for non-pecuniary 
benefits, such as flexible working arrangement and social status. All of this evidence points to 
the importance of understanding the nature of female occupational choice and entrepreneurial 
behavior. 
2.5.4 Employership 
The above analysis is based on the broad definition of entrepreneurship as self-employment. 
Table 2.9 continues to display the effect of migration on being an employer, which is a narrow 
measure of entrepreneurship. For the pooled (top panel), female (middle panel), and male 
(bottom panel) samples, the estimated coefficients and standard deviations reported are obtained 
using the LPM, FE, and IV strategies, all with the control for the initial status of 
entrepreneurship, as well as the LPM approach to the specification with financial constraints. 
In general, the top panel of Table 2.9 shows that there is some evidence for the effect of U.S. 
migration on employership (column (2)) and the underlying financial mechanism (column (4)). 
More importantly, Table 2.9 sheds light on the gender-specific effects of migration. Both LPM 
and FE estimates indicate that migration stimulates the creation of female employers, by 1.5% 
and 2.4% respectively. The magnitude is around 78% and 100% relative to the sample mean. The 
IV estimates are also positive and very close to the FE estimates but are not significant or precise. 
There seems to be no statistically significant evidence for the migration effect on male 
employership. 
For the role of financial constraints, the LPM estimates reported in column (4) do not support the 
hypothesis that migration will generate a greater stimulative effect on female employership for 
women from households with prior financial constraints in terms of low household assets (the 
financial constraints were most likely binding if migration did not occur). However, there is 
suggestive evidence that males originating from families with financial constraints are more 
likely to become an employer following the U.S. migration of other family member. This is 
consistent with the findings from Table 2.7. Taken together, these findings indicate that the 
mechanisms at play that drive the emergence of new employers could be different or more 
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complicated than those drive self-employment. This is understood in light of higher upfront costs 
and the higher entrepreneurial skills necessary for starting a business with employees. 
2.5.5 Robustness 
Transition of Entrepreneurial Status 
The analysis up to this point infers the migration effect on creating new entrepreneurs by 
restricting the sample to non-entrepreneurs in the MxFLS-1. It also establishes the gender-
specific effects on left-behind family members. This section further evaluates the effect of 
migration on a full profile of the transition of entrepreneurial status over time. Specially, a new 
dependent variable that has four possible outcomes is created: “exit” (change from being an 
entrepreneur in the first wave of the survey to be a non-entrepreneur in the second wave), 
“remaining” (being an entrepreneur in both waves), “entry” (change from being a non-
entrepreneur in the first wave to be an entrepreneur in the second wave), and “nonparticipation” 
(being a non-entrepreneur in both waves). Multinomial logistic regression is employed to 
estimate the model. The same set of the individual-, household-, and community-level control 
variables as before are included into regressions, in addition to the migration variable of interest. 
Table 2.10 presents the results for the female sample in the left panel and for the male sample in 
the right panel. The outcome categories from column (1) to (3) (and similarly, (4) to (6)) are exit, 
remaining, and entry, respectively. The base category is then nonparticipation in 
entrepreneurship. Relative risk ratios are reported to indicate the ratio of the probability of 
choosing one outcome over the probability of choosing the base outcome. 
For women with a U.S. migrant family member relative to those without any, the relative risk for 
entering into self-employment over nonparticipation in both waves is estimated to increase by 
1.98 (column (3)), holding the other variables in the model constant. In other words, women 
from migrant families are more likely to become new and nascent entrepreneurs than those from 
non-migrant families. The relative risk of the dependent variable falling into the exit and 
remaining outcomes (columns (1) and (2)) seems not to change with migration in the female 
sample. For males, having a U.S. migrant family member may not influence the relative risk of 
falling into other outcomes compared with the base (columns (4)-(6)). Although all models are 
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estimated using the cross sectional data, Table 2.10 at least provides suggestive evidence that 
migration may stimulate left-behind women becoming entrepreneurs without significant 
influence on men on average. 
Economic Migration 
Without survey questions for migrants living in the U.S., it is uncertain whether all migrants 
identified above moved to the U.S. for economic reasons (e.g., working) and whether they have 
the ability to send remittances to left-behind families. For example, some may leave Mexico for 
vacation or to visit relatives in the U.S. The effect of migrants traveling for non-economic 
reasons may bias the estimates downwards to zero, because their migration may be very short 
and not generate any income. To alleviate this concern, the migration variable is recoded so that 
economic migrants only include those who have participated in the initial wave survey and have 
graduated from school in the MxFLS-2. The underlying assumption is that individuals may not 
go to the U.S. for schooling if they have already left school in Mexico. 
The results estimated for the female and male samples using this new definition of migration are 
presented in Table 2.11. The LPM estimates in Table 2.11 are very close to their counterparts in 
Table 2.4. This analysis also implies that the main definition of migration used in this paper is 
very close to the definition of economic migration. The potential existence of migration for non-
economic reasons does not undermine the main findings drawn above. 
Previous Occupation of Migrants 
The increase in the rate of new female entrepreneurs along with migration may reflect the shift of 
the business ownership from a male migrant rather than the start of a new business. Controlling 
for the previous employment status of the migrant (especially husband if he is a migrant) helps 
determine which case occurs. Since the independent variable of migration in this paper is defined 
beyond the household (having a migrant relative including spouse, sibling, child, or parent), I 
cannot observe the occupation of all migrants. I run a robustness check for the subgroup of 
nonmigrants whose migrating family member’s occupation was observable when migrants and 
left-behind members originated from the same household. The previous findings are not sensitive 
to this change of specification. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Using the data from the first two waves of the MxFLS, this paper establishes the evidence 
showing that Mexico-to-U.S. migration increases entrepreneurship of left-behind individuals in 
Mexico, mainly by inducing individuals' entries into self-employment. Limited evidence 
supports that migration creates more family-owned non-agricultural businesses (see Appendix B 
for more details). However, this does not imply that the boost of migration to entrepreneurship is 
trivial. Previous work (e.g., Fairlie and Woodruff [2007]) documented that the majority of self-
employed Mexican people work by themselves. The rate of own-account workers over all 
entrepreneurs is 88% for males and 89% for females. This may account for why migration seems 
to influence individual occupational choice but not household business ownership. Further, the 
estimated effect is only short term, but the asset accumulation required to start an enterprise and 
the transition from an own-account worker or a business owner may take a substantial period of 
time.38 This may also explain the lack of direct evidence on household business ownership in the 
MxFLS data. 
Moreover, the analysis documents a gender inequality in the migration effect: Having a U.S. 
migrant family member significantly stimulates the emergence of female entrepreneurs and 
employers, in particular for women who faced prior financial constraints. However, this financial 
channel does not absorb all of the migration effect. In contrast, cross sectional estimates suggest 
that more men may switch to self-employment in association with migration only when financial 
constraints were binding. These findings have two implications. First, one important mechanism 
through which migration exerts influences on the development of entrepreneurship is the 
relaxation of financial constraints and the access to the credit market. Second, males may join in 
entrepreneurship due to economic necessity while females may choose to become entrepreneurs 
for more than that reason alone. 
Female entrepreneurship is important not only for gender equality but also because it is a key 
driver of economic growth and social development. The findings of this paper have rich policy 
                                                          
38 This is consistent with the existing finding that returned migrants are more likely to own businesses 
than non-migrants. 
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implications. First, the evidence of the larger effect of ongoing migration on entrepreneurship for 
women than for men suggests that policies easing migration may further empower women and 
reduce gender inequality in entrepreneurial activity and income. Second, the finding that the 
migration effect is largest for individuals from families with the lowest assets implies that 
migration can be a strong force towards poverty reduction and economic growth. 
Entrepreneurship provides a route out of poverty and an alternative to unemployment. Indeed, 
there is some recent evidence from longitudinal data showing more upward mobility in the 
income distribution among low-income and self-employed workers than among low-income 
wage or salary workers (Holtz-Eakin, Rosen and Weathers [2000]). Additionally, business 
owners experience faster earnings growth on average than wage or salary workers after a few 
initial years of slower growth for some demographic groups (Fairlie [2004]). 
As emphasized, the focus of this paper is ongoing migration (i.e. migrants are still abroad), and 
the main findings are interpreted as short-term effects. It is certainly important to explore the 
long-term effects of migration on entrepreneurship and, in particular, how businesses and careers 
started by left-behind family members survive. Further analysis in this direction helps to more 
thoroughly evaluate the implications of international migration for poverty reduction, job 
creation, and local economic development. It also needs a data set that is more comprehensive 
than the currently available MxFLS data. Release of the third wave of the MxFLS may allow 
tracking the employment and business records of individuals over a longer period of time. Future 
work is required to extend the current study to expanded time horizons. Having said that,this 
paper concludes simply by reiterating that the empirical evidence for the short-term effect of 
ongoing migration on entrepreneurship of left-behind family members is necessary towards an 
all-round understanding of the consequences of migration and is new to the literature. 
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Table 2.1. Migration by Family Relationship with Left-Behind Individuals 
  Child Sibling Parent Spouse Any member 
U.S.-migration 5.5% 11.2% 1.2% 0.9% 18.8% 
 (409)  (826)  (85)  (66)  (1386) 
Total number of individuals 7,385 7,385 7,385 7,385 7,385 
Notes: The sample includes 7,385 left-behind adult individuals from households with at least two 
adult members (between 15 and 59 years old at the time of the initial wave survey). In each 
column, the first row reports the percentage of migration and the second row reports the number of 
incidences. 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Self-employed in MxFLS-2 7,385 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Self-employed in MxFLS-2 (active workers) 3,774 0.251 0.434 0 1 
Self-employed in MxFLS-1 5,884 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Employer in MxFLS-2 7,385 0.025 0.156 0 1 
Employer in MxFLS-1 5,884 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Any migration 7,385 0.188 0.390 0 1 
Male 7,385 0.437 0.496 0 1 
Age 7,385 32.66 13.73 15 59 
Years of schooling 7,385 6.434 3.682 0 18 
Raven’s score 7,385 1.000 0.468 0 3 
Household assets, 1st quintile 7,385 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Household assets, 2nd quintile 7,385 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Household assets, 3rd quintile 7,385 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Household assets, 4th quintile 7,385 0.208 0.406 0 1 
Number of household members 7,385 6.315 2.351 3 20 
Number of adult members 7,385 4.619 1.524 1 12 
Number of children younger than 6 7,385 0.427 0.708 0 4 
Border 7,385 0.220 0.414 0 1 
North 7,385 0.193 0.395 0 1 
South 7,385 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Center 7,385 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Capital 7,385 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Rural areas 7,385 0.451 0.498 0 1 
Death of household member 7,385 0.069 0.253 0 1 
Sickness of household member 7,385 0.117 0.322 0 1 
Unemployment of household member 7,385 0.077 0.266 0 1 
Natural disaster  7,385 0.037 0.189 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Agriculture 7,385 0.806 0.396 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Cattle/forestry/hunting 7,385 0.577 0.494 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Metallurgy 7,385 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Mining 7,385 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Manufacturing 7,385 0.370 0.483 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Assembly 7,385 0.247 0.432 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Power 7,385 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Construction 7,385 0.356 0.479 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Wholesale and retail 7,385 0.572 0.495 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Transportation/storage 7,385 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Financial services 7,385 0.166 0.372 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Social services 7,385 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Other 7,385 0.258 0.437 0 1 
Community hourly wage of men (log) 7,385 -2.39 5.650 -6.91 6 
Community hourly wage of women (log) 7,385 -2.67 5.561 -6.91 6 
Notes: Active workers are those employed at the time of the second wave survey. 
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Table 2.3. LPM Estimates of Migration Effect on Self-Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Any migration 0.0359*** 0.0700*** 0.0370*** 0.0662***  
0.0352**
* 
0.0776**
* 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.019) 
Self-employed in 02   0.291*** 0.334***    
   (0.012) (0.017)    
Male 0.115*** 0.002 0.0891*** -0.0386***  0.057*** -0.0539*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)  (0.008) (0.015) 
Age 0.00578*** 0.00778*** 0.00366*** 0.00506***  0.00218*** 0.00348*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of schooling 0.001 -0.0054*** 0.001 -0.0042*  -0.001 -0.0069*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Raven’s score 0.007 0.005 0.004 -0.003  -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)  (0.009) (0.017) 
Household assets, q1 -0.0403*** -0.0931*** -0.0273* -0.0657***  -0.016 -0.0534** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.025) 
Household assets, q2 -0.0286** -0.0703*** -0.014 -0.035  0.000 -0.014 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023)  (0.013) (0.024) 
Household assets, q3 -0.017 -0.0471** -0.007 -0.030  -0.004 -0.026 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.024) 
Household assets, q4 -0.012 -0.0378* -0.003 -0.018  -0.015 -0.0424* 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.021)  (0.013) (0.023) 
# household 
members 0.00721** 0.0106* 0.005 0.005  0.001 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006) 
# adult members -0.00891** -0.0181** -0.00846* -0.0141*  -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.008) 
# young children -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002  -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.014) 
Border -0.0418* -0.054 -0.0443* -0.029  0.017 0.054 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.027) (0.041)  (0.025) (0.044) 
North 0.003 0.034 0.005 0.051  0.033 0.0855* 
 (0.023) (0.041) (0.027) (0.042)  (0.026) (0.045) 
South 0.0867*** 0.159*** 0.0684** 0.132***  0.080*** 0.152*** 
 (0.027) (0.048) (0.031) (0.049)  (0.031) (0.054) 
Center 0.0450** 0.0992** 0.034 0.0936**  0.0621** 0.133*** 
 (0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.040)  (0.025) (0.044) 
Capital 0.040 0.0859* 0.027 0.0852*  0.077*** 0.149*** 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.031) (0.048)  (0.030) (0.051) 
Rural areas 0.0210* 0.0355* 0.0221* 0.031  0.0209* 0.0352* 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.021) 
Death -0.0286* -0.0545** -0.0339** -0.0591**  -0.0324** -0.0654** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027)  (0.016) (0.028) 
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Table 2.3 (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Illness 0.0234** 0.023 0.0297** 0.029  0.0265** 0.033 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.023) 
Unemployment 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.018  0.019 0.022 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026)  (0.016) (0.027) 
Natural disaster 0.0714*** 0.0734** 0.0552** 0.052  0.069*** 0.0883** 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.023) (0.035)  (0.023) (0.039) 
Agriculture -0.0314** -0.0620*** -0.0419*** -0.0686***  -0.0260** -0.0459** 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.023) 
Cattle/forestry/hunting 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.016  0.0232** 0.0383* 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)  (0.011) (0.020) 
Metallurgy 0.019 0.061 0.007 0.050  0.025 0.068 
 (0.022) (0.039) (0.025) (0.039)  (0.024) (0.041) 
Mining 0.032 0.0837** 0.031 0.0684*  0.035 0.0732* 
 (0.020) (0.037) (0.023) (0.036)  (0.022) (0.039) 
Manufacturing -0.001 -0.023 0.000 -0.020  0.018 0.019 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.013) (0.021)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Assembly 0.011 0.015 0.018 0.027  0.007 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.025) 
Power -0.026 -0.045 -0.033 -0.054  -0.0414** -0.0797** 
 (0.019) (0.034) (0.022) (0.034)  (0.020) (0.035) 
Construction 0.0352*** 0.0532*** 0.0297** 0.0343*  0.0235* 0.0390* 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Wholesale and retail  -0.013 -0.009 -0.006 0.000  -0.005 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.018)  (0.010) (0.019) 
Transportation/storage -0.011 -0.026 -0.004 -0.013  -0.021 -0.045 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027)  (0.016) (0.028) 
Financial services 0.005 -0.009 0.006 -0.015  0.004 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.018) (0.029)  (0.018) (0.031) 
Social services -0.003 0.008 0.010 0.017  0.006 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025)  (0.015) (0.027) 
Other industry 0.0367*** 0.0534*** 0.0328*** 0.0412**  0.033*** 0.057*** 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.021) 
Male hourly wage -0.00482* -0.00862* -0.001 -0.002  0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Female hourly wage 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.001  -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant -0.144*** 0.015 -0.0931** 0.047  -0.064 0.041 
 (0.033) (0.062) (0.041) (0.066)  (0.039) (0.070) 
Mean of dep. var. 0.129 0.251 0.152 0.265  0.087 0.164 
No. of observations 7,385 3,774 5,884 3,387  4,787 2,526 
R-squared 0.112 0.109 0.191 0.203  0.041 0.073 
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Table 2.3 (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the status of self-employment at the time of the 
second wave survey. See the narrative for the details of the control variables. All models are estimated 
using linear probability regression. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.4. LPM Estimates of Migration Effect on Self-Employment by Sex 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Female        
Any migration 0.043*** 0.119*** 0.047*** 0.122***  0.048*** 0.147*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.012) (0.030)  (0.012) (0.032) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship   X X  X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.079 0.244 0.095 0.257  0.068 0.196 
No. of observations 4,156 1,350 3,364 1,237  2,962 1,019 
R-squared 0.053 0.119 0.097 0.171  0.032 0.114 
Male        
Any migration 0.027 0.0380* 0.026 0.034  0.018 0.026 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022)  (0.021) (0.025) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship   X X  X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.192 0.256 0.229 0.269  0.118 0.143 
No. of observations 3,229 2,424 2,520 2,150  1,825 1,507 
R-squared 0.150 0.122 0.240 0.238  0.071 0.069 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the status of self-employment at the time of 
the second wave survey. The control variables are included but not reported. See the narrative and 
Table 2.3 for the details of the control variables. All models are estimated using linear probability 
regression. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.5. FE Estimates of Migration Effect on Self-Employment 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Pooled  
Any migration 0.023* 0.035  0.019* 0.0425** 
 (0.014) (0.022)  (0.011) (0.020) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.155 0.251  0.040 0.083 
No. of observations 15,433 7,748  10,778 5,161 
R-squared 0.013 0.01  0.089 0.169 
Female  
Any migration 0.011 0.023  0.0223* 0.0808** 
 (0.016) (0.035)  (0.012) (0.032) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.097 0.213  0.032 0.100 
No. of observations 8,371 2,740  6,454 2,086 
R-squared 0.016 0.045  0.071 0.204 
Male      
Any migration 0.0447* 0.045  0.010 0.012 
 (0.025) (0.027)  (0.022) (0.025) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.225 0.271  0.051 0.072 
No. of observations 7,062 5,008  4,324 3,075 
R-squared 0.018 0.015  0.142 0.166 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the self-employment status at each wave 
of the survey. See the narrative and Table 2.3 for the details of the control variables. All models 
are estimated with individual fixed effects. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.6. IV Estimates of Migration Effect on Self-Employment  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Pooled      
Any migration 0.133*** 0.187**  0.118** 0.218*** 
 (0.052) (0.081)  (0.049) (0.085) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
F-statistic in first stage 293.38 178.34  243.66 144.81 
Mean of dep. var. 0.152 0.265  0.087 0.164 
No. of observations 5,884  3,387   4,787  2,526  
R-squared 0.181 0.195  0.029 0.058 
Female      
Any migration 0.137** 0.336**  0.107* 0.346**  
 (0.058) (0.137)  (0.057) (0.141) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
F-statistic in first stage 163.69 62.22  134.23 55.92 
Mean of dep. var. 0.095 0.257  0.068 0.196 
No. of observations 3,364  1,237   2,962  1,019  
R-squared 0.085 0.141  0.027 0.080 
Male      
Any migration 0.125 0.131  0.145 0.135 
 (0.092) (0.104)  (0.088) (0.107) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X  X X 
F-statistic in first stage 118.65 100.62  103.00 78.90 
Mean of dep. var. 0.229 0.269  0.118 0.143 
No. of observations 2,520  2,150   1,825  1,507  
R-squared 0.236 0.236  0.061 0.073 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating self-employment at the time of the second 
wave survey. The instrumental variable is municipal migration prevalence in the time period of 
1995-1999 and is created using Mexico Census 2000. See the narrative and Table 2.3 for the 
details of the control variables. The 2SLS method is used for estimation. * indicates p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.7. LPM Estimates of Migration Effect on Self-Employment 
with Financial Constraints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Pooled        
Any migration 0.0254** 0.0639*** 0.0245** 0.0571***  0.019 0.0568*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Financial constraint -0.029** -0.060*** -0.029** -0.057***  -0.025** -0.056** 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.021)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Migrant × constraint 0.028 0.046 0.044 0.073  0.0695*** 0.124** 
 (0.026) (0.045) (0.028) (0.046)  (0.027) (0.048) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship   X X  X X 
No. of observations 7,385 3,774 5,884 3,387  4,787 2,526 
R-squared 0.082 0.107 0.177 0.202  0.033 0.069 
Female        
Any migration 0.0387*** 0.105*** 0.0401*** 0.101***  0.0378*** 0.126*** 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.013) (0.033)  (0.013) (0.035) 
Financial constraint -0.018 -0.0580* -0.0242* -0.0751**  -0.016 -0.055 
 (0.012) (0.034) (0.015) (0.036)  (0.014) (0.037) 
Migrant × constraint 0.026 0.084 0.038 0.120  0.050* 0.110 
 (0.027) (0.073) (0.031) (0.077)  (0.029) (0.078) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship   X X  X X 
No. of observations 4,156 1,350 3,364 1,237  2,962 1,019 
R-squared 0.053 0.118 0.096 0.171  0.032 0.111 
Male        
Any migration 0.027 0.039 0.024 0.031  0.000 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.027) 
Financial constraint -0.0422** -0.0567** -0.034 -0.041  -0.0385* -0.0508* 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)  (0.023) (0.027) 
Migrant × constraint 0.017 0.018 0.024 0.027  0.104** 0.123** 
 (0.046) (0.058) (0.052) (0.058)  (0.053) (0.061) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship   X X  X X 
No. of observations 3,229 2,424 2,520 2,150  1,825 1,507 
R-squared 0.147 0.117 0.238 0.236  0.072 0.071 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy indicating the status of self-employment at the time of the 
second wave survey. All regressions include migration, financial constraints, the interaction term, and 
the control variables as described in the narrative. All models are estimated using linear probability 
regression. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.8. Link between Credit Access  and Migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 LPM  FE 
 Asking for any loan Amount of loan (unconditional) 
 Asking for any 
loan 
Amount of loan 
(unconditional) 
  All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Pooled        
  Any 
migration 0.0441*** 0.0470*** 
0.525 
*** 
0.813 
*** 
 
0.036*** 0.040* 
0.534 
** 
0.739 
** 
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.134) (0.194) 
 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.243) (0.363) 
Mean of dep. 
var. 0.060 0.080 -6.010 -5.880 
 
0.079 0.098 -5.812 -5.593 
No. of 
observations 5,341 2,752 5,341 2,752 
 
10,778 5,161 9,453 4,486 
R-squared 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.053 
 
0.015 0.026 0.032 0.051 
Female 
     
 
   Any 
migration 0.0467*** 0.0649*** 0.412** 
0.938 
*** 
 
0.0281
* 0.0281 0.494* 1.049* 
 
(0.011) (0.023) (0.175) (0.332) 
 
(0.016) (0.031) (0.285) (0.539) 
Mean of dep. 
var. 0.051 0.078 -6.030 -5.870 
 
0.070 0.099 -5.920 -5.619 
No. of 
observations 2,937 940 2,937 940 
 
6,454 2,086 5,582 1,787 
R-squared 0.045 0.066 0.04 0.067 
 
0.018 0.041 0.037 0.098 
Male 
     
 
   Any 
migration 0.0423*** 
0.0370 
** 
0.693 
*** 
0.767 
***  0.0542** 
0.0514
* 0.536 0.523 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.211) (0.243) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.450) (0.492) 
Mean of dep. 
var. 0.071 0.081 -5.980 -5.890 
 
0.093 0.097 -5.656 -5.576 
No. of 
observations 2,404 1,812 2,404 1,812 
 
4,324 3,075 3,871 2,699 
R-squared 0.051 0.048 0.049 0.060 
 
0.021 0.031 0.036 0.046 
Notes: The sample does not exclude the initial entrepreneurs. All regressions controlled for the initital 
entrepreneurial status. The dependent variable for columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) is a dummy that equals 1 
if the left-behind person borrowed any loan during the last 12 months before the survey interview and 
0 otherwise. The dependent variable for columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) is the log transformation of the 
amount borrowed, unconditional on having any loan or not. Original coefficients and standard 
deviations reported are estimated using the LPM in columns (1)-(4) and the FE approach in columns 
(5)-(8). See the narrative and Table 2.3 for the details of the control variables. * indicates p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.9. Migration Effect on Being an Employer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LPM FE IV 
LPM 
with financial 
constraints 
Pooled     
Any migration 0.007 0.021*** 0.025 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.006) 
Financial constraint    -0.006 
    (0.007) 
Migrant × constraint    0.0389*** 
    (0.015) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X X X 
F-statistic in first stage   487.5   
Mean of dep. var. 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.031 
No. of observations 5,884 15,433 5,884 5,884 
R-squared 0.046 0.007 0.045 0.047 
Female     
Any migration 0.015** 0.024*** 0.031 0.0133* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.007) 
Financial constraint    -0.001 
    (0.008) 
Migrant × constraint    0.007 
    (0.016) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X X X 
F-statistic in first stage   269.7   
Mean of dep. var. 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.023 
No. of observations 3,364 8,371 3,364 3,364 
R-squared 0.042 0.011 0.040 0.041 
Male     
Any migration -0.006 0.019 0.014 -0.0203* 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.037) (0.012) 
Financial constraint    -0.013 
    (0.012) 
Migrant × constraint    0.0888*** 
    (0.028) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship X X X X 
F-statistic in first stage   216.8   
Mean of dep. var. 0.042 0.035 0.042 0.042 
No. of observations 2,520 7,062 2,520 2,520 
R-squared 0.053 0.012 0.052 0.057 
Notes: The sample does not exclude the initial entrepreneurs. The dependent variable is a dummy 
for the status of being an employer. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.10. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Self-Employment Transition 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Female  Male 
  Exit Remaining Entry  Exit Remaining Entry 
Any migration 1.126 1.348 1.977***  0.976 1.143 1.155 
 (0.172) (0.306) (0.335)  (0.163) (0.178) (0.220) 
Age 1.042*** 1.067*** 1.022***  1.031*** 1.086*** 1.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years of schooling 0.994 1.045 1.016  0.971 0.973 0.965 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.026)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) 
Raven’s score 1.127 1.425 0.855  0.949 1.189 0.939 
 (0.162) (0.316) (0.150)  (0.133) (0.160) (0.155) 
Household assets, q1 0.819 0.463** 0.820  0.420*** 0.294*** 0.829 
 (0.180) (0.169) (0.203)  (0.093) (0.069) (0.221) 
Household assets, q2 0.972 0.523* 1.027  0.474*** 0.371*** 0.957 
 (0.203) (0.192) (0.246)  (0.096) (0.080) (0.236) 
Household assets, q3 0.780 1.216 0.914  0.736 0.570*** 0.953 
 (0.168) (0.364) (0.220)  (0.139) (0.117) (0.240) 
Household assets, q4 1.024 1.011 0.652*  0.409*** 0.723* 1.018 
 (0.198) (0.283) (0.160)  (0.084) (0.137) (0.242) 
# household 
members 0.980 1.038 0.980  1.103* 1.203*** 1.078 
 (0.055) (0.093) (0.066)  (0.060) (0.069) (0.071) 
# adult members 1.051 0.877 0.961  0.917 0.791*** 0.923 
 (0.077) (0.102) (0.084)  (0.067) (0.061) (0.082) 
# young children 1.041 0.942 0.890  0.909 0.912 0.994 
 (0.123) (0.186) (0.130)  (0.108) (0.111) (0.139) 
Border 1.178 0.369* 0.610  1.306 0.229*** 3.336* 
 (0.472) (0.217) (0.294)  (0.521) (0.091) (2.311) 
North 0.921 0.470 0.613  0.900 0.504* 5.443** 
 (0.369) (0.272) (0.302)  (0.363) (0.192) (3.722) 
South 2.284* 1.858 1.640  1.584 1.838 5.947** 
 (1.018) (1.200) (0.869)  (0.740) (0.789) (4.371) 
Center 1.632 1.446 1.194  1.568 0.934 6.406*** 
 (0.633) (0.771) (0.545)  (0.615) (0.339) (4.332) 
Capital 2.505** 1.938 1.627  1.692 0.606 6.834*** 
 (1.167) (1.273) (0.866)  (0.785) (0.268) (4.970) 
Rural areas 0.729* 0.412*** 1.302  1.204 1.562** 1.340 
 (0.135) (0.127) (0.306)  (0.226) (0.300) (0.307) 
Death 1.045 1.003 0.613  0.942 0.727 0.639 
 (0.254) (0.367) (0.210)  (0.231) (0.197) (0.212) 
Illness 1.163 1.601* 1.459*  0.929 1.061 1.181 
 (0.232) (0.427) (0.308)  (0.197) (0.214) (0.279) 
Unemployment 1.010 0.689 1.177  0.863 0.952 1.215 
 (0.258) (0.266) (0.300)  (0.225) (0.248) (0.344) 
Natural disaster 0.741 1.223 0.735  2.197** 1.746* 4.726*** 
 (0.265) (0.554) (0.310)  (0.677) (0.562) (1.541) 
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Table 2.10. (cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Female  Male 
 Exit Remaining Entry  Exit Remaining Entry 
Agriculture 1.192 0.757 0.660*  1.172 0.579** 0.624* 
 (0.259) (0.249) (0.162)  (0.254) (0.128) (0.159) 
Cattle/forestry/hunting 1.548** 2.269*** 1.200  0.923 0.825 1.688** 
 (0.280) (0.663) (0.245)  (0.157) (0.140) (0.367) 
Metallurgy 2.147** 1.935 1.011  2.299** 1.848 1.390 
 (0.781) (1.040) (0.404)  (0.936) (0.694) (0.814) 
Mining 0.860 0.332* 1.397  1.715 2.418*** 1.965 
 (0.284) (0.197) (0.487)  (0.573) (0.803) (0.841) 
Manufacturing 1.173 1.980** 1.244  1.224 0.638** 1.229 
 (0.230) (0.622) (0.284)  (0.228) (0.130) (0.285) 
Assembly 1.003 1.190 1.219  0.779 1.075 1.065 
 (0.240) (0.416) (0.327)  (0.176) (0.266) (0.284) 
Power 1.253 0.602 0.864  0.748 1.168 0.352** 
 (0.407) (0.292) (0.308)  (0.265) (0.385) (0.181) 
Construction 1.175 1.550 1.986***  1.171 1.601*** 0.974 
 (0.223) (0.467) (0.422)  (0.222) (0.289) (0.209) 
Wholesale and retail 0.666** 0.606* 0.784  0.792 0.738* 1.137 
 (0.111) (0.170) (0.156)  (0.127) (0.121) (0.216) 
Transportation/storage 0.656 1.411 0.905  0.541** 0.662 0.615 
 (0.181) (0.521) (0.253)  (0.152) (0.185) (0.196) 
Financial services 0.799 0.940 1.044  1.198 0.876 0.911 
 (0.230) (0.372) (0.319)  (0.336) (0.253) (0.310) 
Social services 0.635* 0.681 0.788  0.850 1.023 1.572 
 (0.157) (0.225) (0.204)  (0.207) (0.246) (0.437) 
Other industry 1.297 3.550*** 1.373  1.522** 1.232 1.803*** 
 (0.233) (0.902) (0.284)  (0.265) (0.228) (0.378) 
Male hourly wage 1.003 0.925 1.026  0.986 0.887** 1.034 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.044)  (0.047) (0.045) (0.054) 
Female hourly wage 1.027 1.022 1.000  1.011 1.104* 0.944 
 (0.048) (0.080) (0.045)  (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) 
No. of observations 3,364  2,520 
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are from one multinomial logit regression using the female sample, and 
columns (4)-(6) are from another regression using the male sample. The samples do not exclude initial 
entrepreneurs. The dependent variable is the transition of self-employment status between the two 
waves of the survey, which contains four outcomes: exit (self-employed in wave 1, not in wave 2), 
remaining (self-employed in both waves), entry (not in wave 1, self-employed in wave 2), and 
nonparticipation (not self-employed in either wave). The log odds of the outcomes are modeled as a 
linear combination of the regressors, and the base category of outcomes is nonparticipation. Relative 
risk ratios (ratio of the probability of choosing one outcome category over the probability of choosing 
the base category) and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 2.11. LPM Estimates of Economic Migration Effect on Self-Employment by Sex 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Female     
Any migration 0.0314* 0.0948** 0.0334* 0.109** 
 (0.017) (0.048) (0.020) (0.051) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship   X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.079 0.244 0.095 0.257 
No. of observations 4,156 1,350 3,364 1,237 
R-squared 0.050 0.110 0.027 0.062 
Male     
Any migration 0.031 0.055 0.032 0.035 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038) 
Control for initial entrepreneurship   X X 
Mean of dep. var. 0.192 0.256 0.230 0.269 
No. of observations 3,229 2,424 2,520 2,424 
R-squared 0.150 0.121 0.038 0.030 
Notes: The sample does not exclude the initial entrepreneurs. Migrants who were participating in 
school at the time of the initial survey are recoded to be non-migrants for economic reasons. All 
models are estimated using linear probability regression. See Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for other notes. * 
indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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CHAPTER 3. CHILD GENDER, PARENTAL INVESTMENT, AND LABOR 
MARKET OUTCOMES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In most countries, the labor force participation and labor supply of women with preschool-aged 
children are substantially lower than those of their childless counterparts due to the high demand 
of intensive caring time (Maurer-Fazio et al, 2011). As a result, labor force participation and the 
labor supply of women (and also men) with preschool-aged children strongly correlate with the 
availability of childcare. In developed countries like the U.S. and Canada where the system of 
childcare and childhood education has been well established, the government provides subsidies 
to parents in order to facilitate the household’s access to childcare and early childhood education 
(Baker et al, 2008). The supply of childcare and childhood education in China, however, is very 
limited. Such inadequacy is reflected by at least two aspects. First, both the quantity and quality 
of childcare facilities are relatively low in China compared with both international standards and 
domestic demand. Second, a universal government program of subsidy is largely nonexistent. 
The inequality with regard to access to formal and informal childcare is very likely to transform 
into gaps in the labor market outcomes of parents. Given the situation of childcare in China, this 
paper examines whether the gender of an offspring influences the access to informal childcare 
due to the grandson preference that eventually affects parents’ investments to children and their 
own labor market outcomes. 
Understanding the intergenerational effect of child gender on the accessibility of childcare and 
parental investments and labor outcomes is of substantial interest to researchers and 
policymakers. The differences in the time allocation of parents on market work and the resultant 
earning gap indicate a distributional effect related to child gender. Gender not only determines 
the living standard of parents, but it may intensify a potential gender bias on a child’s 
development through the production of human capital. The research hence reveals an alarming 
and potentially unintended consequence of a culture of grandson preference and evidence of 
gender inequality present for children from a very young age.  
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To address the heterogeneity of families, I explore an identification strategy based on the random 
assumption of gender for the first child. Economists used the randomness of sex for the first birth 
to provide an exogenous variation (Lundberg, 2005). Although previous findings have shown 
that the male to female ratios at birth strongly increase with the birth order, gender of the first 
child is arguably random and leaves cross sectional analysis advantageous (because causality can 
be established). This strategy has been widely used in, for example, Dahl and Moretti (2008), 
Bogan (2010), Ebenstein and Leung (2010), Ebenstein (2010) and Li and Wu (2010). I also 
construct a test and find that the gender of the first child is not significantly correlated with 
individual and household characteristics. The results indicate that these characteristics are very 
much balanced between households with a boy and households with a girl. 
To preview, the findings show that having a first-born son increases mother’s (father’s) annual 
wage income by 38% (20%), weekly working time by 1.8 (2.5) hours and annual working time 
by 133.4 (123.7) hours, compared to those having a first-born daughter. Regarding the allocation 
of parenting time, mothers with a son spend 4.2 hours less on childcare than mothers with a 
daughter. This leads to a 5.2-hour difference in total parenting time per week between boys and 
girls. 
To test whether the gender-based parental investments and labor outcomes found in this paper 
are driven by differential access to informal childcare caused by patrilineal culture and grandson 
preference, I compare the living proximity to grandparents of households with a son and 
households with a daughter. Results indicate that parents with a preschool-aged son are more 
likely to live near (within 8 kilometers) grandparents than parents with a preschool-aged 
daughter. Living proximity enables the care of a grandchild more conveniently, and it is found 
that the closer the physical proximity of grandparents to their adult children, the more likely 
grandparents are to fulfill a caring role. To put it differently, informal childcare is easier to 
access for households with a son than households with a daughter. Access to informal childcare 
provided by grandparents (mainly grandmothers) strongly and positively correlates with the 
activities of the mother (Compton and Pollak, 2014). All of this evidence suggests that the 
intergenerational transfer of childcare is one plausible reason that parents return to work sooner 
after the birth of a son than the birth of a daughter.  
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This paper is closest to the work by Fan et al (2013). Based on the same dataset as this paper, 
they investigated the effects of child gender on parental time allocation of market work and 
household chores. Fixed effects estimates show that the presence of sons reduces maternal time 
on household chores without a significant increase in maternal labor supply in rural households. 
Similar to this paper, Fan, et al argue that the foregone maternal time in household chores is 
likely to be covered by grandparents living in the same households due to the increased intra-
household bargaining power of a woman with a son. While their research question is similar to 
mine, the attention, sample and empirical strategy are different. My paper examines how child 
gender leads to inequality with regard to access to informal childcare and to gaps in the labor 
market outcomes of parents. Another focus of my paper is the parental investment of money and 
time to boys and girls because the developmental inputs determine children’s outcomes. Thus, I 
selected a sample of households with a preschool-aged child.  I document the use to formal and 
informal childcare by gender and discuss its potential influences on gender inequality relative to 
childhood development. For the identification strategy, I explore the random assumption of 
gender of the first child to address the heterogeneity of families; whereas, Fan, et al used fixed 
effects modeling to track changes in the number of boys and girls living in rural areas. 
This paper is in line with two branches of literature: child gender and parental investments and 
childcare and labor supply. With this research, I contribute to existing literature in three ways. 
First, based on the arrangement of childcare, this paper rigorously analyzes parent’s investment 
of money and time to preschool-aged boys and girls and discusses its potential influences on 
gender inequality for childhood development. This paper adds new evidence to recent studies 
that uncover the influence of home environments on a boy’s disadvantage in non-cognitive skills 
(see Bertrand and Pan, 2013).  
Second, in contrast to the studies that document gender gaps in intra-household resource 
allocation on formal education, nutrition intake and health care, fewer theoretical and empirical 
studies have explored the intergenerational effects of child gender on parental economic well-
being, such as labor market outcomes. In particular, research is very limited from a developing 
country (Lundberg, 2005). This research extends previous work on child gender and parental 
labor outcomes using a Chinese dataset.  
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Third, informal care settings (daycare home and relative care) have received much less attention 
than formal childcare (childcare centers). This paper studies one of the factors that affect the 
supply of informal childcare (provided by grandparents) and provides a new plausible 
explanation to the findings on parental investments and labor outcomes, i.e., grandson preference 
and the access to informal childcare provided by grandparents. From a policy perspective, this 
paper sheds light on an important distributional effect of family ties and culture on economic 
outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, this mechanism has not been emphasized in previous 
studies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical 
background and literature. Section 3.3 introduces the identification strategy. Section 3.4 
describes the data, sample, and variable construction. Section 3.5 discusses the findings and 
interprets the results. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of future extensions. 
3.2 Background and Literature 
3.2.1 Literature on Child Gender and Parental Labor Market Outcomes  
Among the empirical work, fathers with a son have been found to work longer and harder in 
developed countries including the U.S. and Germany. In a leading 2002 study, Lundberg and 
Rose show that each son increases his father’s labor supply by 40 hours per year and his hourly 
wage by 3% more than each daughter using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). In a similar work, Choi et al (2005) use data from a German Socio-economic Panel and 
find that a first-born son increases his father’s labor supply by 107 hours per year more than a 
first-born daughter. The premium on working hours and earnings corresponding to having a son 
is called a son premium.  
3.2.2 Literature on the Mechanism and Explanation 
Besides the literature documenting the links between child gender and parents’ labor market 
outcomes, other studies attempt to empirically test the underlying mechanism that drives such a 
gender effect of offspring. Pabiloni and Ward-Batts (2007) use data from the Census and Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to compare the son premium among parents who are native born versus 
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first- or second-generation immigrants. Evidence shows that a preference for a male child is 
persistent among Asia immigrants, but they work fewer hours than White natives when they 
have a son rather than a daughter. Pabiloni and Ward-Batts’ empirical work is not consistent with 
the preference hypothesis. That is parents have unequal concern for child’s economic outcomes 
(Behrman et al, 1986). 
Moreover, having a son increases a marriage’s duration (Dahl and Moretti, 2008), which leads 
couples to be more likely for gender specialization. Traditional fathers with boys are predicted to 
work harder and longer to earn a wage premium and promotion than fathers with girls.39 Based 
on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Lundberg (2005) finds that the gender-
induced labor division depends on a parent’s education. Having a son reduces the gender 
division of labor for more educated couples, but it increases specialization for less educated 
couples in the three years following the birth of a child.  
Further, a demonstration effect indicates that fathers who express traditional gender ideologies 
believe it is more important to model a traditional male role of “the breadwinner” for their sons 
than for daughters. Glauber and Gozjolko (2011) use data from the NLSY 1979 and find 
fatherhood to be associated with an increased amount of time spent on paid work among White 
men. This increase is more than twice as strong for traditional White men than for egalitarian 
White men. But no studies directly link the findings to child gender. 
Next, having a son increases the financial distress of a family. When investments on boys are 
more productive than investments on girls, rational parents choose to allocate their resources 
accordingly. In China, parents may intend to invest more on boys due to the skewed male to 
female ratios at birth (number of males per 100 females). Edlund et al (2013) find a gender gap 
in premarital education investments in China. That is, there is an increase in the educational 
attainment of males relative to females in areas with high male to female ratios. In a study that is 
similar to this paper, Knight et al (2010) argue that rural parents with a son rather than a daughter 
have an incentive to increase their family income to support their sons. Research from Wei and 
Zhang (2011) confirms the findings in Knight et al (2010) and reveals that parents with a son 
                                                          
39 The assumption is that females have a comparative advantage in domestic tasks but a disadvantage in 
market tasks due to their productivity advantage in household activities and the gender-wage gap. 
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spend more hours on off-farm work in rural areas and are more likely to undertake a dangerous 
job corresponding to the skewed male to female ratios. However, both studies only observe 
people living in rural China and do not provide a direct test of the gender effects on parental 
labor supply or wage earnings. 
3.2.3 Informal Childcare and Labor Supply 
Intergenerational kinship ties are likely another reason that links child gender to parents’ labor 
market outcomes. However, it is not to my knowledge thoroughly discussed in the related 
literature of son premium. Empirical evidence from many countries indicates that family 
proximity and associated access to informal childcare facilitates women’s labor supply. In China, 
intergenerational kinship ties and grandparent’s care for grandchildren are very important to 
married women for two reasons. First, center-based childcare facilities are underdeveloped in the 
sample period of 1991-2009. In particular, it is estimated that the number of kindergartens 
decreased by 28.5% between 1997 and 2006 due to the economic transition and the shutdown of 
public kindergartens previously run by state enterprises (Du and Dong, 2013). Second, even in 
areas where childcare facilities are well developed, grandparents can also provide essential help 
for the irregular needs of childcare when a child is sick or when the daycare is closed in the 
evening time and on holidays.  
In fact, as an important step to establish a “universal preschool” for the entire population, the 
Chinese government launched a three-year program to increase the establishments of childcare 
facilities and enrollment rate of 3-6 years old children in 2010 (after the sample period in this 
paper). According to China Educational Yearbook, from 2010 to 2013, the number of formal 
childcare facilities increased sharply by 32% to 198,600. The enrollment rate of 3-6 years old 
children increased to 67.5% (a 10.9 increment relative to the base year of 2010). 
Using data from the National Survey of Families and Households and the public use files of the 
U.S. Census, Compton and Pollak (2014) show that a close geographic proximity to mothers or 
mothers-in-law increases the labor supply of married women with young children. The reason for 
this is that family proximity increases the supply of informal childcare, not only childcare during 
work hours but also irregular or unanticipated childcare time. Similarly, Maurer-Fazio et al 
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(2011) employ data from the China Census to examine how the labor force participation of 
married women in urban areas responds to a family structure. Elderly co-residence increases the 
labor force participation of prime-age women. Notably, the effect is larger for rural-to-urban 
migrant women than for non-migrants.  
Table 3.1 tabulates the use of a childcare mode by child’s age using data from the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey. Among all of the newborn to six-year-old children in the sample, 
grandparents cared for 43.4%, and only 27.5% were enrolled in a day care center. Very low 
enrollment rate of center-based childcare facility is the consequence of a universal lack of 
daycare facilities for children younger than 2.5-year-old. Without the assistance of grandparents, 
mothers may have to withdraw from the labor market or hire a nanny (which is not the primary 
choice for most households) to care for the very young child. In fact, over 75% of mothers obtain 
help from their parents or parents-in-law before their children reach two years old. Even when 
children reach the age to attend a daycare center, the informal childcare rate is still as high as 50% 
since grandparents may cover for irregular childcare needs. The Figure 3.1 plots the childcare 
arrangement by age using data displayed in Table 3.1 and shows the trend of childcare mode 
more visually.  
Preference for a grandson influences intergenerational kinships. For parents, the birth of a 
grandson is often the most important aspect of their adult children’s marriage in old Chinese 
society (Chyi and Mao, 2012). Studies from Maurer-Fazio et al (2011) and Chen et al (2011) 
emphasize the role of grandparents as caregivers and the strong legacy of patrilineal culture. To 
the extent that the positive effect of close proximity is related to the availability of grandparent’s 
childcare, and given the importance of informal childcare from grandparents, a woman’s and her 
husband’s labor market attachment are every likely to be influenced by child gender if a 
grandparent provides gender-based childcare due to their strong preference for a male offspring.  
3.3 Data, Sample and Variables  
Data used in this paper are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) conducted by 
the Population Center at the University of Carolina. It is a longitudinal study that covers 
approximately 16,000 individuals originating from 4,400 households in the years 1989, 1991, 
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1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2009. Nine provinces40 from coastal, middle, northeastern 
and western areas participated in this survey. The questions comprising the 1989 survey are, in 
general, different from the questions in the remaining waves. As such, I removed it from the 
sample of analysis. 
CHNS only asks childcare questions in households with present children aged zero to six 
because the care for young children is typically more intense than the care for older children 
(Chen et al, 2011). To capture the parent’s time allocated to childcare, I limited the sample to 
households with one and only one preschool-aged child (aged 0-6). My sample totals over 850 
observations of preschool-aged children who have no siblings.41 Their fathers and mothers are 
between the ages of 22 and 5042, who are married and have graduated from school. 
The unit of observation is a preschool-aged child. The sample includes 208 children (i.e., 
households) in 1991; 154 in 1993; 96 in 1997; 65 in 2000; 105 in 2004; 110 in 2006; and 117 in 
2009, respectively. The sample sizes decrease considerably over time due to the panel design and 
attrition. Younger people are more likely to leave the sample due to marriage or economic 
migration (Chen et al, 2011).  
The variables of labor time are constructed according to the information on the average working 
hours per day, working days per week and the number of working months last year. I construct 
the average weekly working hours by multiplying the working hours per day by the days per 
week. Since there are no questions asking the weeks worked per month, I assume all respondents 
work four weeks per month and define the yearly working hours as four times the weekly hours 
by working month. The working time variables generate many missing values for farmers. The 
reason is that farmers may not have an accurate self-measure for their labor time. For this reason, 
agricultural workers and farm families are under-represented in the sample of analysis.   
                                                          
40 These nine provinces are Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
and Shandong. 
41 A potential pitfall is that most of the conclusions in this paper only apply to three-person families and 
may not be generalized to include families with multiple children. This may not be a serious concern 
since large portion of parents in China only have one child due to the limitations of fertility. 
42 According to the latest marriage law in China, the minimum age to get married is 22 for males and 20 
for females. The compulsory retirement age is 50 for most women and 60 for most men in China. 
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There is direct question related to an individual’s monthly salary from the original survey when a 
person is employed. To proxy the efficiency of work, I define the hourly wage as the ratio of 
monthly salary divided by four times the weekly hours worked. The income variables used in the 
analysis are CPI-adjusted43 to remove the trend of inflation. For all income related variables, I 
take the log transformation after adding one to the real value in order to avoid dropping the zeros.  
The information of child gender and the number of offspring used in the analysis are from the 
self-reported fertility history. The CHNS contains information on fertility from married women 
who are under age 52. Variables which are constructed based on this fertility information are 
more reliable than using the roster file because the roster file usually does not track children who 
are not living with their parents.     
Information with regard to parenting participation and time is from the modules of child, adult 
and family surveys. For families with preschool-aged children younger than seven, CHNS asked 
each adult how much time a parent spent on childcare by feeding, bathing, dressing, holding, and 
watching a child during the week prior to the interview. Time used for cooking and washing 
clothes while caring for the child is also included. I use this information to construct a father and 
mother’s time spent on caring for young children. Moreover, the childcare arrangement is 
constructed using information in this panel. Specifically, each child (the questions were 
answered by their parents) was asked whether they received care from any individual living 
outside of the household, including non-coresident maternal grandparents and paternal 
grandparents, other relatives or nannies. Children were also asked how many hours they were 
cared for outside of their own households in the past week. I define a child as enrolled in a 
center-based facility if the household gave an affirmative answer to the question that the child 
was cared for by a daycare facility, preschool, or nursery school the week prior to the interview. 
Childcare expenditure is calculated by taking the log transformation of how much a household 
paid per month for all childcare-related expenses.    
                                                          
43 Each wave of the CHNS contains variables of consumer price indexes. See website of the CHNS for 
details of these variables.  
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/data/datasets/Household%20Income%20Variable%20Constructio
n.pdf  
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Living proximity is identified using information derived from a module designed for married 
females. These women were asked about the geographic location of their parents and parents-in-
law’s residences. I group the households in the sample into two categories: living in the same 
household or neighboring, and living within eight kilometers. Childcare is localized. I use eight 
kilometers to measure the accessibility of assistance related to childcare from grandparents (see 
Hotz and Xiao [2011], and Ihara et al, [2012]).  
Variables of age and the family member type are directly recoded from the roster file. Education 
is recoded from the question of the number of years of formal education completed in school. 
The set of occupation dummies is used to proxy the detailed type of individual’s primary job, 
which is categorized as agricultural worker, manager, ordinary worker, or unemployed. Province 
dummies are used to capture the provincial level fixed effects since there is a great variation in 
economic development across the provinces of China. Finally, resident location dummies 
indicate whether the individual lives in urban (city and suburb) or rural (town and village) areas. 
CHNS provides variables that measure local transportation, population, health, economics and 
social services that are indexed at the community level. See Jones-Smith and Popkin (2010) for 
details on the construction of these variables. 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis. Fathers spend 9.2 
hours per week caring for their children, while mothers spend 24.2 hours per week, nearly three 
times as much as father’s caring time. Total parental child care time averages 34 hours. The log 
transformation of parent’s expenditure on formal childcare averages 1.7 (in 1991 yuan, log 
transformation). The following rows indicate that fathers with a preschool-aged child work 41 
hours per week, 1883 hours per year, earn 1.26 (log transformation) hourly wage, and a 7.5 (log 
transformation) annual wage. In contrast, mothers work 5 hours less weekly and earn less than 
fathers.  
Fifty one percent of the households have a first-born son, which indicates that the ratio of male to 
female children in the sample is 1.04 (104 boys per 100 girls). This number is within the range of 
natural births (World Bank, 2006). The children’s age averages 3.5-year-old. Fathers are 30.9 
years old and completed 11 years of schooling on average. The employment rate among fathers 
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is 89%. Seventy one percent of them work as ordinary workers. Mothers are 29 years old and 
complete 10.1 years of schooling on average. The mother’s employment rate is 78%. The 
remaining rows in this table report year and geographic distributions.  
Farm families are underrepresented in the sample. Only 29 children were from farm families 
where parents are farmers. The findings presented in the following sections are robust to the 
sample specification in which these farm families are excluded.  
3.4 Methodology 
Although the gender of a child is predetermined and not affected by parental labor outcomes 
several years after birth, it could be the outcome of sex selection when the demand for a son is 
strong. Some unobserved individual and household characteristics could determine both the 
fertility and time allocation on the labor market. For example, individual ability and personality 
(e.g., self-esteem and ambition) may determine both the likelihood of having a son as well as 
labor supply and earnings. Traditional patrilineal families may be both likely to use prenatal sex 
selection to achieve a son and make the gender division of labor between husband and wife. In 
this case, the positive effect of having a son and paternal labor supply or negative effect on 
maternal labor supply would be spurious.  
To address the potential endogeneity of sex selection, I use the gender of the first child as the 
main variable on the right-hand-side in the empirical analysis. To ensure that I make a 
comparison within the same type of households, I follow the method outlined in Knight et al 
(2010) and Wei and Zhang (2011) and analyze the respondents from families with only one-child. 
The age of the child in these one-child households is restricted to be less than seven years old to 
assure that parents have answered questions related to childcare. 
Although the male to female ratios at birth strongly increase with the birth order, leading to the 
gender of a child at higher birth parities endogenous, the gender of the first child is arguably 
random in both China and other countries. This leaves a cross sectional analysis advantageous 
because causality can be established. Li (2007) (see figure 3.2) plot the male fractions at birth by 
parities using the five waves (1982, 1987, 1990, 2000, and 2005) of China’s Census. According 
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to the graph, male fractions of the second and third birth strictly increase over the years from 
1982 to 2005. The fraction of the first birth, however, is quite stable and close to the biologically 
natural level. The sex ratio at birth of the first birth parity is 105.6, 107.7, 105.4, 107.1 and 108.4 
in 1982, 1987, 1990, 2000, and 2005, respectively.44 All are within the biologically normal range 
of sex ratio at birth, i.e. 103-107 boys per 100 girls at birth (World Bank, 2006); except, in 2008, 
the sex ratio at birth is slightly higher than the biological norms coming in at 108.4.45 Almond et 
al (2013) find sex ratios to be normal at first parity among Asian immigrants to Canada, but 
rising with parity if there were no previous sons. In the final sample of analysis, children were 
born between 1985 and 2009, and 90% of them were born before 2005. The male to female ratio 
in this sample is 104, which is within the biological normal limits.  
As to CHNS and the sample used in this paper, I follow the method set out in Barcello et al 
(forthcoming) and run a series of regressions to test whether the likelihood of having a first-born 
son correlates with parental and family characteristics. This model checks whether a 
predetermined family character is balanced between families with a boy and families with a girl. 
For example, the selected variables include the father and mother’s characteristics: age, years of 
schooling, and whether he/she worked in the state sector. A parent’s ethnicity is not considered 
here since parents whose ethnicity is not Han were dropped (8% of the CHNS sample). In Table 
3.3, all null hypotheses cannot be rejected except for those having a prenatal check (which turns 
out to negatively predict having a first-born son). However, the number of prenatal visits has 
minimal influence on the probability of having a son.  Among all of the variables that describe 
the development of the local economy (community), only the sanitation condition correlates with 
child gender.  
By assuming there is no systematic sex selection at the first birth, I use an empirical model that 
has been previously applied to Lundberg (2005), Dahl and Moretti (2008), Bogan (2009), 
Ebenstein and Leung (2010), Ebenstein (2010), and Li and Wu (2010), to examine the effects of 
child gender on parental labor market outcomes and parental investments. 
                                                          
44 China conducted six censuses in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. In 1987 and 2005, the 
government conducted around a 1% population survey. I use the household level 1% sample from the 
1990 census to replicate the sex ratio at birth of the first parity and arrive at a similar number.    
45 The 95% confidence interval is very likely to include 103-107, according to Almond et al (2013). 
102 
 
(3.1) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
In Equation (3.1) 𝑌𝑖  is the individual parent 𝑖’s labor outcomes and parental investments at a 
survey year.46 I use five variables to measure the labor outcomes in this paper. These include the 
following: yearly wage income, hourly wage, working hours during the week prior to the 
interview, average weekly hours worked last year, and the total annual hours last year. I use 
parenting time, childcare arrangement, and childcare expenditure to measure parental 
developmental investments to young children. 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy variable, indicating that the first child born to a parent is a boy. 𝑋𝑖 
contains a child’s demographics (mainly age), father and mother’s demographics, including 
gender, age, education, occupation, province where the family lives, the year of the interview 
and resident location of city, suburb, town or village. To further capture the local economic 
conditions which are important determinants of individual labor outcomes, I include variables 
that measure the level of urbanizations of the local community, including population density, 
education score, sanitary score, housing score, transportation score, quality of health score, 
market component, diversification score, modern market score and social service score. And 
finally, 𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Parental Labor Supply and Earnings 
Table 3.4 presents the findings related to the labor market outcomes of parents. The results of the 
working hours are reported for regressions on two measures: an indicator for having a job or not 
(extensive margin), and working hours conditional on employed (intensive margin). The 
coefficients and standard deviations reported in each column are from a single regression in 
which the name of the dependent variable is shown as the column title. Column (1) displays the 
regression that results from the probit models on labor force participation. Columns (2)-(5) show 
the regression results from the OLS models on working hours and earnings conditional on the 
                                                          
46 In this part, I pool observations from different waves of survey in one sample and treat it as a repeated 
cross sectional data set. As longitudinal files, CHNS contains multiple years of data for part of 
respondents but not all of them due to the problems of attrition and missing values. 
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employment status. The estimated effects of child gender on fathers and mothers are displayed in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively.  
Despite the fact that child gender does not significantly influence paternal labor force 
participation (both the coefficient and standard deviation are large), it is evident that having a 
boy significantly increases the working hours and total earnings of both fathers and mothers. 
After controlling for individual and household level characteristics, fathers whose first child is a 
son work an additional 2.9 hours during the week prior to the interview, 2.5 weekly hours based 
on a yearly average, 123.7 hours yearly total, and earn nearly a 20% higher total wage income 
than fathers whose first child is a daughter. These findings imply that on the intensive margin, 
having a first-born son increases a father’s working hours by 7%, according to the estimates 
using weekly working hours in the prior week to the interview.  
The effects of child gender on mothers’ labor market outcomes are as strong as the effects on 
fathers. Again, child gender does not influence maternal labor force participation. But mothers 
whose first child is a son work an additional 3.2 hours during the week just before the interview 
time, 1.8 hours yearly average, 133 hours yearly total, and earn a 38% higher total wage income 
than mothers whose first child is a daughter. Similarly, these findings imply that on the intensive 
margin, having a first-born son increases maternal working hours by 9%, according to the 
estimates using weekly working hours in the prior week to the interview to measure the time 
allocation of market work. 
The direction and magnitude of the estimated effects of child gender on parent’s labor supply are 
similar to the findings in Lundberg and Rose (2002) and Choi et al (2005). This implies that the 
son premium found in developed countries also exists in a developing country like China. The 
estimated effect of child gender on the total yearly wage earnings from cross sectional analysis is 
higher than their estimates but similar to the findings in Knight et al (2010). According to their 
estimates, having a son rather than a daughter raises a family’s income by 13% among two-
parent families with a child under 10-year-old.  
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Findings in Table 3.4 indicate that on the intensive margin, the gender of offspring influences 
both a father and mother’s time allocation on the market work in two-parent families with one 
child when the child is of preschool age. 
3.5.2 Parental Investments to Early Childhood 
Table 3.5 presents the estimated effect of having a first-born son on a parent’s participation in 
childcare and weekly hours spent on caring for a child conditional on providing care. It is evident 
that child gender matters to a parent’s time investments. Columns (1) and (2) display the 
estimates of whether or not a parent provides any childcare to a preschool-aged child. Column (1) 
indicates a weak evidence of a father’s participation in caring for a child, responding to the 
gender of an offspring. Boys may have a higher probability of getting any paternal care (p-value 
= 0.15). A mother’s participation in childcare appears independent of the gender of her offspring. 
Conditional on participation, the time that mothers spend on caring for a child significantly 
relates to child gender. Boys obtain 4.2 hours caring time from mothers less than girls on average. 
This difference leads to a total gender gap of 5.2 hours in caring time from both parents. 
Although insignificant, the parenting time of fathers responding to having a son than a daughter 
is also estimated negative. Overall, Table 3.5 indicates a strong gender difference in obtaining 
parenting time on the intensive margin, especially from mothers. 
3.5.3 Quality of Parenting Time 
Instead of the quantity of parenting time, it is more fruitful to test whether quality-parenting time 
responds to child gender. Quality parenting time usually requires a sufficient amount of 
interaction between parents and children. Price (2008) defines quality time as including time 
spent on reading, playing, eating, talking, attending museums and other similar activities, and it 
is based on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Unfortunately, the CHNS contains no 
survey questions on quality-parenting time or the interaction between parents and children. 
Instead, I use the parent’s report of playing time47 and reading time48 of children as proxy, since 
                                                          
47 The measure of time doing exercises is based on the question, “How many hours do you spend doing 
physical exercises each week (e.g., running, and playing) in preschool facilities, athletic schools, or at 
home?” 
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parents are very likely to participate in these activities while watching their young children. 
Table 3.6 presents the findings on the gender gap relative to time allocation for playing and 
reading. The sample size is different from Table 3.4 due to the missing values of these queries in 
the original questionnaire. Boys spend less time reading than girls despite the fact that child 
gender is not relevant for the time allocation of exercises.  
Parental time has been traditionally regarded as one of the most important investments for 
children’s development. In particular, high quality parenting time spent on the activities 
described in this section may have a great impact on both children’s developmental well-being in 
the childhood and their economic outcomes in adult life (Case et al, 2005). Findings in this table, 
therefore, suggest that for at least in two married-parent families with a single child, boys are at a 
disadvantage for obtaining high quality parenting time, especially from mothers. These findings 
are important since characteristics that are measured as of age seven have been observed to 
explain a great deal of the variation in educational attainment, employment and earnings in 
adulthood. 
3.5.4 Living Proximity and Access to Informal Childcare 
The remainder of this paper discusses a plausible explanation for the findings on the son 
premium in the previous section. I examine access to non-parental childcare providers and 
expenditures on childcare, and link the son premium found in the previous section to the 
accessibility of informal childcare provided by grandparents. 
Parents may pay for the services of a caregiver, such as a babysitter, grandparent or daycare 
facility. To get a sense of how the choice of nonparent childcare responds to the gender of an 
offspring, I examine a household’s choice of grandparent’s care, facility care, non-household 
member care, and household’s expenditure on childcare per month. Since childcare can take 
place in multiple locations, these categories are not mutually exclusive. This overlap is similar to 
the argument in Chen et al (2011). Table 3.7 presents the estimated results. In all of the 
regressions shown in Columns (1)-(3), the coefficients are very small and insignificant. That is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
48 Reading time is measured based on the question, “How many hours do you spend reading (books, 
newspapers and magazines), writing, and drawing in a typical day during the weekend?” 
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the probability that parents choose any childcare provided by grandparents, facility, or any 
nonhousehold member is not influenced by child gender. The last two columns indicate that the 
monthly expenditure on childcare is not significantly different between households with a boy 
and households with a girl on both the extensive margin and intensive margin.  
Current findings on a household’s choice of nonparent childcare are unable to explain the 
gender-based parental time allocation on market work and childrearing, because so far 
(according to Table 3.7), no evidence indicates that the reduced parenting time invested on a boy 
is compensated by nonparent caring time. 
As an older generation, grandparents, and paternal grandparents in particular, have a strong 
preference for boys over girls because only boys could carry the family name and inherit the 
family patrimony (Li and Wu [2010]). Therefore, it is consistent to speculate that caring for a 
child relates to such a grandson preference, i.e., grandparents are more willing to provide care for 
grandsons than granddaughters. This fact directly reduces the amount of time spent on childcare 
from parents who can work more intensively at the workplace. Very little work in Economics has 
studied grandparent’s preference and intrahousehold behavior. Providing direct evidence on time 
allocation related to childrearing given by grandparents is also a challenge undertaken in this 
paper since the specific childcare time is only available for co-resident grandparents in multi-
generation households. No variables measure the endeavor of non-coresident grandparents. 
To avoid excluding non-coresident grandparents, I instead examine how a household’s 
geographic proximity between grandparents and grandchildren is influenced by child gender. 
The geographic proximity is the most important determinant to informal childcare choices and 
parental labor supply (Dunifon and Bajracharya, [2013], Maurer-Fazio et al, [2011], and 
Compton and Pollak [2014]).  
Figure 3.3 presents the smoothed probability of getting grandparent care using locally weighted 
regressions. The figure shows that coresidence is very important for children to obtain any 
grandparent care. The probability of grandparent care decreases gradually as the distance 
between a grandparent and parent’s place increases. After the distance reaches 80 kilometers, it 
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is very unlikely that children get any weekly grandparent care49. Previous research also finds that 
5-mile distance (i.e. 8-kilometer) is a conservative estimation but captures the boundary of 
providing daily caregiving (Hotz and Xiao [2011], and Ihara et al, [2012]).  
I then examine how child gender influences the living proximity of grandparents and present the 
results in Table 3.8. Since each child may have four grandparents, the living arrangement is 
measured by the geographic distance between parents’ place and the nearest grandparent’s place. 
I also create another two binary variables indicating whether a grandparent lives in the same 
household or lives within 8 kilometers (i.e. 5 miles) to capture the potential nonlinearity between 
living proximity and grandparent care as indicated in Figure 3.3. All regressions controlled for 
individual and family level characteristics as described in previous section and whether each of 
the four grandparents are alive. Although other demographic characteristics of grandparents may 
impact the supply of informal childcare, it is not desirable to include these variables in the 
regressions due to the missing reports, in particular the years of schooling, working status and 
health condition. The age distributions of the youngest and eldest grandparents of grandsons are 
very similar to those of granddaughters (see Figure 3.4). This result supports the argument that 
these omitted demographic characteristics may not significantly affect the findings in this section. 
Column (1) in Table 3.8 indicates that grandsons live closer to their grandparents than 
granddaughters on average. The probability of coresidence with parents or parents-in-law shown 
in Column (2) is 26.1% (38% relative to the mean) higher when the young child being analyzed 
is a boy rather than a girl. The gender difference in the probability of grandparents living within 
8 kilometers is even higher i.e. 36.3% (40% relative to the mean), according to Column (3). 
Since labor market outcomes of women are strongly related to the geographic proximity of 
elderly people (Maurer-Fazio et al, 2011), a grandparent’s help on childcare is arguably a 
plausible explanation of the gender effects on parental labor market outcomes and investment to 
children.  
                                                          
49 97 percent of children in the sample have at least one grandparent living within the same city and 96 
percent of children in the sample have their grandparents living nearer than 40 kilometers. This 
distribution of the geographic distance may explain why no gender effect on the participation of 
grandparents in childcare found in Table 3.7.  
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3.6 Extension and Conclusion 
This paper uses data from the CHNS to examine whether child gender matters to parental 
investments to children and economic well-being. Findings and conclusions are made in the 
context of China’s shortage of childcare facilities and widely-used informal childcare provided 
by grandparents. Based on the random assumption of gender of the first parity, single equation 
estimates provide supportive evidence of the existence of a son premium on the labor supply and 
wage income of both parents. On the intensive margin, the magnitude of the son premium is near 
7% relative to the sample mean of paternal working hours and 9% of maternal working hours per 
week. More interestingly, mothers with a son spend 14% less time caring for their child than 
mothers with a daughter. It is noted that despite the overall effect (including both the extensive 
and intensive margins) of child gender on paternal labor supply and wage income is still 
significant and positive, the overall effect on maternal working time and earnings is insignificant 
according to the estimates presented in Table 3.9.  
I attempt to use the choice of childcare and intergenerational ties between grandparents and 
grandchildren to explain the son premium and conclude that parents with a young son are able to 
increase their labor supply faster than parents with a young daughter because it is plausible that 
grandparents provide more childcare to grandsons. This theory, however, does not fully rule out 
other possibilities. More work is thus required in order to explain the findings in this paper more 
entirely. 
The findings underline the importance of further work to extend the current study. First, this 
paper uses a sample of nonfarm households selected from rural and urban areas. A larger sample 
which contains information of formal and informal child care as well as parental investments to 
children is desirable to use to examine whether the effects of child gender is symmetric between 
households in rural and urban areas. Second, similar to other existing work, this paper only 
provides indirect evidence of grandson preference and corresponding intergenerational transfers. 
The economic behavior of grandparents requires further study, using a dataset that contains more 
information on their time allocation, transfers, and residence choices. Third, due to the 
requirements of an identification strategy, the findings in this paper may be only applicable to 
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families comprised of two parents and one child. Although a one-child family is prevalent 
especially in urban China, whether child gender affects parental labor outcomes and investments 
to children during their childhood when the family structure changes remains an open question 
and needs further exploration. Similarly, this paper focuses on the intrahousehold behavior of 
young parents around 30-year-old (see Table 3.2), when their children are in the early childhood 
(of preschool age). Whether the stronger labor market attachment associated with having a first-
born son lasts in the long run and matters in the life cycle is an important question to further 
examine.  
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Figure 3.1. Childcare Mode by Age 
 
Notes: Author’s calculation using data from the CHNS. 
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Figure 3.2. Sex Ratio at Birth by Birth Parity 
 
 
Notes: Source is Li (2007). 
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Figure 3.3. Locally Weighted Regressions 
 
Notes: CHNS and author’s calculation. Line is smoothed using nonparametric locally weighted 
regressions in which any grandparent care is modeled as a function of the geographic distance to the 
closer grandparent. 
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Figure 3.4. Age Distribution of Grandparents 
 
Notes: CHNS and author’s calculation. 
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Figure 3.4. (cont’d) 
 
Notes: CHNS and author’s calculation. 
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Table 3.1. Childcare Mode by Age 
Child's age Parent's care only Grandparent's care Daycare facility Obs. 
0 0.138 0.724 0.052 58 
1 0.133 0.767 0.056 90 
2 0.164 0.582 0.213 122 
3 0.132 0.512 0.347 121 
4 0.216 0.305 0.443 167 
5 0.226 0.321 0.370 146 
6 0.172 0.192 0.205 151 
Total 0.177 0.434 0.275 855 
Notes: Author’s calculation based on CHNS 1991-2009. China provides paid maternity leave. 
The standard maternity leave is 90 days. 
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics 
  0-6-year old children 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Hours caring for a child, Dad 746a 9.20 17.92 0 140 
Hours caring for a child, Mom 736a 24.22 28.83 0 168 
Hours caring for a child, total 727a 33.95 37.89 0 280 
Expenditure on childcare 675a 1.73 2.34 0 7 
Working hours (week prior to the interview), Dad 855 39.95 19.81 0 105 
Average working hours, Dad 855 40.84 18.85 0 105 
Total working hours, Dad 855 1882.72 904.43 0 5040 
Hourly wage, Dad 855 1.26 0.86 0 6 
Total wage, Dad 855 7.49 3.20 0 13 
Working hours (week prior to the interview), Mom 855 34.24 22.63 0 98 
Average working hours, Mom 855 34.93 22.17 0 90 
Total working hours, Mom 855 1617.35 1068.99 0 4320 
Hourly wage, Mom 855 0.93 0.79 0 4 
Total wage, Mom 855 6.20 3.84 0 12 
Having a first-born son 855 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Child's age  855 3.51 1.84 0 6 
Age, Dad 855 30.90 4.87 22 58 
Education, Dad 855 10.60 2.68 0 18 
Dad's occupation: farmer 855 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Dad's occupation: administrator 855 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Dad's occupation: ordinary worker 855 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Dad's occupation: not working 855 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Age, Mom 855 29.04 4.19 22 57 
Education, Mom 855 10.08 2.72 0 18 
Mom's occupation: agricultural worker 855 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Mom's occupation: administrator 855 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Mom's occupation: ordinary worker 855 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Mom's occupation: not working 855 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Urban 855 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Suburb 855 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Town 855 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Village 855 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Wave = 1991 855 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Wave = 1993 855 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Wave = 1997 855 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Wave = 2000 855 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Wave = 2004 855 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Wave = 2006 855 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Wave = 2009 855 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Province = 21 (Liaoning) 855 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Province = 23 (Heilongjiang) 855 0.07 0.26 0 1 
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Table 3.2. (cont.) 
 0-6-year old children 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Province = 32 (Jiangsu) 855 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Province = 37 (Shandong) 855 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Province = 41 (Henan) 855 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Province = 42 (Hubei) 855 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Province = 43 (Hunan) 855 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Province = 45 (Guangxi) 855 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Province = 52 (Guizhou) 855 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Community population density 855 6.26 1.54 0.5 10 
Community education score 855 3.66 1.37 1.2 8 
Community sanitary score 855 7.83 2.41 0.3 10 
Community housing score 855 7.11 2.38 0.14 10 
Community transportation score 855 6.35 2.39 0 10 
Community quality of health score 855 6.56 1.91 0 10 
Community market component 855 5.99 3.23 0 10 
Community diversification score 855 4.98 1.23 2 10 
Community modern market score 855 5.41 2.76 0 10 
Community social service score 855 1.73 2.71 0 10 
Notes: Author’s calculation based on CHNS 1991-2009.  
a sample size is smaller than 855 due to the missing values of questions related to childcare.  
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Table 3.3. Mean Differences by Child Gender 
  Father's characteristics Mother's characteristics Prenatal visit Grandparent's alive 
 
Age Educ State worker Age Educ 
State 
worker Abortion Any visit 
No. 
visits Paternal Maternal 
First-born 
son 0.361 0.162 0.028 -0.138 -0.116 -0.023 -0.005 -0.097* -0.345 0.005 -0.001 
 
(0.333) (0.184) (0.034) (0.287) (0.186) (0.033) (0.020) (0.041) (0.290) (0.021) (0.018) 
Constant 30.71** 10.52** 0.463** 29.11** 10.14** 0.381** 0.098** 0.462** 2.517** 0.894** 0.923** 
 
(0.238) (0.131) (0.025) (0.205) (0.133) (0.024) (0.014) (0.029) (0.208) (0.015) (0.013) 
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 
            
 
Community development index 
 
Population 
density 
Education 
category 
Sanitation 
score 
Housing 
score 
Transport 
score 
Health 
score 
Market 
component 
Diversity 
score 
Modern 
market 
Social 
service   
First-born 
son -0.048 -0.020 0.442** 0.011 0.023 0.052 0.226 -0.084 -0.117 -0.140   
 
(0.106) (0.094) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.131) (0.221) (0.084) (0.189) (0.186) 
 Constant 6.285** 3.671** 7.602** 7.106** 6.339** 6.531** 5.870** 5.020** 5.474** 1.799** 
 
 
(0.076) (0.067) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.094) (0.158) (0.060) (0.135) (0.133)   
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855 855   
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001   
Notes: Coefficients reported are from separate linear regressions, where each characteristic is regressed on a dummy for male child and a 
constant. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Table 3.4. Effects of Child Gender on Parental Labor Market Outcomes  
  Participation Working hours Wage income 
 
  Last week 
Yearly 
average Yearly total Hourly 
Yearly 
total 
Sample of fathers 
     First-born son 0.177 2.878** 2.514** 123.7** -0.019 0.197+  
 
(0.135) (1.040) (0.870) (43.360) (0.039) (0.102) 
Mean of dep. var 0.867 40.427 41.105 1899.0 1.241 7.480 
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.277 0.145 0.172 0.090 0.515 0.406 
Sample of mothers 
     First-born son -0.026 3.312** 1.755+ 133.4** 0.055 0.383** 
 
(0.113) (1.088) (0.950) (50.860) (0.035) (0.134) 
Mean of dep. var 0.751 33.886 34.644 1594.7 0.898 6.089 
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.292 0.220 0.242 0.127 0.667 0.425 
Notes: Each specification controls for age, years of schooling of the father and mother, geographic 
location, province fixed effects, year fixed effects, and community development score. Participation is 
estimated using a probit regression. Other specifications are estimated using OLS. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01. 
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Table 3.5. Effects of Child Gender on the Allocation of Parenting Time 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Any parenting                     
(participation) 
Parenting hours (conditional on 
participation) 
 
Father Mother Father Mother Total 
First-born son 0.124 0.600 -2.396 -4.213+ -5.231+ 
 
(0.096) (0.116) (2.301) (2.402) (3.071) 
Mean of dep. var 0.551  0.830  17.830  29.780  39.210  
Observations 816a 816a 386b 601b 632b 
R-squared 0.103 0.124 0.141 0.145 0.130 
Notes: Original estimates from probit regressions are reported in Columns (1) and (2). Estimated 
coefficients and standard deviations shown in Columns (3)-(5) are from OLS. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
a sample size is different from Table 3.4 due to the missing values of childcare related questions.  
b sample changes due to condition on participation. 
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Table 3.6. High Quality Parenting Time 
  (1) (2) 
 
Exercises Reading 
First-born son -0.803 -0.131*  
 
(0.750) (0.057) 
Mean of dep. var 2.062  0.216  
Observations 341a 329a 
R-squared 0.189 0.315 
Notes: Results are estimated using OLS regressions. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
a sample size is different from Table 3.4 due to the missing values of questions related to the time use 
of children.  
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Table 3.7. Parents’ Choice of Non-Parenting Care, Formal and Informal 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
 
Care by non-parents   Expenses 
 
Grandparents Facilities Non-household 
members 
  Any Amount 
First-born son 0.002 0.067 0.017 
 
-0.013 0.125 
 
(0.105) (0.110) (0.102) 
 
(0.120) (0.111) 
Mean of dep. var 0.441  0.310  0.458  
 
0.417  4.690  
Observations 776a 759a 770a 
 
599a 250b 
R-squared 0.216 0.169 0.153   0.180 0.420 
Notes: Results shown in Columns (1)-(4) are from separate probit regressions. Results shown in Column 
(5) are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
a sample size is different from Table 3.4 due to the missing values of childcare related questions.  
b sample changes due to condition on participation. 
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Table 3.8. Family Proximity and Child's Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Log distance 
 (km) 
Same household or 
neighbor Within 8 kms 
First-born son -1.910* 0.261* 0.363*  
 
(0.764) (0.117) (0.174) 
Mean of dep. Var. -4.400 0.682 0.916 
Observations 774a 774a 774a 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.268 0.283 
Notes: a sample size changes due to the missing report of geographic distances. Model (1) is estimated 
using tobit regression and (2) and (3) are estimated using dprobit regression. See the narrative for the 
details of control variables. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
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Table 3.9. Total Effects of Child Gender on Parental Labor Market Outcomes 
  Working hours Wage income 
 
Last week 
Yearly 
average Yearly total Hourly 
Yearly 
total 
Sample of fathers 
     First-born son 3.073* 2.784* 133.8* 0.012 0.280 
 
(1.544) (1.412) (66.780) (0.059) (0.242) 
Mean of dep. var 39.950 40.850 1883.3 1.256 7.489 
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.018 0.023 0.014 0.115 0.038 
Sample of mothers 
     First-born son 2.024 0.613 78.150 0.013 0.185 
 
(1.947) (1.861) (89.420) (0.061) (0.321) 
Mean of dep. var 34.210 34.910 1616.3 0.929 6.198 
Observations 855 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.035 0.036 0.022 0.139 0.063 
Notes: Each specification controls for age, years of schooling of the father and mother, geographic 
location, province fixed effects, year fixed effects, and community development score. Specifications 
are estimated using tobit regressions.  + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
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Appendix A. Explanation of Time-Use Variables  
 
Variable Age universe 
Housework During the last week (Mon-Sun), how many hours did the child/you 
a. Do domestic housework e.g. sweeping, washing dishes, dusting, 
washing clothes, etc. 3 to 14 
b. Cook/prepare food 15 and above 
c. Wash clothes and/or clean your house 15 and above 
d. Carry firewood 3 and above 
e. Carry water 3 and above 
  
 
Home care During the last week, (how many hours) did the child/you  
a. Take care of elderly or sick people, and/or children 3 and above 
b. Help a household member with studies or homework 5 and above 
 
 
 
Leisure During the last week, (how many hours) did the child/you  
a. Participate in a sport, cultural, or entertainment activities out of the 
household 3 and above 
b. Watch TV 3 and above 
c. Play inside or outside the house 3 to 14 
d. Read 5 and above 
e. Use internet 5 and above 
 
 
 
Agricultural work During the last week, (how many hours) did the child/you …  
a. Participate in any agricultural activities like weeding, cleaning, 
sowing, shucking, or taking care of animals. 3 and above 
 
 
 
Employment 
 
 
a. During the past 12 months, on average, how many hours did the 
child work from Monday to Friday? 4-14 
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Appendix A. (cont’d) 
Variable  Age universe 
b. During the past 12 months, on average, how many hours did the 
child work on weekends? 4-14 
c. What was the total number of hours that you worked in the main and 
secondary jobs in the past week? 15 and above 
d. Normally, how many hours do you work in the main and secondary 
jobs per week? 15 and above 
Formal education 
  a. How many hours a day does/did the child spend in school during the 
current academic year? 5-14 
b. How many days a week does/did the child spend in school during the 
current academic year? 5-14 
c. How many hours a week does/did the child spend studying and 
doing homework somewhere other than school during the current 
academic year (including labor days and weekends)? 5-14 
d. Last week, from Monday through Sunday, how many hours did you 
study in school or elsewhere? 15 and above 
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Appendix B. Household Ownership of Non-agricultural Business 
This appendix presents the analysis at the household level for Chapter 2. Household ownership 
of nonagricultural business is used to measure entrepreneurship. To be concrete, the migration 
variable becomes a dummy indicating whether or not the household owned any family enterprise 
at the time of the second wave survey, excluding agricultural businesses. The MxFLS does not 
inquire the size of non-household-member employees that a business hired at the time of the 
survey. It is therefore infeasible to determine the characteristics of the business. However, 
according to the question on the number of non-household-member employees when the 
business was established, the size of businesses in the sample averages very small: 95% of them 
hire no more than five employees. 
To estimate the effect of migration on business ownership, specify the model at the household 
level as 
(B.1) 𝑦ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋ℎ + 𝛾𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺ℎ + 𝑒ℎ 
where the dependent variable 𝑦ℎ  indicates whether or not household h owned any non-
agricultural enterprise in 2006. The migration variable 𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐼𝐺ℎ and the control variables 𝑋ℎ are 
defined in the same way as in the individual-level analysis except that the demographic 
characteristics of household head (sex, age, education, and cognitive ability) are also controlled 
for. 
The sample for this analysis is the same set of households with at least two adult members (aged 
between 15 and 59 years old) at the time of the MxFLS-1. Table B.1 displays the summary 
information of the dependent and independent variables for the sample. 14% out of 2,083 
households owned a family enterprise in 2006. This number is slightly lower than 17% in 2002. 
The distribution variables for household wealth show that the subsamples are roughly 
representative of the asset distribution of the entire sample. Sampled households on average have 
6 total members and 4 primary-age members, which are very close to the averages from the 
individual-level sample. About 46% of sampled households are from rural areas. As to the 
characteristics of household heads, their age averages at 45 and almost all are male (nearly 99%). 
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The average education attainment is low, with over 50% of household heads only completed 
elementary school, 19% completed secondary school, 8.4% completed high school, and 8.2% 
completed college. The Raven’s score of heads averages as high as that of other family members. 
Table B.2 reports the estimates at the household level using the LPM with and without 
controlling for the initial status of ownership in 2002, the FE model, the IV strategy and the LPM 
with the financial constraints variables. The instrumental variable used in column (4) is again 
municipal migration prevalence between 1995 and 1999. In none of the specifications, the 
estimates are statistically significant. There seems to be no evidence supporting that U.S. 
migration spurs the creation of small family owned non-agricultural businesses. As discussed in 
the main text, this does not contradict or undermine the main findings of this paper. 
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Table B.1. Summary Statistics of Household Level Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Family business owner in MxFLS-2 2,083 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Family business owner in MxFLS-1 2,083 0.169 0.374 0 1 
Any migration 2,083 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Household assets, 1st quintile 2,083 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Household assets, 2nd quintile 2,083 0.202 0.402 0 1 
Household assets, 3rd quintile 2,083 0.198 0.399 0 1 
Household assets, 4th quintile 2,083 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Number of household members 2,083 6.156 2.383 3 20 
Number of adult members 2,083 4.395 1.496 1 12 
Number of children younger than 6 2,083 0.460 0.740 0 4 
Border 2,083 0.223 0.416 0 1 
North 2,083 0.199 0.399 0 1 
South 2,083 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Center 2,083 0.369 0.483 0 1 
Capital 2,083 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Rural areas 2,083 0.461 0.499 0 1 
Head, age 2,083 44.58 7.369 23 65 
Head, female 2,083 0.013 0.113 0 1 
Head, elementary 2,083 0.544 0.498 0 1 
Head, secondary 2,083 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Head, high school 2,083 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Head, college 2,083 0.082 0.274 0 1 
Head, Raven’s score 2,083 1.030 0.554 0 3 
Death of household member 2,083 0.068 0.251 0 1 
Sickness of household member 2,083 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Unemployment of household member 2,083 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Natural disaster 2,083 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Agriculture 2,083 0.819 0.385 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Cattle/forestry/hunting 2,083 0.574 0.495 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Metallurgy 2,083 0.062 0.241 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Mining 2,083 0.050 0.219 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Manufacturing 2,083 0.361 0.481 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Assembly 2,083 0.237 0.425 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Power 2,083 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Construction 2,083 0.358 0.479 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Wholesale and retail 2,083 0.574 0.495 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Transportation/storage 2,083 0.199 0.399 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Financial services 2,083 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Social services 2,083 0.207 0.405 0 1 
Community leading enterprise: Other 2,083 0.256 0.436 0 1 
Community hourly wage of men (log) 2,083 -2.38 5.658 -6.91 6 
Community hourly wage of women (log) 2,083 -2.65 5.570 -6.91 6 
Notes: The sample includes 2,083 households with at least two members aged 15-59 at the time of 
the initial survey. 
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Table B.2. Migration Effect on Household Non-Agricultural Business Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
LPM LPM FE IV 
LPM 
with financial 
constraints 
Any migration 0.014 0.015 0.022 0.010 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.057) (0.018) 
Financial constraint     -0.009 
     (0.022) 
Migrant × constraint     -0.068 
     (0.046) 
Control for initial 
entrepreneurship  X X X X 
F-statistic in first stage    199.09   
Mean of dep. var. 0.142 0.142 0.156 0.142 0.142 
No. of observations 2,083 2,083 5,328 2,083 2,083 
R-squared 0.063 0.174 0.024 0.174 0.169 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for the status of household non-agricultural business 
ownership. * indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix C. The First Stage Analysis for the IV Model  
Table C.1 presents the first stage analysis for the IV model in Chapter 2. The endogenous 
variable of current migration is regressed on the lagged municipal migration prevalence (in the 
period of 1995-1999) and other control variables. The first row of this table indicates that a 6% 
(mean of the variable) increase in municipal migration rate between 1995-1999 tends to increase 
the probability that an individual living in this municipality has a current migrant family member 
in 2006 by 11%. In all specifications, the F-statistics reported in the bottom of Table C.1 are 
large, which relieves the weak instrument concern. 
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Table C.1. Effect of Lagged Municipal Migration Prevalence on Current Migration, 
First Stage Estimates 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Municipal migration rate in 1995-1999 1.894*** 1.971*** 
 
1.914*** 2.072*** 
 
(0.111) (0.148) 
 
(0.123) (0.172) 
Self-employed in 2002 -0.004 0.000 
 
  
 
(0.013) (0.016) 
 
  Male -0.031*** -0.041*** 
 
-0.026** -0.031** 
 
(0.010) (0.014) 
 
(0.011) (0.015) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Years of schooling -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.004** -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Raven’s score 0.0243** 0.0256* 
 
0.0224* 0.023 
 
(0.011) (0.015) 
 
(0.012) (0.017) 
Household assets, q1 -0.0286* -0.016 
 
-0.024 -0.003 
 
(0.017) (0.022) 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
Household assets, q2 -0.018 -0.014 
 
-0.019 -0.016 
 
(0.016) (0.021) 
 
(0.018) (0.024) 
Household assets, q3 0.024 0.017 
 
0.022 0.020 
 
(0.016) (0.021) 
 
(0.018) (0.024) 
Household assets, q4 0.002 0.002 
 
-0.002 0.009 
 
(0.015) (0.020) 
 
(0.017) (0.022) 
# household members 0.000 -0.006 
 
0.001 -0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
# adult members -0.003 0.004 
 
-0.005 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.006) (0.008) 
# young children -0.005 -0.008 
 
-0.011 -0.020 
 
(0.009) (0.012) 
 
(0.010) (0.013) 
Border 0.0778** 0.0876** 
 
0.0765** 0.0853* 
 
(0.033) (0.042) 
 
(0.036) (0.047) 
North 0.130*** 0.0892** 
 
0.120*** 0.052 
 
(0.033) (0.043) 
 
(0.037) (0.049) 
South 0.0950** 0.127*** 
 
0.105** 0.166*** 
 
(0.038) (0.048) 
 
(0.043) (0.058) 
Center 0.085*** 0.0687* 
 
0.0881** 0.064 
 
(0.032) (0.041) 
 
(0.035) (0.047) 
Capital 0.0811** 0.0843* 
 
0.0802* 0.077 
 
(0.038) (0.048) 
 
(0.042) (0.055) 
Rural areas -0.018 -0.028 
 
-0.020 -0.032 
 
(0.015) (0.019) 
 
(0.016) (0.021) 
Death -0.016 -0.004 
 
-0.014 0.008 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
 
(0.021) (0.028) 
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Table C.1. (cont.) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Illness 0.0302* 0.008  0.028 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.023) 
Unemployment -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.007 -0.003 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
 
(0.021) (0.027) 
Natural disaster 0.0529** 0.036 
 
0.0500* 0.038 
 
(0.026) (0.033) 
 
(0.030) (0.039) 
Agriculture -0.007 -0.011 
 
0.002 0.006 
 
(0.017) (0.022) 
 
(0.018) (0.024) 
Cattle/forestry/hunting 0.0309** 0.030 
 
0.0294** 0.025 
 
(0.014) (0.018) 
 
(0.015) (0.021) 
Metallurgy 0.0648** 0.057 
 
0.0562* 0.029 
 
(0.030) (0.039) 
 
(0.033) (0.043) 
Mining -0.069** -0.056 
 
-0.08*** -0.082** 
 
(0.027) (0.035) 
 
(0.030) (0.040) 
Manufacturing -0.0316** -0.032 
 
-0.024 -0.014 
 
(0.015) (0.020) 
 
(0.016) (0.022) 
Assembly 0.019 0.008 
 
0.009 -0.018 
 
(0.017) (0.023) 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
Power 0.000 0.014 
 
-0.006 0.006 
 
(0.026) (0.033) 
 
(0.028) (0.036) 
Construction 0.001 0.007 
 
0.007 0.013 
 
(0.015) (0.019) 
 
(0.016) (0.022) 
Wholesale and retail 0.008 -0.004 
 
0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.013) (0.017) 
 
(0.014) (0.019) 
Transportation/storage -0.013 0.016 
 
-0.023 0.012 
 
(0.020) (0.027) 
 
(0.022) (0.030) 
Financial services 0.032 0.022 
 
0.0541** 0.0572* 
 
(0.022) (0.028) 
 
(0.024) (0.032) 
Social services -0.025 -0.030 
 
-0.035 -0.0567* 
 
(0.020) (0.025) 
 
(0.022) (0.029) 
Other industry 0.059*** 0.053*** 
 
0.061*** 0.044** 
 
(0.015) (0.019) 
 
(0.017) (0.022) 
Male hourly wage 0.002 0.003 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Female hourly wage -0.001 -0.003 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Municipal average employment rate in 2000 0.108 0.223* 
 
0.145 0.405** 
 
(0.102) (0.135) 
 
(0.116) (0.164) 
Municipal average literacy rate in 2000 -0.116 0.028 
 
-0.161 -0.092 
 
(0.210) (0.272) 
 
(0.244) (0.332) 
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Table C.1. (cont.) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Initial entrepreneurs 
not excluded  
Initial entrepreneurs 
excluded 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
 
 
All 
adults 
Active 
workers 
Municipal average highest degree in 2000: 
primary 0.324* 0.142  0.374* 0.241 
 (0.172) (0.219)  (0.203) (0.269) 
Municipal average highest degree in 2000: 
secondary -0.478* -0.398 
 
-0.363 -0.181 
 
(0.261) (0.343) 
 
(0.286) (0.390) 
Municipal average highest degree in 2000: 
university -0.216 -0.485 
 
-0.346 -0.730 
 
(0.325) (0.425) 
 
(0.356) (0.473) 
Constant -0.216 -0.295 
 
-0.247 -0.380* 
 
(0.142) (0.185) 
 
(0.159) (0.216) 
F-statistics 293.38 178.34 
 
243.66 144.81 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
No. of observations 5,884 3,387 
 
4,787 2,526 
R-squared 0.158 0.147 
 
0.158 0.147 
Notes: The endogenous variable of having a migrant family member is regressed on the measure of 
municipal migration prevalence (defined using Mexico Census 2000) and other control variables. * 
indicates p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
 
